The construction and assessment of social risk:\ua0perspectives from Australian coal mining project teams by Worden, Sandra
The Construction and Assessment of Social Risk:
Perspectives from Australian Coal Mining Project Teams
Sandra Jane Worden
Master of Business (Communication Management)
Bachelor of Arts
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at
The University of Queensland in 2019
Sustainable Minerals Institute
iAbstract
The term ‘social risk’ is gaining traction in coal industry discourse. It is used in policy documents
and standards, and is incorporated into project risk assessment workshops. Coal mining can
dramatically change the environmental and social landscape. There is a substantial literature about
the adverse social risks and impacts of large-scale mining projects, with some scholars describing
the activity as one of the most socially disruptive interventions possible. In Australia, there is a
growing body of work on the social impacts of coal mining; however, little research has examined
how mining proponents make risk decisions when evaluating the potential impacts of these projects.
This thesis examines how social risk is constructed and assessed by team members of Australian
coal mining projects. A risk governance framework, based on the principles of multidisciplinarity,
inclusiveness and multidimensionality, provides the basis of analysis.
Two data generation methods are employed: an exploratory review and case research. The
exploratory review provides a broad overview of the construction and assessment of social risk
across the Australian coal industry, while the case research enables a deeper evaluation of a specific
project and for research participants’ experiences of the same project to be compared.
The research finds that there is no consensus on the meaning of social risk among research
participants; however, constructions of social risk can be categorised according to who or what is at
risk; that is, risk to people, risk to project, or risk to both people and project. ‘Dual orientation of
social risk’ is coined to describe risk to people and project. When the priority social risks of external
actors conflict with the proponent’s business imperatives, risk to project prevails. The research also
finds that professional background is not a reliable indicator of how project team members orient
their constructions of social risk; conceptualisations of social risk tend to be place-based rather than
distributed; and that discussions of social risk focus on physical rather than non-physical risks.
The way team members of Australian coal mining projects assess social risk can be mapped against
two models – the mechanistic and integrated models. In the mechanistic model, social risk and
social impact assessments are undertaken independently of each other by different groups of
assessors. Because the data are not integrated, it is difficult for team members to obtain a
comprehensive understanding of the social risks generated by the project and to make risk
decisions. This lack of integration can affect the accuracy of the project’s risk profile. An example
of integrated social risk assessment practice is evaluated in the case research. The case illustrates
that coal mining proponents in Australia can deliver projects that a give a high priority to avoiding
or mitigating risks to potentially affected people. The ability of proponents to do so, however,
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requires a shift in thinking from short-term, narrow self-interest to longer-term, enlightened self-
interest, and a willingness to accept responsibility for the social risks generated by their projects.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
That is certainly one way to look at the matter. There are others.
– Patricia C Wrede in Thirteenth Child, 2009.
These succinct sentences capture the essence of this thesis: To assess social risk in the Australian
coal mining project environment, one must look beyond the dominant risk paradigm and consider
other constructions of risk. There is no one ‘truth’. Different people see issues differently and frame
and prioritise risks accordingly. How people think about risk and what motivates them to take
action is influenced by many factors, such as their cultural background, their life experiences,
familiarity with the situation and whether their involvement in that situation has been voluntary or
involuntary. Different risk perspectives are neither right nor wrong, just different.
The term ‘social risk’ has only recently emerged in coal industry discourse. It is now being used in
policy documents and standards and is being incorporated into project risk assessment workshops;
however, agreement has yet to be reached on what social risk is. Who or what is at risk in the
context of coal mining? The meanings attributed to social risk can be broadly categorised as risk to
people, risk to project, or risk to both people and project. I coin the term ‘dual orientation of social
risk’ to describe risk to both people and project. Project team members engage this construct of
social risk because it enables them to use the language of social performance while retaining the
flexibility to orient their position one way or the other. The extent to which team members engage
with each of the elements is uncertain. However, when the concerns of external actors conflict with
the proponent’s business imperatives, risk to project dominates. The meaning attributed to social
risk in this thesis is aligned with the first orientation. I define social risk as uncertainty and
ambiguity about the physical or non-physical consequences of a future event or activity, such as
coal mining, on individuals or civic entities. Social risk can also be produced by events or activities
not occurring, such as proponents not conducting a cultural heritage survey prior to mining. This
thesis also engages with the concept of ‘social risk assessment competence’ by which I mean the
ability of project team members to assess risk to a standard that avoids or mitigates risk to people.
While it is common in the risk literature for definitions of risk to include both opportunities (upside)
and threats (downside), and this is the approach I have used to define social risk, the primary
orientation of risk used in this thesis is downside risk. There are two reasons for this focus. First,
general discourse is often limited to downside risk (Lupton and Tulloch, 2002; Zinn and Taylor-
Gooby, 2006; Evans et al., 2007; Lupton, 2013). This is the case in the Australian mining industry
(Evans et al., 2007) and, in their interviews, the research participants predominantly refer to risk as
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a threat. Second, avoiding harm to people (and the environment) is a key requirement for mining
projects, in addition to maximising value.
Understanding how project team members construct and assess social risk is important from both
ethical and business perspectives. Coal projects that pose a significant risk of harm to people should
not be granted development consent. It is unethical for one group of people to be exposed to risks
involuntarily – to bear the costs of project development – when another group reaps the rewards in
terms of profits. Mining proponents hold considerable power and control over the way they develop
their projects. Understanding how they make risk decisions could lead to improvements in SRA
practice and provide an opportunity to avoid or limit project-generated social risks.
Some mining proponents have acknowledged a business case for addressing social risk – the
prospect of obtaining development consent without lengthy delays and continuing to develop new
mines into the future. In addition, when mining proponents do not consider and govern the social
risks generated by their projects, they can put development consent at risk via widespread
opposition to their projects, and they can put their reputation at risk when their poor social
performance is publicised through media and other forums. In these circumstances, social risk can
rebound as a business risk.
Research context
The extraction of coal generates political, financial, geotechnical, environmental, and health and
safety risks. It also produces social risks, both threats and opportunities. The threats include changes
in air quality, water pollution, excessive noise, loss of cultural heritage artefacts and sites,
subsidence, stress, and people’s sense of social amenity. Not all mining risks, however, are threats.
Opportunities exist for potentially affected people to benefit through training, employment and
proponents’ investment in community initiatives. By piggy-backing onto projects undertaken for
business reasons, mining proponents can also deliver benefits to external actors. For example, in
gassy mines, methane can be collected and converted into electricity. Excess power can be used for
specific community projects or fed into the grid, thereby reducing the potency of greenhouse gas
emissions (by converting methane to carbon dioxide) and reducing the need for alternative sources
of electricity. Projects designed to deliver potable water to mines can be boosted to accommodate
community needs.
The context for the research undertaken in this thesis is the Australian coal mining project
environment; that is, the workplace setting in which project team members construct and assess
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social risk, among other activities. From the mining proponent’s perspective, project evaluation is
undertaken to deliver the environmental impact statement (EIS), which incorporates a social impact
assessment (SIA), to the regulating authority as a precondition to obtaining development consent,
and to determine whether the project’s risk profile warrants the investment needed to develop a
mining operation. I consider project evaluation to be one of three components of mining project risk
governance in Australia. These components are regulatory requirements at the state level;
regulatory requirements at the federal level; and project evaluation work undertaken by the
proponent to meet corporate and regulatory requirements.
Many coal mining proponents do not consider project evaluation to be part of a broader risk
governance framework. Their focus is self-interest; that is, on maximising project value and
obtaining development consent. Others have linked an ability to obtain development consent with
the governance of social risk. This approach can be described as enlightened self-interest, a term
used to describe the alignment of one’s own interests with those of others (Frimer et al., 2011); to
“do well by doing good”, a phrase commonly attributed to American founding father, Benjamin
Franklin.
One of the challenges in assessing social risk in the coal mining project environment is the
dominance of a techno-scientific risk paradigm. ‘Techno-scientific’ is a term used by social
scientists to describe engineers, scientists and other technically-trained professionals, and the
approaches they use to assess risk. Other adjectives used by social scientists include technico-
scientific (Lupton, 2013), technical (Renn, 1998; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006b; Lidskog and
Sundqvist, 2012), technologic (Wynne, 1992; Renn and Walker, 2008) and technocratic (Lockie,
2001; Dusek, 2012). Traditionally in the mining industry, the social sciences are not considered to
be technical or scientific in nature by the engineering and scientific disciplines. I am not
substantiating that claim. I am using the terms techno-scientific (engineering, environmental science
and geology) and social scientific (sociology, psychology and anthropology) to simply demarcate
the disciplines.
Techno-scientific approaches to risk are expressed through the mathematical functions of
probability and harm, where harm is associated with human health, the environment and physical
assets (Renn et al., 2011). Techno-scientific experts prefer using quantitative risk data – the “most
valid” type of data – such as that generated from empirical surveys, scientific measurements and
statistical calculations (Short, 1984; Dusek, 2012; Lidskog and Sundqvisit, 2012, p. 1006). “Most
valid” implies that other data generation methods and knowledge are less valid or not valid at all.
Lay people’s knowledge and risk perspectives, for example, are generally considered to be ill-
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informed in contrast to those held by techno-scientific experts (van Voorst, 2014). Potentially
affected people, however, may have risk knowledge that project teams are not privy to, and they can
explain the significance of risks that may have been dismissed as immaterial by assessors.
Furthermore, not considering diverse perspectives, experiences and concerns may render social risk
assessments inadequate or incomplete. As a result, some threats or opportunities may be
underestimated or overlooked altogether, with the risk to different external actors neither captured
nor addressed.
While this thesis is concerned with social risk within an Australian coal mining context, the
findings from the research have the potential for application in mining projects across different
commodities around the world. The global mining industry has long grappled with how to
proactively manage the social risks generated by its projects and operations. The statement that it
was “failing in its obligations” to society in Breaking New Ground, the final report of the Mining
Minerals and Sustainable Development research project (IIED, 2002, p. xiv), was a clear signal that
improvement was needed. To drive improvement, companies and industry associations developed
social performance policies, standards, toolkits and best practice guides. When the social risks
generated by projects are not proactively managed by proponents, they can rebound as business
risks through opposition to project development and, thereby, to development consent. This is a
common challenge facing mining proponents globally.
Motivation for the research
This research was motivated by my experience as a communication management specialist in the
mineral resources sector, primarily in the coal industry, and my observations of the land-use conflict
between mining proponents and mining-affected people during the boom of the 2000s.1 In Australia
there was a strong focus on developing new coal projects and expanding existing operations to feed
the global demand for coal. Key coal mining regions, such as the Bowen Basin and the Hunter
Valley, were a flurry of activity. Accommodation was in short supply, the domestic airlines had
scheduled more flights to keep pace with demand, and social services and infrastructure were at
capacity. Mining towns were a sea of ‘high-vis’ work wear and white four-wheel drive vehicles.
There was such a focus on project development and optimising market conditions at this time that
the concerns of mining-affected people were neither heard nor addressed.
1 According to Downes et al. (2014), this mining boom occurred between 2002 and 2012.
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As the boom was subsiding, I was intrigued by a scenario unfolding in the Hunter Valley region of
New South Wales. I have dubbed this scenario the tale of two projects. Two brownfields coal
projects in proximity to each other were being developed around the same time by different
proponents. The projects had the same external actors interested in their development. Both project
teams had access to social performance specialists either from the corporate group or via a specialist
consultancy that was regularly engaged by the company. Both projects had corporate community
relations/social performance standards in place. One project attracted intense, vocal and organised
opposition. This opposition stemmed from concerns about the risks, primarily social and
environmental risks, generated by the project. Proponents planned to develop a mining pit less than
one kilometre from a small residential centre. The stronger the opposition to the project became, the
more tightly the proponent held to its position, framing its right to develop the project on economic
and legalistic grounds. In addition, when communicating with external actors, the proponent
demonstrated an inflexible approach to developing the mine plan. The other project had a similar
footprint, production rate and mining method, so its social and environmental risks were
comparable. The second project, while not wholeheartedly embraced by local communities,
indigenous groups and other external actors, was begrudgingly accepted. This tale raises questions
about the way mining proponents engage with potentially affected people to make sense of their
concerns and how those concerns should be addressed. The tale also raises questions about whose
risk perspectives should be used in making decisions about the development of coal mining
projects, and how mining proponents construct and assess social risk. Why did one project generate
outrage while the other project did not?
Research design
My reflections on land-use conflict during the mining boom led me to develop the overarching
research question of my thesis: How is social risk constructed and assessed by team members of
Australian coal mining projects? The primary research question is supported by three secondary
questions. These are:
1. What conceptualisations of social risk are predominantly used by team members of Australian
coal mining projects?
2. What paradigmatic assumptions underpin their construction and assessment of social risk?
3. How do these assumptions influence how project team members construct and assess social
risk?
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Based on the types of questions this thesis seeks to answer, a qualitative approach was used to guide
the collection of primary data. Two different data generation methods were selected: an exploratory
review and case research. The exploratory review comprises a series of face-to-face, semi-
structured, in-depth interviews with 31 industry participants who work in diverse roles, including as
engineers, environmental scientists, risk specialists, project managers, community relations
practitioners, and communication management specialists. They are employed by different types of
organisations, including small, mid-sized and major mining companies; engineering, procurement
and contract management (EPCM) companies; and specialist consultancies.
The case research is designed around a single case – the Koala Extension Project – an open-cut coal
mining project that had obtained development consent. Face-to-face, semi-structured, in-depth
interviews were conducted with 11 members of the project team (including environmental and
social consultants). Koala represents the revelatory case, which Yin (2003) describes as a case in
which the researcher is given access to observe and analyse a phenomenon not previously
accessible to other researchers. I was given access to team members of a contemporary coal mining
project and the associated documentation in order to examine how social risk is constructed and
assessed. Mining proponents do not often provide this type of access to external researchers.
Using the two data generation methods was important because it enabled different but
complementary levels of data to be generated. The exploratory review sought to provide a broad
overview of the construction and assessment of social risk across the Australian coal industry while
the case research aimed to undertake a deeper evaluation of a specific project and for research
participants’ experiences and perspectives of the same project to be triangulated. In addition, the
method was designed to test and compare the findings from the case research against those from the
exploratory review.
Thesis structure
This thesis comprises 10 chapters: an introduction, a literature review, a conceptual framework, the
research method, four findings chapters that are based on the exploratory review and the case
research, a discussion of the research findings in the context of the established literature, and the
implications of the research and the thesis conclusion. Figure 1.A (on page 7) provides a graphical
representation of the thesis structure. An overview of the thesis has been provided in this chapter,
including the research context, the motivation for the research, the research design and thesis
structure.
Sandy Worden Chapter 1 7 | P a g e
The literature review provides context for examining the research questions by exploring three
broad themes: the meaning attributed to risk, social risk and social impact (key terms used in the
assessment of social risk), the assessment of risks and impacts, and the concept and application of
risk governance. Although the concept ‘social risk’ intersects many different literatures, this review
concentrates on the SIA, project development and risk governance literature.
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Figure 1.A: Thesis structure
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Literature from sustainable development and social licence to operate is included, but it is not the
central focus.
A conceptual framework founded on risk governance (Renn, 2008; Aven and Renn, 2010; van
Asselt and Renn, 2011) is presented in Chapter 3. The framework is underpinned by three
interrelated principles – multidisciplinarity, inclusiveness and multidimensionality – which are
based on the premise that different actors construct risk differently. Diverse risk perspectives,
therefore, need to be canvassed to understand those differences and to make risk decisions. The
chapter develops the three risk governance principles and describes how the conceptual framework
is used in the thesis.
Chapter 4 presents and justifies the research method. The research design comprises an exploratory
review that uses semi-structured in-depth interviews with industry participants, and case research
that is based on the Koala Extension Project. In the case research, data is generated using semi-
structured, in-depth interviews with project team members and analysis of material, including the
SIA, organisational policies, standards, guidelines and communication collateral. In addition, the
chapter examines the trustworthiness of the research, the limitations of the research method, and it
concludes with a discussion of ethical considerations. The research was developed from a
constructivist perspective.
Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters that form the basis of the exploratory review. Taking into
account Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) contention that phenomena can only be understood within the
context in which they are situated, this chapter provides the context in which the construction and
assessment of social risk is undertaken by team members of Australian coal mining projects. By
‘context’ I mean the project evaluation environment which encompasses the evaluation activities
undertaken over the project lifecycle, the perspectives of the people responsible for the evaluation
process (project team members and the project governance committee), the priorities proponents
allocate to project evaluation objectives, and the challenges the project team faces during the
evaluation process. In other words, the context is the workplace setting in which project team
members construct and assess social risk.
How social risk is constructed and assessed by team members of Australian coal mining projects is
examined in Chapter 6. The chapter begins with an exploration of the research participants’
understanding and use of social risk and how these concepts are applied in the assessment of risk. It
then examines the types of social risks identified by participants and differentiates between physical
and non-physical risks. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of participants’ experiences with
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social risk assessment and SIA, and highlights the factors that enable social risk to be assessed
during the project evaluation process. The importance of this chapter lies in its identification of the
main strengths and weaknesses of existing social risk assessment practices.
The processes used by the proponent Marsupial Coal to evaluate the Koala Extension Project are
described in Chapter 7 and the context provided for the discussion in Chapter 8. The chapter starts
with an overview of the project and then describes the Koala Extension Project team, team
dynamics, and relationships between the different actors. Next is an examination of Marsupial
Coal’s culture, consideration of the influence the culture had on the Koala Extension Project, and an
overview of the project strategy. The chapter concludes with an examination of the risk governance
mechanisms used in the project: the project governance committee; the corporate systems, policies,
standards and guidelines; project stage gates; and risk assessment. The key finding from this chapter
is that prioritising social engagement and taking an inclusive approach to the assessment and
mitigation of social risk can enhance the understanding and management of these risks. It can also
help proponents to maintain the constructive relationships they need with key actors in order to
continue to develop mining operations in highly contested environments.
Chapter 8, the second of two chapters that form the basis of the Koala Extension Project case study,
examines how social risk was constructed and assessed by the project team. The chapter starts with
an examination of the research participants’ conceptualisations of social risk. It explores the social
engagement processes used by the Koala Extension Project team, including how the team
differentiated its ongoing engagement with a range of social entities from its community
engagement work undertaken during the SIA. The importance that the established relationships and
existing engagement mechanisms had on project success are then discussed. A key feature of this
chapter is the examination of Koala’s SIA process, including community engagement, risk
mitigation workshops, social risk assessment, and a community visioning study. The chapter
concludes with a comparison between the mechanistic model of social risk assessment and the
integrated model.
The research findings are drawn together in Chapter 9 under three broad themes – conceptual
considerations, organisational considerations, and considerations of social risk assessment (SRA)
practice and competence – and reflections made on the findings in the context of the established
literature. Chapter 9 begins with an examination of the different meanings attributed to social risk
and the significance of those meanings to the assessment of social risk. It also differentiates the
concepts of ‘social risk’ and ‘social impact’. The chapter then explores the conflicting objectives of
project evaluation and considers how project evaluations are resourced and the extent to which
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social practitioners are integrated into project teams. Finally, it presents the case for SRA
competence and engages with the concept of enlightened self-interest.
The research questions are addressed in Chapter 10, along with the implications and limitations of
the research, and the thesis conclusion. The thesis concludes that there is no consensus on the
meaning of social risk among research participants, however constructions of social risk can be
categorised according to who or what is at risk. Furthermore, it is possible for coal mining
proponents in Australia to deliver projects that give a high priority to avoiding or mitigating risks to
potentially affected people if they take a longer-term approach, operate under conditions of
enlightened self-interest and accept responsibility for the social risks generated by their projects.
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CHAPTER 2: APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL RISK,
SOCIAL IMPACT AND RISK GOVERNANCE
With an outward mindset, I am alive to and interested in others’ needs, objectives
and challenges; I see others as people. With an inward mindset, on the other hand,
I become self-focused and see others not as people with their own needs,
objectives, and challenges but as objects to help me with mine. Those that can help
me, I see as vehicles. Those that make things more difficult for me, I see as
obstacles. Those whose help wouldn’t matter become irrelevant to me.
– The Arbinger Institute (2016),
The Outward Mindset: Seeing Beyond Ourselves, pp. 29–30.
Introduction
There is a substantial literature about the adverse social risks and impacts of large-scale mining
projects. The reach of mining extends to issues relating to indigenous peoples (Whiteman, 2009),
their cultural heritage (O’Faircheallaigh, 2008) and their employment (Barker, 2008); human rights
(Kemp and Vanclay, 2013); gender and development (Gier and Mercier, 2006; Lahiri-Dutt and
Macintyre, 2006); livelihoods and resettlement (Adam et al., 2015; Downing, 2002); equitable
distribution of benefits (Bebbington et al., 2009; Langton and Mazel, 2008); community
development (Banks et al., 2013; Kapelus, 2002); and social disruption (Peck and Sinding, 2003).
Civil society groups have called attention to mining’s myriad social risks and impacts. One need
only peruse websites such as Mines and Communities, published by a network of non-government
organisations (NGOs) that represent mining-affected people, to get a sense of the sheer number of
cases and issues involved in this debate. It is clear from this body of work that many researchers
and commentators consider mining to pose a threat to people. Peck and Sinding (2003, p. 131)
describe mining as one of the most “socially disruptive activities undertaken by humankind”. In
some cases, the consideration of riskiness reflects an ideological a priori opposition to large-scale
mineral resources extraction. For others, mining is considered to be a threat on the basis of evidence
that highlights mining’s harm-inducing effects.
Not all mining risks are threats. Opportunities exist for mining-affected people to benefit through
training, employment, investment in community initiatives, development of new infrastructure and
services, strengthening of community groups, and so on. For Parsons et al., (2018) opportunities
include improvements in health and wellbeing that come from meaningful employment in the
coordinated project. Nevertheless, the most prevalent use of the term ‘risk’ across the mining
industry is as a threat (Evans et al., 2007).
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The aim of this literature review is to provide context for examining the research question: How is
social risk constructed and assessed by team members of Australian coal mining projects? The
context is provided by exploring three broad themes: the meaning attributed to key terms used in
reference to social aspects in mining industry discourse, the assessment of risks and impacts, and
the concept and application of risk governance. Although the concept ‘social risk’ intersects many
different literatures, this review concentrates on the SIA, project development and risk governance
literatures. The SIA literature provides a rich source of material that addresses the assessment of
social risk. The project development literature is central to the thesis because the assessment of
social risk is undertaken as part of the project evaluation process, a key component in the risk
governance of mining projects in Australia. Insights into the development of scholarly thinking
about project risk governance and the evolution of the practice can be obtained from this literature.
The findings from the established academic literature will then be used in the discussion presented
in Chapter 9 as the basis for comparing empirical data generated for the thesis.
The chapter has five sections. Section 2.2 examines the meaning of terminology commonly used in
reference to social aspects in mining industry discourse, namely ‘risk’, ‘social risk’ and ‘social
impact’. How social risk is constructed within two contrasting literatures (development and welfare,
and mining and business) is examined to present an alternative perspective to the self-referential
view common in mining literature. The construction of social risk by NGOs and mining companies,
and its use in international policies and standards is also explored. Two concepts not commonly
engaged with in mining industry discourse are presented – ‘social acceptability risk’ and the
‘rebound dynamic’ – as a means of navigating the different constructions of social risk in the
literature.
Section 2.3 examines SIA. The section defines social impact, traces the development of SIA,
explores the components of SIA, and examines the relationship between social risk and social
impact. Section 2.4 explores the concept of risk governance and draws heavily from the work of
Ortwin Renn and his colleagues. Renn is the author of what has been labelled the first scholarly
work to develop risk governance from a loose term to a defined concept. Section 2.5 traces the
emergence of social risk in the project and sustainability literature while Section 2.6 analyses
literature on the social impacts of mining in Australia. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
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An introduction to risk and social risk
2.2.1 Presentation of three risk definitions
Many scholars (e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Fischhoff et al., 1984; Power, 2007) note the
diverse meaning and usage of the term ‘risk’. Risk definitions often reflect paradigmatic,
disciplinary or other preferences held by the actors who develop them. Aven and Renn (2009)
explain that in the risk literature, ‘risk’ is used as an unexpected value, a probability distribution,
uncertainty and an event. These authors divide the types of risk definitions into two categories:
those in which risk is expressed as probabilities and expected values, and those in which risk is
expressed through events/consequences and uncertainty (Aven and Renn, 2009).
In this subsection, three risk definitions, selected because they connect to the thesis content, are
presented. The definitions come from AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and
Guidelines, which is commonly referred to by risk assessors across the mining industry; from
project risk specialist David Hillson, as the thesis is about coal mining projects and social risk; and
from risk governance scholars Terje Aven and Ortwin Renn, as the conceptual framework used in
the thesis is based on risk governance. These definitions meet Aven and Renn’s second
categorisation of risk definitions: those in which risk is expressed through events/consequences and
uncertainty.
Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines was produced by a joint Standards Australia and
Standards New Zealand committee. The guidelines conceptualise a framework to encourage the
integration of risk management into the existing governance, strategy and planning, and
management processes of organisations. Risk is defined as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives”
(ISO, 2009, p. 1), but this definition has attracted criticism. Aven (2011), for example, describes it
as ambiguous, and Hillson (2011) is critical of the way the definition is framed:
A risk can be an uncertain event or an uncertain set of circumstances or an
uncertain assumption, but the key point according to these standards is that the
risk is uncertain. Of course because a risk is uncertain then it may never
happen, but if it does happen then it will have an effect on objectives. But the
risk is not the effect. The risk is the uncertainty that would result in an effect
[emphasis in the original]. (Hillson, 2011, p. 1)
In other words, the effect is the outcome or consequence rather than the risk.
The second definition is: “Risks are uncertainties, which, if they occur, would affect achievement of
the objectives either negatively (threats) or positively (opportunities)” (Hillson, 2010, p. 65). This
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definition explicitly refers to two dimensions of risk: opportunities, also called upside risks, and
threats, also called downside risks. Hillson explains that because risk is a possible future event, it
clearly includes threats “which might occur and which would cause problems if they did” (Hillson,
2010, p. 67). He asserts that risk includes opportunities because opportunities are also possible
future events and, therefore, are uncertain (risks are uncertainties). In contrast to threats,
opportunities would be beneficial if they occurred. Hillson (2010) suggests that there are advantages
to be derived from integrating opportunities and threats into risk processes, such as workshops,
assumptions testing, SWOT analysis or root-cause analysis, rather than only considering threats.
Integration, he says, leads to synergies and efficiencies by providing “a structured framework to
find and implement ways of working ‘faster, smarter, cheaper.’ This supports innovation and
creativity, and is highly motivating for teams who want to maximise the value they deliver”
(Hillson, 2010, p. 68). Not all uncertainties are relevant, Hillson states, and irrelevant uncertainties
– those that do not affect the achievement of objectives – should be excluded from the risk
assessment process.
The third definition is “uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes)
of an activity with respect to something that humans value” (Aven and Renn, 2009, p. 6). The
things that humans value, the authors suggest, could include human life, the environment, or
money. Aven and Renn consider risk to have three dimensions: consequences, judgements of
uncertainties, and knowledge basis. They contend that, in most cases, not including all three
dimensions will result in poor assessments of risk (Aven and Renn, 2018). There are similarities
between Aven and Renn’s risk definition and Hillson’s definition. “Something humans value”
(Aven and Renn, 2009, p. 6) has a connection to “achievement of objectives” (Hillson, 2010, p. 65),
as most objectives relate to something humans value, for example, maintaining health and
wellbeing, protecting the environment, optimising profit, or retaining a connection to land. Aven
and Renn’s use of the term ‘severity’ seems to imply a focus on unwanted events and outcomes
rather than opportunities, as one does not talk about the severity of an opportunity. This is not their
intention, however, as they later define severity as “intensity, size, extension, scope and other
potential measures of magnitude” (Aven and Renn, 2009, p. 7), terms which are equally relevant for
opportunities and threats. The authors more explicitly express their acceptance of upside risk when
they state that “accommodating undesirable […] and desirable outcomes is a requirement for any
definition of risk” and “an outcome could be positive for some stakeholders and negative for
others” (Aven and Renn, 2009, pp. 3–4). To better encompass upside risk in their definition, the
word ‘magnitude’ could replace ‘severity’.
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Linked to the different meanings attributed to risk is an epistemological debate about whether risk is
a physical phenomenon or a cognitive construct. Burgess (2015, p. 57) explains that risk is about
the potential for an event to occur in the future: “It has not yet happened and is therefore an idea
rather than a fixed reality, ‘constructed’ in the psychology of individuals and through interaction
with social influences.” Luhmann (1993), the OECD (2003), the International Risk Governance
Council (IRGC) (2005, p 23), and Aven and Renn (2009, 2010) describe risks as “mental
constructs”. The IRGC explains this position, saying that:
[Risks] are not real phenomena but originate in the human mind […] Humans
have the ability to design different futures, ie construct scenarios that serve as
tools for the human mind to anticipate consequences in advance and change,
within constraints of nature and culture, the course of actions accordingly.
(IRGC, 2005, p 23)
This position is criticised by Rosa (2008) in his assessment of the IRGC’s risk governance
framework. He asks that if risk originates in the human mind and is not a real phenomenon, how
can it interact with the ‘real world’? According to Rosa, risk exists independently of people’s
perceptions (Rosa, 2008). He describes risk as “something more than a mental construct; it is a state
of the world with identifiable features and parameters” (Rosa, 2008, p. 106). Renn and Walker
(2008, p. 332) attribute Rosa’s criticism to the ongoing debate about the nature of knowledge,
specifically between constructivism and realism:
However as important as the debate is, we wish to clarify that it is not the
intention of IRGC’s risk governance framework to take a decisive stand on the
controversial issue of constructivism versus realism of evidence and values,
although it continues to be an active topic of discussion [….] Ultimately,
whether the evidence collected represents human ideas about reality or depicts
representations of reality is of no importance for the distinction between
evidence and values that is suggested throughout the risk governance
framework.
Renn et al. (2011) state that the way people think about risk is influenced by their knowledge and
experience of ‘real’ past events and consequences even though the risk scenarios reside in their
minds. Aven and Renn (2009) concur, saying that constructions of risk can be based on
observations and causal knowledge. Renn and Walker (2008) argue that risk as a mental construct
does not preclude risk assessors from logical reasoning using empirical data as well as their own
experience. They further argue that:
Whether based on scientific predictions or public perceptions, estimates for the
magnitude of risks, however, should reflect sound knowledge and technical
expertise as much as possible, since the implications of taking action – for
health, the environment, or the economy – may be very real. (Renn and
Walker, 2008, p. 333)
Sandy Worden Chapter 2 18 | P a g e
In other words, risk is a mental construct, but the consequences of an activity with respect to
something humans value “may be very real”.
2.2.2 Examining the three constructions of social risk
In this subsection, the grey and scholarly literatures are used to examine how social risk is
constructed. The examination draws on the development and welfare literature, the business and
mining literature, reports from NGOs, international policies and standards, and published
documents from major mining companies. It finds that social risk definitions can be categorised in
three ways, depending on who or what is at risk. For example, whether the risk in question is a risk
to people, the business or to both people and the business.2 The subsection defines the term ‘social
acceptability risk’ (Miller and Lessard, 2001) and concludes with an exploration of ‘societal risk’
and ‘institutional risk’ (Rothstein et al., 2006).
Within the development and welfare literature, the orientation of social risk is directed from
external forces towards individuals and civic entities. The focus is predominantly on economic
vulnerability (Mckinnon, 2004), socio-economic disadvantage (Asenova et al., 2015) and adverse
social change (Oxfam, 2016). Pelletier et al. (2013, p. 9) also take a negative reading of social risk
in their report on the social sustainability of the EU’s trade and development policy, defining social
risk as “the potential for one or more parties to be exposed to negative social conditions that, in
turn, undermine social sustainability”.3
A limited number of business and mining scholars also use this orientation of social risk. For
instance, Brereton and Parmenter (2006, p. 1) state that “a social risk exists wherever there is the
potential for an existing or planned project to impact adversely on one or more social entities (such
as residents of nearby communities, Traditional Owners, adjoining landowners or local
businesses)”. Likewise, Graetz and Franks (2015, p. 6) draw on their extractive industry experience
to define social risk as risk from the business to social entities:
Social risks are the perceived or expected potential future threats to, and
unwanted impacts on individuals and groups of individuals arising from the
processes of social change precipitated by development interventions and the
decision of external actors, namely business, industry organisations, financiers,
executive governments, regulators and non-government organisations.
2 Risk to the business or project.
3 Social sustainability is the ability of social entities to develop processes and structures which not only meet the needs of their current members but
also support the ability of future generations to meet their needs (Brundtland, 1987).
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Both these definitions only consider downside risk.
In contrast to the development and welfare literature, it is more common in the business and mining
literature to take a much more self-referential approach, framing social risk in terms of risk to the
business from external actors. Barclay et al. (2009, p. 15), for example, define social risk as “the
range of potential impacts on a project that may result from its interaction with communities and
stakeholders”. Kytle and Ruggie (2005, p. 6) state that:
social risk occurs when an empowered stakeholder takes up a social issue area
and applies pressure on a corporation (exploiting a vulnerability in the earnings
drivers, e.g. reputation, corporate image) so that the company will change
policies or approaches in the marketplace.
For Bekefi et al. (2006, p. 3), social risks are “challenges by stakeholders to companies’ business
practices due to real or perceived business impacts on a range of issues related to human welfare”.
This orientation of social risk serves to connect it to the business’ financial bottom line.
The appropriateness of taking such a self-referential approach to social risk is questioned by civil
society (see, for example, Baab and Jungk, 2009; Shift, 2015; Oxfam, 2016) and others. Baab and
Jungk (2009) note that the Danish Institute of Human Rights developed a new model, the Arc of
Human Rights, to help businesses move their focus from the impact of potential human rights
abuses on themselves to the impacts on the rights holders, and to prioritise human rights issues
based on their seriousness rather than their media profile. Oxfam (2016) notes a similar
preoccupation among businesses. The NGO contends that it is a “misdiagnosis” for businesses to
describe challenges to their practices as social risk, and that this misdiagnosis prevents them from
identifying and mitigating the negative consequences of social risk (Oxfam, 2016, p. 9).4 In its Due
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct report, the OECD (2018, p. 15) explains that
for many businesses or enterprises, risk is self-referential:
For many enterprises, the term ‘risk’ means primarily risk to the enterprise –
financial risk, market risk, operational risk, reputational risk, etc. Enterprises
are concerned with their position in the market vis-à-vis their competitors, their
image and long-term existence, so when they look at risks, it is typically risks
to themselves. The Guidelines however refer to the likelihood of adverse
impacts on people, the environment and society that enterprises cause,
contribute to, or to which they are directly linked. In other words, it is an
outward-facing approach to risk.
4 Although Oxfam is critical of business’ misdiagnosis of social risk, it nevertheless considers social risk to have a dual orientation (to and from the
business), arguing that social risk includes damage to a business’ reputation and loss of its social licence to operate.
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Reorienting their thinking away from themselves towards others is an important first-step for
businesses in addressing the social risks generated by their activities or the risks along their supply
chain.
The global mining industry uses a range of international policies and standards to set its own social
performance benchmarks, such as those set by The World Bank and the International Finance
Corporation. These policies and standards tend to be equivocal on the topic of social risk. The
World Bank, for example, suggests that social risk is:
The possibility that [an] intervention would create, reinforce or deepen inequity
and/or social conflict, or that the attitudes and actions of key stakeholders may
subvert the achievement of the development objective, or that the development
objective, or means to achieve it, lack ownership among key stakeholders
[emphasis added]. (The World Bank, 2016)
Rio Tinto’s (2011) Social Risk Analysis Guidance Note states that social risk “covers a range of
threats and opportunities for the business that may result from how the business impacts upon and
interacts with communities and stakeholders”. Similarly, Anglo American (2014a, p. 9) considers
social risk to be the “probability and severity of risks to the business as well as to employees,
contractors and external stakeholders”. These definitions connect (external) social risk and
(internal) business and project objectives with the effects pathway flowing both ways. Other mining
industry scholars also use social risk as a single term to cover both risk to people and risk to
business (see, for example, Lapalme, 2003; Franks et al., 2010; Cessford, 2011).
Kemp et al. (2016) argue that the current approach to social risk in mining does not clearly
distinguish between these two types of socially related risks. The lack of clarity creates a barrier to
accurately defining key concepts and understanding the process through which risks interact. This
leads to a situation in which risk assessment in mining is partial or incomplete and the risk across
different entities and organisations is not captured. Responsibility for risk can, as a consequence, be
left unassigned and undefined for external actors.
In describing social risk as risk to the business, scholars and other commentators equate social risk
with social acceptability risk. Social acceptability risk is a term coined by Miller and Lessard (2001,
p. 439) to describe the likelihood that proponents “will meet opposition from local groups,
economic development agencies and pressure groups”. This term has the same underlying focus as
social licence to operate: to protect the business from threats posed by external actors. Both social
acceptability risk and social licence to operate are useful in prompting proponents to look beyond
production-based objectives. However, as Owen and Kemp (2013) have identified, both concepts
encourage mining companies to limit their thinking to those factors that threaten their ability to
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achieve business objectives, such as gaining development consent for mining projects. Taking such
a narrow risk perspective may increase the likelihood that the burden of risk is carried by those
people with the least resources to deal with it. Kemp et al. (2016) explain that without community
opposition, companies can be unresponsive to concerns about particular risks to external actors.
However, social opposition is not always the best indicator of whether harm is present or imminent.
Social risk can readily manifest within communities that have limited political power and access to
public debate to voice concern or lodge a grievance. According to Kemp et al. (2016), in these
circumstances, it is the community and not the company that faces potential harm and carries the
burden of risk. Mining companies cannot rely on communities to voice dissatisfaction or non-
acceptance before attending to social risk. If they do, they will fail to meet their policy
commitments to sustainable development and fail to demonstrate human rights due diligence under
the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
Social risk and social acceptability risk share similar characteristics to societal risk and institutional
risk, notions articulated by Rothstein et al. (2006). These scholars, who operate outside the mining
context, define societal risk as “traditional and novel risks to members of society and their
environment” (Rothstein et al., 2006, p. 92). Rothstein et al. give examples, including the
management of contaminated land, workplace stress, the administration of convicted criminals in
the community, and so on. Institutional risks are “risks to organisations (state or non-state)
regulating and managing societal risks, and/or risks to the legitimacy of their associated rules and
methods” (Rothstein et al., 2006, p. 95). Rothstein and his colleagues observe that these two types
of risk are often misidentified in public discourse, just as Worden (2016) states that social
acceptability risk is misdiagnosed as social risk in mining. Rothstein et al. call for the differences
between societal risk and institutional risk and their dynamic relationship to be examined more
thoroughly.
Regardless of the differences, Rothstein et al. (2006) note a link between societal and institutional
risks. They state that in contemporary society, public and private organisations are under increasing
pressure from external actors to become more transparent and publicly accountable for societal
risks. They call these actors “spectators and quasi-controllers” (Rothstein et al., 2006, p. 96). The
emergence of these checks to institutional behaviour could be described as a reflection of the shift
from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, a concept discussed by Rothstein (2006), Sundstrӧm and 
Jacobsson (2007), Lidskog et al. (2011), and others. As Rothstein et al. (2006) note, broadening the
spectrum of risk governance actors brings with it potential for conflicting demands to be directed
towards the regulatory organisation and other risk governance actors. This, they contend, can create
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institutional risks that threaten the organisation’s legitimacy. Failing to address societal risks to the
satisfaction of “quasi-controllers” can rebound as institutional risks. Kemp et al., (2016) describe
this phenomenon as the “rebound dynamic”; that is, the ways in which social and business risk can
inﬂuence and affect the other. The authors suggest that if mining companies are able to grapple with 
the rebound dynamics of social risk in this way, they will be in a better position to protect their
business interests and contribute to sustainable development.
Contextualising SIA
2.3.1 Defining social impact
Since the formalisation of SIA in the 1970s, scholars have sought to clarify what the term ‘social
impact’ means. Franks (2011, p. 1817) defines it as “the effect of an action”. According to Ziller
(2012, p. xvi), social impacts are “the consequences to groups of people, or society as a whole,
arising from a decision or an action”. In this sense, Franks (2011), Ziller (2012), Graetz and Franks
(2015), and Vanclay et al. (2015) consider social impacts to be consequences that are experienced
or felt, in a physical or perceptual sense, either directly or indirectly, over the short or long term.
Franks (2011) describes social impacts as being either positive or negative while Ziller (2012) and
Vanclay et al. (2015) observe that social impacts can manifest in changes to people’s self-esteem,
values, ways of life, culture, community, identity, sense of belonging, health and wellbeing, fears
and aspirations, rights, environment, political systems, access to work, services and amenities, and
so on.
2.3.2 The development of SIA
SIA is a key mechanism for understanding and managing social impacts. Although Becker (2001)
has traced consideration of social impacts back to the 19th century, it is generally accepted among
SIA authors (e.g. Burdge and Vanclay, 1996; Joyce and MacFarlane, 2001; Lockie, 2001; Esteves
et al., 2012) that the formalisation of SIA as a field of applied social research occurred in response
to environmental regulations in North America in the 1970s. These regulations included the US
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 1969 and the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Review Process (EARP) 1973. Burge and Vanclay (1996) note that a similar trend was emerging in
Europe at this time, with a study commissioned into the social impacts of the Channel tunnel in
1973. A pivotal point in the development of SIA practice, according to Burdge and Vanclay (1996)
and Joyce and MacFarlane (2001), was an inquiry into the proposed Mackenzie Valley gas pipeline
from the Yukon in Canada’s north, down to Edmonton in Alberta. Commissioned in 1974 and
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presided by Chief Justice Thomas Berger, the inquiry was the first time that social impacts were
considered in project decision-making. After listening to evidence, including presentations from
indigenous people, Berger postponed the project for at least 10 years while land access agreements
were negotiated and indigenous institutions and programs were established to deal with project
development. In Australia, social science was being applied to the 1974 Pilbara Study, which
examined potential industrial development of the Pilbara region in Western Australia (Burdge and
Vanclay, 1996). In particular, quality of life factors were considered in designing the towns and
infrastructure associated with the planned industrial development (Commonwealth of Australia,
1974).
SIA practice and scholarly works continued to grow, including the establishment of the
International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) in 1980, the first international SIA
conference held in Vancouver in 1982 (Joyce and MacFarlane, 2001) and the first SIA guideline
published in 1994 (Esteves et al., 2012). However, Lockie (2001, p. 277) contends that SIA
remained the “poor cousin” of environmental impact assessment and was only given passing
reference in impact assessment texts published in the 1990s. Around this time the IAIA
acknowledged the need for international SIA guidelines and principles and, in 1997, a taskforce was
established for that purpose (Esteves et al., 2012). In 2003, the IAIA Board endorsed the
international SIA principles (Vanclay, 2003) and in 2015 it published Social Impact Assessment:
Guidance for Assessing and Managing the Social Impacts of Projects. Esteves et al. (2012) note the
steady increase in SIA publications, more than 600 in 2010. Today, the authors assert, SIA has
grown into an interdisciplinary process of managing the social issues of development around the
world.
Based on their extensive experience of SIA practice in Canada and the UK respectively, Joyce and
MacFarlane (2001) observe that SIAs have tended to be conducted as one-off studies. Esteves et al.
(2012) note one of the barriers to making use of SIA data is the limited understanding and skills of
those who commission them. The quote they published from Jon Samuel, Head of Social
Performance at Anglo American, provides valuable insights into this perspective:
These studies are usually not commissioned by social scientists. They are
typically commissioned by environmental scientists or by permitting or project
managers, most of whom have a scientific (or possibly legal) training with little
understanding of the more progressive/innovative end of the impact assessment
topic. This is a powerful barrier, particularly when the social analyses are often
inherently messy, and with uncertain outcomes in terms of implications for the
project (ie they stick with what they know) (Jon Samuel, Head of Social
Performance, Anglo American Plc, personal communication, 21 June 2011, in
Esteves et al., 2012, p. 40).
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Samuel indicates that by having project team members with social science expertise, the project
team may be better equipped to manage the SIA process.
2.3.3 Assessing social impacts
SIA is described by Vanclay (2003, p. 6) as “the process of analysing, monitoring and managing the
intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions
(policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by those
interventions”. In Australia, governments of the largest coal mining states – Queensland and NSW –
have published SIA guidelines to provide project proponents with direction on assessing the
potential social impacts from their projects, each oriented towards state-specific conditions.
In March 2018, Queensland released a guideline that replaced the more rudimentary 2013 guideline.
The impetus for the new guideline was the Strong and Sustainable Resource Communities Act
2017, which specified the need for an enhanced SIA process for large resource projects in
Queensland; this Act is an outcome of a parliamentary inquiry into fly in, fly out (FIFO) practices.
The influence of the inquiry’s findings are evident in the SIA guideline, with specific requirements
to ensure project workforce management practices, such as: “prioritise recruitment of workers from
local and regional communities and workers who will live in regional communities, reduce the
proportion of workers engaged in FIFO arrangements where operationally feasible, support the
health and well-being of the project workforce” (Queensland Coordinator-General, 2018, p. 13).
Further requirements include that the proponent develops a workforce management plan, including
proposed capacity building for local people and under-represented groups; that the availability and
affordability of local housing and accommodation is not affected by the project; and that the project
does not adversely affect the level of social services, facilities and infrastructure (Queensland
Coordinator-General, 2018, p. 13). The new guideline is longer (20 pages) and provides more
details on what is expected of proponents in producing the SIA than the 2013 version (13 pages).
The NSW Department of Planning and Environment released its SIA guideline in September 2017
after an extensive stakeholder engagement process. This is the state’s first guideline and its content
and structure reflect the local requirements. The guideline’s objectives include to provide “a clear,
consistent and rigorous” SIA framework, “facilitate improved project planning and design [….],
promote better development outcomes [….], support informed decision-making [….], facilitate
meaningful, respectful and effective community and stakeholder engagement” and to ensure
transparency and accountability of the SIA process (NSW DPE, 2017, p. 2).
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Both guidelines have similar requirements for proponents, including scoping, baseline analysis,
social engagement, assessment of impacts, impact mitigation and benefit enhancement, monitoring,
and consideration of cumulative impacts. The NSW guideline is longer (50 pages), has clearer
objectives, provides more context for undertaking SIA, emphasises the need to consider potential
positive and negative impacts consistently throughout the document, explains in more detail where
SIA fits into EIS preparation, provides more detail on the process of social engagement, introduces
the term ‘material effect’ to indicate which impacts matter the most or pose the great risk, provides
an example of a social risk matrix, and uses a graphical device to show the reader at which stage of
the EIS process the activity is located. In contrast, the Queensland guideline includes the
requirement for a social impact management plan (SIMP), the requirement for which had been
removed in 2013. Although the NSW guideline does not require a SIMP, it does require the
development of a monitoring and management framework.
Mining companies such as Rio Tinto and Anglo American have also developed guidelines and tools
for SIA. In its Social Impact Assessment Guidance document, Rio Tinto defines SIA as a one-off
study to “review the social implications of the planning, design, decision making, management,
operation and termination of a proposed activity” (Rio Tinto, 2011, p. 3). Its SIA process comprises
five successive stages: scoping; baseline establishment; analysis of potential effects; development
of mitigation and enhancement options; and the documentation of findings. It includes the
identification of social benefit opportunities as well as potential negative impacts (Rio Tinto, 2011).
Anglo American’s Socio-Economic Assessment Toolkit (SEAT) provides guidance and outlines an
obligatory process of assessing social impacts for its existing operations. The process is designed to
be undertaken by company employees and includes three-yearly assessments of the operation and
neighbouring communities; the identification of impacts, with participation from the community;
the development of a management and monitoring plan to address the issues; and completion of a
post-closure plan. A report is published and feedback provided to stakeholders (Anglo American,
2014a; Franks et al., 2009; Franks and Vanclay, 2013). SEAT, however, is a tool used for mining
operations rather than projects. Anglo American’s guidance for projects is provided in the Project
Way, an internal document that articulates the company’s project stage-gate review process. It
provides guidance on social risks such as resettlement (Anglo American, 2014b).
2.3.4 Differentiating social impact and social risk
The emergence of the term ‘social risk’ in mining discourse along with the established term ‘social
impact’ leads one to ask: Are social risk and social impact the same thing? If not, what are the
differences between them?
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As a first-step in examining the meaning of these terms, a comparison is made between risk
assessment and SIA processes. Table 2.A compares the key risk management processes specified in
AS/NZ ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines with the key SIA activities
published in the IAIA’s Guidance for Assessing and Managing the Social Impacts of Projects
(Vanclay et al., 2015). By comparing the columns in each row, the table shows that the activities
undertaken in risk management and SIA are very similar. The communication and consultation
activities which have been separated out in ISO 31000 are integrated into the SIA activities. The
key differences between the two processes are underlined in the table. These differences are that
SIA activities include: supporting communities with change, establishing a grievance mechanism,
negotiating impacts and benefits agreement, and designing and implementing a participatory
monitoring plan. These four activities, which relate directly to engagement with external actors, are
not precluded from the risk management process per se, they are just not articulated. Hence the
assessments of risk and social impact are similar, but do the terms ‘social risk’ and ‘social impact’
mean the same thing? This subsection will explore how this question is addressed in the literature.
Table 2.A: Comparison of risk and SIA activities
Risk management activities* SIA activities+
Establish the context
• Define the external and internal parameters
to be taken into account when managing
risk and setting scope and risk criteria.
Understand the issues
• Understand the project
• Clarify roles and responsibilities
• Social area of influence
• Community profiling
• Inform communities
• Inclusive participatory processes
• Scope issues
• Assemble baseline data
Risk assessment – risk identification
• Find, recognise and describe risks
• Identify risk sources, events, their causes
and consequences
• Use historical data, theoretical analysis,
informed and expert opinions, and
stakeholders’ needs where appropriate.
Risk assessment – risk analysis
• Determine the nature of risk and the level
of risk
• Risk analysis provides the basis for risk
evaluation and decisions about risk
treatment (mitigation).
Predict, analyse and assess the likely impact
pathways
• Social changes and impacts
• Indirect impacts
• Cumulative impacts
• Affected party responses
• Significance of changes
• Project alternatives
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Risk assessment – risk evaluation
• Process of comparing the results of risk
analysis with risk criteria to determine
whether the risk and/or its magnitude is
acceptable or tolerable
Risk treatment
• Process to modify risk
o Remove risk source
o Change the likelihood
• Change the consequence
Develop and implement strategies
• Address negative impacts
• Enhance benefits and opportunities
• Support communities with change
• Establish a grievance mechanism
• Negotiate impacts and benefits agreement
• Develop SIMP
• Establish partnerships to implement SIMP
• Implement ongoing social performance
plans
Monitoring and review
• Continually check, supervise, critically
observe or determine the status in order to
identify change from the required
performance level
• Determine the suitability, adequacy and
effectiveness of the subject matter to
achieve objectives
Design and implement monitoring programs
• Indicators to monitor change
• Participatory monitoring plan
• Implement adaptive management
• Evaluation and periodic review
Communication and consultation
• Communicate and consult with external and
internal stakeholders should during all
stages of the risk management process.
• Establish a consultative team to ensure that
the interests of stakeholders are understood
and considered
Qualitative data for SIAs is collected via social
engagement mechanisms.
* Source: International Organization for Standardization (2009), ppvi-7, 14; + Source: Vanclay et
al. (2015), p. 7. See Section 2.4.2 of this chapter for further discussion of risk assessment using the
ISO 31000 risk management framework and the IRGC risk governance framework.
The grey and scholarly literatures differ in the way they consider social impacts and social risks. In
the policies and standards published by mining companies, international finance institutions and so
on, it is common for the terms ‘risk’ and ‘impact’ to be coupled or used interchangeably (see
AngloGold Ashanti, 2012; IFC, 2012; Anglo American, 2014a). For example, in The Anglo
American Social Way, the company presents its governing framework for social performance. On a
single page, the coupling of risk and impact occurs 10 times (Anglo American, 2014a, p. 9). In
contrast, scholars tend to engage with social risk and social impact separately. There is an extensive
body of scholarly literature that engages with the sociology of risk and another that focuses on
social impact, but very little work that explicitly compares and contrasts the two concepts. This is a
gap in the literature.
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One of the few scholarly discussions of the relationship between social risks and social impacts is
presented by Graetz and Franks (2015, p. 8), who draw on their experience with extractive
industries. They identify temporality as a distinguishing feature, saying that:
Social risks are the perceived or expected potential future threats to, and
impacts on, individuals and groups of individuals arising from the processes of
social change precipitated by development(s) [… whereas] social impact
pertains to individuals’ and groups of individuals’ past and present experiences
of activities, developments or technologies.
Mahmoudi et al. (2013) present a hybrid model that incorporates SRA and SIA. In presenting their
hybrid model, the authors identify a different distinguishing feature; that is, certainty:
In some ways social risks are much the same as social impacts in terms of what
they are, but the concept of risk refers only to the uncertain social
consequences of an activity or event, whereas social impact also refers to the
certain or expected outcomes. (Mahmoudi et al., 2013, p. 3)
Social risks are not, therefore, the same as social impacts. Social risks refer to an activity or event
that occurs in the future, whereas social impacts occur in the present or the past; they are occurring
now or they have already occurred. Social risks are uncertain, whereas social impacts can be
uncertain, expected or certain. The assessment of social risk and social impacts are both carried out
ex-ante, that is, in advance of the outcome, although Western and Lynch (2000), Ahmadvand et al.
(2009) and Mahmoudi et al. (2013) note that SIAs can also be undertaken as ex-post assessments.
When used to predict the potential impacts of a project, SIAs are effectively engaging in a form of
SRA, notwithstanding that such studies have seldom used the language and tools of risk analysis.
This section examined the meaning of terminology commonly used in reference to social aspects in
mining industry discourse. Clarity around the meaning of social risk and the relationship between
social risk and social impact were identified as gaps in the literature.
Risk governance
According to van Asselt and Renn (2011), the notion of risk governance was introduced to the
scholarly literature via European risk networks in the late 1990s. While risk assessment, risk
management and risk communication were being practised well before the 1990s, Renn et al. (2011)
assert that these activities, undertaken as discrete practices, are not sufficient to analyse and
improve risk governance processes. A new paradigm, risk governance, was required to improve risk
decision-making structures and processes. Van Asselt and Renn (2011) link a three-year program,
launched in 1997 and funded by the European Commission, with the start of a more focused
consideration of risk governance as a concept. This program fostered views from industry
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representatives, policymakers, regulators and bureaucrats from technical, natural science and social
science backgrounds. They explored how local, national and international risks were dealt with by
different European countries via a series of seminars and mini case studies. Van Asselt and Renn
(2011) observe that following this initiative, articles with risk governance in their titles began to
appear in peer-reviewed scientific journals, with two papers published in 2001. Although the term
‘risk governance’ was not coined until the late 1990s, van Asselt and Renn (2011) and Rosa et al.
(2013) note that the notion has been informed by 40 years of interdisciplinary risk research, drawing
from sociology, psychology, political science, science, technology, policy and law. Originally a
loose term, van Asselt and Renn (2011) argue that a more rigorous conceptualisation of ‘risk
governance’ began in earnest following the establishment of the IRGC in Switzerland in 2003.
Risk governance encompasses all the regulations, systems, processes and tools that are used by
diverse actors – including governments, corporations, civil society and individuals – to collect,
analyse and communicate risk information in order to make risk-related decisions. This is the
position taken by the IRGC (2005); Renn (2008); Aven and Renn (2010); Klinke and Renn (2010,
2012); Renn et al. (2011); van Asselt and Renn (2011); Renn and Klinke (2013); and Heath and
McComas (2015). According to van Asselt and Renn (2011), risk governance can be considered in
two ways: as the critical examination of complex, interacting networks in which risk choices and
risk decisions are made, and as a set of normative principles that can be used to engage with risks in
a responsible way. The aim of risk governance, according to Rosa et al. (2013), is to regulate,
reduce or control risks. These authors state that risk governance comes into play when risk affects
groups of people, institutions or social entities.
Risk governance is multidimensional. Lyall and Tait (2004), van Asselt and Renn (2011) and Rosa
et al. (2013) differentiate between horizontal and vertical risk governance to untangle some of the
complexity of the interacting networks and to ensure that both dimensions of risk governance are
considered. Horizontal governance refers to the interactions between actors within a specified
geographical, functional or regulatory space; whereas vertical governance refers to the relationship
between local, regional, national and international levels.
According to Renn (2012), acknowledging the trade-offs associated with making risk decisions is
an important part of risk governance. He asserts that risk decisions rarely result in ‘win–win’
outcomes – there will be some positive outcomes and some negative outcomes; some winners and
some losers. He argues that the groups of people that will carry the risk burden need to be identified
and acknowledged, and the use of any compensation mechanisms clearly articulated. Lӧfstedt and 
van Asselt (2008) add that risk governance should incorporate determinations of fairness as well as
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technocratic and bureaucratic solutions. Rosa et al. (2013, p. 169) develop this point further, saying
that:
Many risks embed complex tradeoffs of costs and benefits. Systemic risks are
characterized by their complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Risk governance
underscores the need to ensure that societal choices and decisions adequately
address these complicating features. However, conventional risk
characterization typically treats, assesses, and manages such risks as if they
were simple.
Alternative approaches to traditional risk analysis are needed to effectively deal with uncertain,
complex or ambiguous risks. Uncertainty refers to the difficulty of predicting if, when, and with
what consequences an activity or event may occur due to incomplete or inaccurate data. Complexity
denotes the challenge of identifying and quantifying causal links between actors and specific
impacts (Aven and Renn, 2010). Ambiguity occurs when there are different legitimate perspectives
or multiple values to be considered when analysing risk (Renn et al. 2011).
Ambiguity may come from differences in interpreting factual statements about
the world or from differences in applying normative rules to evaluate a state of
the world. In both cases, ambiguity exists on the ground of differences in
criteria or norms to interpret or judge a given situation. High complexity and
uncertainty favour the emergence of ambiguity, but there are also quite a few
simple and low uncertainty cases that can cause controversy and thus
ambiguity. (Aven and Renn, 2010, p. 13)
Van Asselt and Renn (2011) propose three risk governance principles to address the weaknesses of
traditional risk analyses: communication and inclusion; integration; and reflection. The first
principle is that different perspectives, experiences and concerns should be exchanged between the
various actors, and that those actors need to contribute to how risks are framed. Implicit in the
second principle is the value of adopting a multidimensional approach in which knowledge and
experience from different sources – including perspectives and values as well as scientific analyses
– are integrated into risk assessments. The third principle is that risk governance cannot be
routinised; a reflexive approach is needed when considering uncertain, complex and ambiguous
risks.
Aven and Renn (2018) note that risk decisions are becoming complex as assessors consider multiple
and often conflicting values amid high levels of uncertainty. These scholars identify three major
strategies for governing risk, which they describe as risk-informed strategies, such as the use of risk
assessments; cautionary/precautionary strategies, such as increasing knowledge and choosing risk
management options cautiously; and discursive strategies, such as building trustworthiness by
involving potentially affected people. They suggest that in circumstances of routine risk decision-
making, risk-informed strategies would be appropriate, whereas cautionary strategies would be
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more appropriate in circumstances characterised by high uncertainty, and discursive strategies are
required in circumstances in which there are conflicting values and concerns among actors.
A number of scholars (e.g. Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005; Rothstein, 2006; Sundström and Jacobsson,
2007; Lidskog et al., 2011; Renn et al., 2011) describe the move away from a centralised
governance system where bureaucrats manage threats to society towards a decentralised, multi-tier
approach with overlapping authorities as a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. According to
Sundström and Jacobsson (2007, p. 5), this shift is “one of the more noteworthy developments
within contemporary social science” and represents the merging of boundaries between public and
private actors and significant changes in the way politicians govern. Rosa et al. (2013) state that the
result of the shift to governance is a diverse, multilayered sociopolitical landscape:
It is a landscape populated by a multitude of actors whose perceptions and
evaluations draw on a diversity of knowledge and evidence claims, value
commitments, and political interest. Their goal, of course, is to influence
processes of risk analysis, decision making, and risk management. (Irwin,
2008; Jasanoff 2004 in Rosa et al., 2013, p. 151)
Along with its more inclusive approach, then, the move to risk governance presents the potential for
conflict as actors with diverse risk perspectives vie for their perspectives to be given priority. Power
(2007) contends that rather than the shift to risk governance leading to more inclusive risk
regulation processes, it has focused proponents’ attention on how to deal with business risk; that is,
threats to their own legitimacy.
Project risk and the emergence of social risk
There is some debate in the project literature around the origins of project risk assessment. Ward
and Chapman (1991) claim that comprehensive, formal risk analysis was not routinely undertaken
for major projects until as recently as the 1990s. However, Shrader-Frechette (1991, p. 5) links the
first risk assessments back to Mesopotamian priests before the time of Christ, but acknowledges
that risk assessment as “a developing science” did not occur until the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Initial formal project risk assessments focused primarily on analysing physical risks such as
structural, engineering and environmental aspects using technical and quantitative techniques from
the techno-scientific tradition, but Shrader-Frechette (1991) claims that inadequate standards made
risk assessment practice difficult. By the mid-1990s, scholars such as Dey et al. (1994) were
discussing the need to expand quantitative risk analysis to include qualitative (they use the adjective
‘subjective’) data. Chapman (1997) notes a further development in risk assessment practice: a move
away from tactical technical risk analysis towards a more strategic approach to risk assessment and
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planning. According to Kunz et al. (2013) and EY (2014) this transition has proven problematic in
the global mining industry. These authors point to volatile commodity markets, geopolitical
uncertainty and social opposition as challenges to long-term, strategic thinking about risk in this
industry.
An emphasis on non-technical risks began to appear in the project risk literature from the early
2000s. Jaafari (2001), for example, suggests that external factors, such as social, political and
institutional issues, were a key source of project uncertainty and that project developers needed to
improve their approach to non-technical risks if they were going to succeed in reducing uncertainty.
Miller and Lessard (2001, p. 439) position stakeholder engagement as critical to reducing non-
technical risks, including the risk of stakeholder opposition to projects. They coined the term “social
acceptability risk” to describe this type of risk.
It is at this point that the concept of social risk began to appear in mining and sustainable
development literature with Joyce and Thomson’s (2000) reference to ‘social risk’ in their analysis
of ‘social licence to operate’. According to Thomson and Boutilier (2011, p. 1779), social licence
refers to the “level of acceptance or approval continually granted to an organisation’s operations or
projects by a local community and other stakeholders”. Owen and Kemp (2013) suggest that social
risk is implied in the industry’s reference to social licence, but only where risk to people has a
rebound effect on the business, such as through public outrage or opposition. These authors argue
that social licence is a “pragmatic calculation”, where companies invest in winning community
support, often at the expense of understanding potential harms for different groups of people Owen
and Kemp (2013, p. 31).
Concurrent with Joyce and Thomson’s articulation of social licence, the broader concept of
sustainable development started to gain traction in mining industry circles. Sustainable development
has since emerged as a central management objective for the global mining industry. The final
report of the global Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development research project, Breaking New
Ground, describes the minerals sector and its relationship with concepts of sustainable
development. The report recognised that simply meeting market demand for mineral commodities
“falls short of meeting society’s expectations of the industry” and is seen as “failing in its
obligations” to society and “increasingly unwelcome” (IIED, 2002, p. xiv). Although the report
elaborated on the industry’s need to build social licence and address social impacts, it did not
engage the concept of social risk. Botin and Anderson (2009) later made a direct connection
between mining, social risk and sustainable development. They linked social risk to a broad set of
mining impacts with the potential to generate social harm, including changes in land use, dust,
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noise, impacts on surface and groundwater resources, in-migration, displacement and resettlement,
dependency and livelihood impacts.
A key dimension of the classic sustainable development framework is the social pillar. Including
social dimensions in a policy framework does not, however, guarantee that social harm will be
addressed in practice. Several analytical frameworks (e.g. Corder et al., 2010) have been developed
that encourage the mining industry to examine social aspects of mining within multidimensional
sustainability assessments. These processes have potential for ensuring that social considerations
are included in project risk identification and analysis in mining, and that threats and opportunities
are considered.
This subsection tracked the development of project risk assessment processes in the project
environment over time, including the emergence of notions of social risk in the mining and project
development literatures. Project risk scholars seem to have had little interest in social risk as a
research topic and, while mining and sustainable development scholars may have engaged more
frequently with social risk, the engagement has been predominantly theoretical in nature rather than
through empirical studies. This is a gap in the literature.
Analysis of social impacts in the context of Australian mining
This section analyses 13 journal papers and reports published from 2003 to 2014 on the social
impacts of mining in Australia. The work was undertaken by researchers from Central Queensland
University, the University of Newcastle, the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining at The
University of Queensland, the University Sydney, the University of Western Sydney, Charles Sturt
University, Curtin University and CSIRO. Two of the studies were commissioned by mining
companies and one by a not-for-profit ‘think-tank’. Most of the studies focus on the Hunter Valley
region of NSW and Queensland’s Bowen Basin. Of the remaining two studies, one centres on
Boddington in south-east Western Australia and the other covers 71 local government areas
associated with mining activities.
The studies engage with a range of social impacts, including economic matters (livelihoods, income
inequity, economic dependency); community structure (community functionality, changes in the
fabric of rural communities, ‘masculinisation’, a decline in the number of women and families in
communities, transiency); human health; and the implications of environmental impacts for people
(air quality, water quality and availability, soil fertility). One group of studies, predominantly from
the University of Newcastle, uses discourse analysis to examine land-use conflict and the adverse
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impacts of coal mining on communities in the Upper Hunter Valley. McManus and Connor (2013)
contend that the fabric of rural communities is being damaged by mining, particularly in relation to
human health, rising income inequity and depopulation of small towns, and that livelihoods are
threatened by water scarcity, coal dust, noise, vibration and increased traffic, including the number
of coal trains. The authors argue that the expansion of coal mining also threatens arable land,
Australia’s ability to produce its own food and the protection of rural ways of life. In this work,
McManus and Connor examine power relations and the way actors use scripts to advance their
interests. The authors find that the scripts used by miners focus on job creation, economic benefits,
and sustainability through coexistence with farmers; whereas farmers, vignerons and horse breeders
use scripts that portray farming is an essential activity that has a multi-generational pedigree:
They construct themselves as stewards of the land, knowledgeable about local
conditions, a source of jobs and wealth and caring about issues such as water –
unlike the coal and gas industries which are seen as temporary activities that
damage the land. (McManus and Connor, 2013, p. 181)
McManus and Connor (2013) connect the authority of scripts with the outcome of mining
development applications; the actors with the most influential scripts are the most successful.
In their study of the Bickham coal project, Connor et al. (2008) argue that the proponent’s use of
“hard scientific knowledge” marginalised opponents’ calls for a future sustainable water supply and
that this discourse ignored the ‘precautionary principle’ in favour of maximising business benefits
(Connor et al., 2008, p. 88). By framing their arguments around the uncertain science of
hydrological modelling, the drought, and increasing public acceptance of climate change science,
mining opponents were able to convince the Planning Assessment Commission (PAC) that the
project’s risks did not outweigh its benefits. The PAC announced in May 2010 that the project
would not proceed due to risk of water contamination and drainage, and the threat to the viability of
the thoroughbred horse breeding industry (Commonwealth of Australia, 2018). Connor et al. (2008)
state that it is not common for the discourse of mining opponents to prevail against mining
proponents:
Contests waged in the domain of scientific discourse and regulatory regimes
that are defined by government and powerful industries are rarely successful.
But the fluidity of water, its ability to metamorphose from one form to another
(eg from mist, to rain, to river, to sea) is an apt metaphor for the impetus for
community and environmentalist opponents to endure and eventually prevail in
mining conflicts and perhaps even for a sea-change in mining policy. (Connor
et al., 2008, pp. 88–89)
The success of opponents’ discourse around the Bickham project did not continue with the Anvil
Hill project, however, as their next study identified.
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Although opponents to the development of the Anvil Hill coal project were ultimately unsuccessful
in preventing the coal project from proceeding, Connor et al. (2009) contend that environmentalists
successfully challenged the legitimacy of coal mining by framing the debate in moral terms and
using the science of climate change.5 The authors describe this legitimacy challenge as “a
reconfiguration of the social field of mining development”:
Organised groups of opponents, by focusing on environmental and climate
change impacts of the Anvil Hill mine, have weakened the officialising
strategies of the coal industry and government (which invoke the benefits to all
citizens of jobs, taxes and royalties paid to government, export income, cheap
electricity) and thus challenged the mining industry’s social licence to operate.
(Connor et al., 2009, p. 507)
This group of studies was undertaken at a time of growing concern about the cumulative impacts of
mining in the Hunter Valley and, at the same time, a shift in public sentiment away from coal as a
source of power generation.
The inaction of the regulating authority in NSW to address the air quality health concerns of local
residents is the focus of a study by Higginbotham et al. (2010). The authors consider the
government’s inaction to be an example of “environmental injustice”, which they define as the
disproportionate exposure of socially vulnerable groups to the health effects of pollution.
Higginbotham et al. (2010, p. 265) contend that experiential knowledge and lay assessments of air
pollution were dismissed by the mining industry and the state government:
Their experiential knowledge is discounted against dominant positions of
industry and government that use state-sponsored science and regulatory
regimes to deny, minimise or obfuscate the link between dust and disease.
This observation is aligned with discussions of the lay–expert divide, a well-researched topic in the
sociology of risk literature (e.g. Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Plough and Krimsky, 1987; Zinn
and Taylor-Gooby, 2006; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2012; Lupton, 2013).
A second group of studies examines the socio-economic impacts of mining on rural communities.
Lockie et al. (2009) use the resource community cycle conceptual framework to evaluate the results
from their two SIA studies of Coppabella coal mine, Nebo Shire, in Queensland’s Bowen Basin.
The framework links local economic performance and community development with the (‘boom–
bust’) lifecycle of resources operations, and focuses on examining the relationship between
economic growth and decline, workforce and infrastructure decision-making, and population
dynamics and social capital. Lockie et al. (2009) explain that in the case of the Coppabella township
and mine, the resource community cycle was influenced by two key factors: the mine’s labour
5 Xstrata acquired the project in 2007 and renamed it Mangoola open cut mine. It started operation in 2010.
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recruitment and social infrastructure policies which did not prioritise local employment and
investment, and the cumulative impacts from multiple mining operations in the region, such as
severe shortages of skilled workers in other industries, housing affordability and increased pressure
on emergency services. The authors find that the demographic and social changes from the
accommodation of the mining workforce weakened the ability of communities in Nebo Shire to
foster more prosperous futures. The authors observe a progressive “masculinisation” of the local
population due to mining:
On the whole, [….] the capacity of the Nebo community to deal with any
downturn in the mining industry will be limited. Further, with mining
encouraging the masculinisation of the Nebo population without increasing
participation in social activities and networks, it may be seen as having
detrimental effects on those aspects of social capital that might support
economic, social and cultural development; namely, constructive relationships
between groups and individuals that support diversity, a climate of trust,
acceptance of difference, and ability to resolve conflict. (Lockie et al. 2009, p.
338)
Lockie et al. (2009) conclude that impact mitigation strategies developed through the SIA process
need to address long-term, cumulative impacts of resource development as well as the immediate or
acute concerns.
Petkova et al. (2009) examine the social impacts of mining’s boom and bust cycle on six mining
service towns in the Bowen Basin to identify how impacts may vary across towns. Five social
impacts were common across the towns: accommodation is expensive and in short supply; clubs
and organisations are under pressure; itinerants cause visual and crime impacts, and impacts on the
social fabric and identity of the community; shift work/equal time rosters/itinerant lifestyle cause
physical, mental and social health issues; and an increase in traffic density increases the potential
for motor vehicle accidents. Variation occurred in relation to impacts from coal dust, noise and
power shortage; water shortage; availability of social infrastructure and services; the percentage of
itinerants in the local population; and local spending habits. Petkova et al. (2009) conclude that the
extent of social impacts on most communities is determined by the number of coal mines close to
town and the size of the non-resident workforce.
In Western Australia, Petrova and Marinova (2013) identify significant demographic changes in the
agricultural community of Boddington, which has been subject to small-scale bauxite mining for the
past three decades and large-scale gold mining since 2010. The start of gold mining signalled
significant in-migration and the transition to a highly mobile population. Petrova and Marinova
(2013) contend that two new phenomena – transiency and dependency culture – are transforming
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the local social environment. While the authors confirm that Boddington is a socially cohesive
community, it is under pressure:
The unfavourable impacts of mining on the local business environment and the
recent decline in social capital combined with the transient workforce could
potentially be a serious threat to the local community, impacting on its sense of
place and culture. (Petrova and Marinova, 2013, p. 162)
The authors suggest that the sustainability of the town will depend on the extent that residents are
able to maintain current levels of social and economic capital and benefit from the economic
opportunities associated with mining.
This group of studies identify that the social impacts of mining are exacerbated by the size of the
non-resident workforce and the cumulative impacts of multiple mining operations in proximity to
each other. At the regional level, mining impacts may be less adverse. Hajkowicz et al. (2011)
explore the impacts of mining on the quality of life and wellbeing of mining-impacted people in 71
local government areas. The authors present examples of positive mining impacts, including
income, housing affordability, communication access, education and employment. Hajkowicz et al.
(2011) say they find no evidence of “systematic negative association between quality of life and the
gross value of minerals production”. They acknowledge, however, that the regional benefits of
mining may conceal localised inequalities and disadvantages, such as those identified by Lockie et
al. (2009), Petkova et al. (2009) and Petrova and Marinova (2013).
This section confirms that there is a substantial body of literature that examines the social impacts
of mining in Australia; however, little research has examined how mining proponents make risk
decisions when evaluating the impact of their projects. This is a gap in the literature. Furthermore,
none of the studies explored in this section of the literature review engage with the concept of social
risk.
Conclusion
This review identified four gaps in the literature. First, there is a lack of consistency around the
meaning attributed to social risk. Three different orientations to social risk have been identified
based on who or what is at risk: risk to people, risk to the business, and risk to both people and the
business. If this diversity of meanings attributed to social risk in the literature is replicated in
practice, it would raise questions about the quality of SRAs. After all, how can social risk be
assessed and avoided or mitigated if there is no agreement on what is at risk? Little research has
been undertaken by mining scholars to differentiate the meanings attributed to social risk. Second,
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the relationship between social risk and social impact is unclear. In the grey literature, the terms are
often coupled or used interchangeably. In contrast, scholars tend to engage with social risk and
social impact separately. Very little prior research has explicitly compared and contrasted these two
concepts. Third, proponents are only one group of actors in the risk governance of coal mining
projects. The regulators, other government agencies, and potentially affected individuals, for
example, also have important functions. Little previous research has explored the role of
proponents’ project evaluations in the overall risk governance of coal mining projects in Australia.
Fourth, the construction and assessment of social risk in the Australian coal mining project
environment has not been empirically examined despite the growing use of the term in mining
industry discourse. Scholars tend to explore the social impacts of specific mining projects or
operations rather than examining how proponents make risk decisions when evaluating their mining
projects.
In reviewing the literature, this chapter provided context for examining the research question: How
is social risk constructed and assessed by team members of Australian coal mining projects? The
next chapter develops the conceptual framework of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 3: A RISK GOVERNANCE APPROACH TO ASSESSING
COAL PROJECTS
The different risk governance components and their interfaces have to be adequately designed
to be able to deal with the ‘factual’ as well as the ‘socio-cultural’ context, i.e. to include the
varying values and perceptions of pluralist societies.
Aven and Renn (2010), Risk Management and Governance, p. 53.
Introduction
This chapter describes the evaluative conceptual framework used to examine how team members of
Australian coal mining projects construct and assess social risk and the conditions that support SRA
competence. SRA competence is the ability of project team members to assess risk to a standard
that avoids or mitigates risk to people. In this thesis, social risk is defined as uncertainty and
ambiguity about the physical or non-physical consequences of future events or activities, such as
coal mining, on individuals and civic entities. Social risk can also be produced by events or
activities not occurring, such as proponents not conducting a cultural heritage survey prior to
mining. The context for the examination of social risk is the project evaluation environment (see
Figure 3.A).
Figure 3.A: The context in which coal mining project teams construct and assess social
risk.
Once proponents complete their project evaluation, including the EIS, and decide that the project
warrants investment, they submit a development application to the regulating authority. The
regulator assesses whether the benefits of the project outweigh its downside risks and determines
whether the project can proceed. This process is a type of risk governance, a concept presented by
Renn (2008), Aven and Renn (2010), van Asselt and Renn (2011), and others. For these scholars,
risk governance encompasses all the regulations, systems, processes and tools that are used by
Regulatory risk
governance of (coal)
mining projects
Project evaluation
conducted by proponent
All risks considered by
proponent
Social risk
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diverse actors – including governments, corporations, civil society and individuals – to collect,
analyse and communicate risk information in order to make risk-related decisions. This is the
understanding of risk governance that is applied in the thesis.
Based on this understanding of risk governance, project evaluation can be considered one of three
key components of mining project risk governance in Australia. The first component is regulatory
requirements at the state level, such as the EIS, the SIA and the inclusive consultation plan. This
component includes other requirements as specified by the Coordinator-General of the Department
of State Development, Manufacturing, Infrastructure and Planning in Queensland or the Secretary
of the Department of Planning and Environment in NSW.6 Regulatory requirements include two
further processes: a review by the PAC and formal submissions. The PAC’s review of the
development application is triggered if more than 25 people make submissions on the development
application, the relevant local government authority objects in writing, or associated political
donation disclosure statements are received. It only applies in NSW. Actors such as local
governments, landholders, residents of nearby towns, indigenous groups, and activists, have an
opportunity to make formal submissions in support of, or in opposition to, the development
application. The second component is regulatory requirements at the federal level if triggered via
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, and most major mining
projects will trigger this Act. The third component is the project evaluation work undertaken by the
mining proponent to meet corporate and regulatory requirements, including the assessment of social
risk.
Many project proponents do not consider project evaluation to be part of a broader risk governance
framework. Their focus is self-interest; that is, on maximising project value and obtaining
development consent. In contrast, regulators, potentially affected people and other actors want to
maximise the benefits of coal projects and to minimise the downside risks to them and to the
environment. The way proponents conceptualise project evaluation can influence how they consider
other components of the risk governance framework, such as formal submissions. Do proponents
consider these submissions to be a democratic mechanism to highlight different perspectives of
project risk, or do they consider them to be a hurdle that must be overcome en route to development
consent, or something else altogether?
6 As mining is a state government responsibility, the jurisdictions of most relevance in this thesis are Queensland and New South Wales – the
country’s largest coal producing states.
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Figure 3.B: A conceptual framework of mining project risk governance.
Risk governance forms the foundation of the conceptual framework of this thesis. Figure 3.B
provides a graphical representation of the framework. The scope of risk governance is represented
by the outer circle. It contains three interrelated principles of risk governance – multidisciplinarity,
inclusiveness and multidimensionality – which are based on the premise that different actors
construct risk differently. Diverse risk perspectives, therefore, need to be canvassed in order to
understand those differences and to make risk decisions. Lockie and Measham (2012, p. 6) describe
this type of approach as “empirical validity”. The development of these principles is influenced by
the work of van Asselt and Renn (2011). The principles are numbered according to their
foundational level. In other words, each principle builds upon the foundation of the preceding
principle: without a commitment to the first principle – multidisciplinarity – it may be challenging
to achieve the second principle, inclusiveness; without inclusiveness, it may be difficult to achieve
multidimensionality. In the project evaluation process, risk decisions are made by the project team
under the guidance of the project governance committee. By adopting the three principles of risk
governance, the project team has the potential to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the
social risks generated by its project and, therefore, to be able to make informed risk decisions.
The risk governance principle of multidisciplinarity
Underpinning the principle of multidisciplinarity is an acknowledgement that risk may be
understood differently across disciplinary domains and that diverse tools, methods and frameworks
of analysis can be used, depending on the discipline in which assessors place themselves (Lupton,
2013). Environmental scientists assessing the risks of a mining project to the surrounding
environment, for example, are interested in natural phenomena. They want to understand potential
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changes to downstream water quality (changes in the salt content and other pollutants, as well as the
subsequent impacts on biota), biodiversity (changes in the number of flora and fauna species,
particularly vulnerable and endangered species), stability of the landscape (erosion, loss of topsoil,
soil nutrition) and air quality (such as changes in dust concentrations, particularly PM10, PM2.5,
PM1). These changes are tracked by monitoring quantitative data and require specific tools,
methods and frameworks of analysis. Social scientists, on the other hand, are interested in social
phenomena; that is, risks to people and social entities. Will changes in water quality affect the
livelihoods of neighbouring farmers and graziers? Will mining reduce access to water for local
residents? Will changes in the stability of the landscape affect the visual amenity for the project’s
neighbours? Will changes in air quality lead to increased incidences of asthma or other respiratory
conditions and diseases? Will mining affect indigenous peoples’ connection to land? These risks are
understood using qualitative as well as quantitative data, often using different tools, methods and
frameworks of analysis from those used by environmental scientists. Both perspectives are valid
and both perspectives are critical in building a picture of the overall risk generated by the project.
There are also differences in risk approaches across the disciplines. Renn et al. (2011) explain that
techno-scientific approaches to risk, for example, are focused on developing discrete strategies to
identify and control a defined set of risk factors. The strengths of these approaches to risk
assessment include the ability to: identify risks and map causal factors (van Voorst, 2014); make a
process or technique controllable, safe and reliable (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006); estimate the
expected physical harm from the phenomenon being analysed and to develop risk reduction actions
(Renn, 1998); and systematise data and uncertainties in order to identify patterns and to draw
conclusions about the riskiness of the phenomenon being analysed (Aven and Renn, 2010). In
contrast, social scientific approaches to risk focus on understanding the broader “risk phenomenon”,
including types of harm and the ambiguities associated with different interpretations of risk (Renn
et al., 2011, p. 5). Risk assessors using a social science perspective consider important sociocultural
factors, such as the way different individuals and groups value certainty and different types of
“social reality” (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003; Zinn, 2009, p. 510), and the influence of subjective
judgements, such as heuristics and cognitive biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et
al., 1982; Slovic et al., 1982; Simon, 1982); acknowledge the complexity of risk and the trade-offs
required in risk decision-making (Aven and Renn, 2010; Domínguez-Gómez, 2016); see risk in
relative rather than absolute terms (Bradbury, 1989); consider lay people’s knowledge and
perspectives (Wynne, 1992, 1998; van Voorst, 2014); and address the concerns actors may have
about the risks facing them (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2012). There is, however, some commonality
between disciplines more broadly in the way they systematically investigate a specific subject area
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to generate new knowledge (Jetzkowitz et al., 2018). There are established systems and protocols
for data generation. In the coal mining project environment, baseline studies are required for the
natural and social sciences to determine local conditions prior to the commencement of the project
so that comparisons can be made with conditions after mine construction and operation.
There is a richness in the diversity of risk perspectives that could be harnessed in risk decision-
making. As Aven and Renn (2018) state, most risk decisions relate to more than one dimension of
risk and, therefore, require trade-offs in relation to value priorities. Assessors experienced in these
dimensions are required to negotiate the trade-offs. In the context of this thesis, social risk from coal
mining projects sits at the intersection between the physical world (the project) and the human
world (the risks the project poses to people). There is value, therefore, in project team members
drawing on both techno-scientific and social scientific expertise in order to assess social risk.
Techno-scientific expertise includes engineering, environmental science, geology and so forth,
while social scientific expertise includes sociology, psychology and anthropology. This is the
position I take in the thesis and it is informed by Aven and Renn’s (2010) perspective on the dual
nature of risk:
The dual nature of risk as a potential for physical change and as a social
construction demands a dual strategy for risk management. Public values and
social concerns may act as the driving agents for identifying those topics for
which risk assessments are judged necessary or desirable. The central task, of
balancing the opportunities and risk of modern technologies and other human
activities in accordance with the needs and visions of those who ought to be
served requires a plural but integrated attempt to have the technical and the
social sciences join forces to shape a humane future in line with best available
knowledge and a consensus on social expectations. (Aven and Renn, 2010, p.
40)
Of course, risk assessors also need to confirm that their constructions of social risk are aligned and,
if not, that they negotiate an agreement so that they can proceed with the assessment and, more
broadly, the project evaluation.
The principle of multidisciplinarity requires the project team to have the disciplinary backgrounds
and experience needed to assess the diversity of risks the project generates and to review the
associated studies. In addition to the standard engineering and scientific expertise, are there team
members with sufficient experience in the social dimensions of mining to be able to assess social
risk? Are the strategies adopted fit-for-purpose, rather than “automatic rules that are intended to fit
all situations” (Aven and Renn, 2018, p. 235)? Using this principle, I am examining whether the
project team discusses how decisions are to be made in the face of uncertainty.
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Achieving multidisciplinarity is not without its challenges, given the ontological distinctions
between the disciplines on risk and, as Wong and Lockie (2018) identify, a lack of conceptual and
methodological tools to bridge this divide. The risk governance principle of inclusiveness, outlined
in the next section, seeks to address the challenge of working with diverse risk perspectives. Aven
and Renn (2018) describe this type of approach as a discursive strategy, which is required in
circumstances where there are conflicting values and concerns among actors.
The risk governance principle of inclusiveness
The principle of inclusiveness requires potentially affected people and other actors to be included in
the assessment of risk so that they can discuss their risk perspectives, concerns, and their aspirations
for the project with the project team. It is also about encouraging a shared framing of risk, so that
the risk perspectives of the most powerful actors – such as project proponents – do not dominate the
assessment of social risk. In developing this principle, I draw on three key concepts: the social
construction of risk (the rationale), framing (the dominance of techno-scientific risk frames in
project evaluation) and collaborative approaches to risk decision-making (a solution). At the heart
of the first concept – social construction of risk – is an understanding that risk perspectives are
mediated through social interaction via the family, school or work environments, sporting and other
social networks, and the media. Burgess (2015) explains that risk is an idea rather than a fixed
reality that is developed through interaction with social influences. Bradbury (1989, p. 389) argues
that ‘truth’ is relative and that risk does not exist independently of individuals or social groups:
It is people, and not independent facts, who constrain the way concepts are
framed, questions posed, and research goals set. And it is people who design
event and fault trees, close options, choose attribute sets, fund data collection,
interpret and publish findings. Once the criterion of an absolute truth is
abandoned, then surely no one can avoid the inference that people see the
world differently and that these differences emerge from different experiences
of differently constructed social worlds [emphasis in original].
Hillson (2010) asserts that risk is managed by people making judgements about risk in the face of
uncertainty as they see it. Different people see the same risk differently and this influences their
behaviour towards the risk. Drawing more on the psychology than the sociology of risk, Hillson and
Murray-Webster (2012) developed a conceptual model of factors that influence the construction of
risk. They call this model the triple strand of subconscious, conscious and affective factors.
Conscious factors, they assert, are the visible and measurable characteristics, including situational
factors such as familiarity, manageability and proximity of the risk. Subconscious factors include
heuristics and cognitive biases (see Section 3.4 for a discussion of heuristics). Because heuristics
are subconscious, their influence is not readily apparent. Affective factors are the visceral feelings,
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such as fear, excitement or attraction that occur automatically in the face of risk (Hillson and
Murray-Webster, 2012). Hillson and Murray-Webster note that in risk situations, people not only
consciously assess the situation, but their subconscious biases and feelings also influence the
decisions they make about the situation. I engage with these concepts of the triple strand model in
my examination of project team members’ construction and assessment of social risk. Social and
psychological constructions of risk stand in contrast to positivist notions of risk; in particular, that
“objective facts can be explained, predicted and controlled by science” (Bradbury, 1989, p. 381)
and that it is possible to determine the absolute truth about risk (Shader-Frechette, 1991).
The concept of ‘framing’ has its origins in social constructivism (Allan et al., 2010). Entman (1993)
states that framing involves selection and salience:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described. (Entman, 1993, p. 52)
I consider the project evaluation environment to be dominated by techno-scientific experts, both in
the project team and in the consultancies that undertake the series of studies during feasibility.
Techno-scientific experts tend to frame their own construction of risk as the only risk ‘reality’ and
often dismiss other risk perspectives as irrational or erroneous and fail to acknowledge the
assumptions inherent in their own risk perspectives (Bradbury, 1989; Wynne, 1992, 1998; Tulloch
and Lupton, 2003; Zinn, 2009; van Voorst, 2014). This, Wynne (1992, p. 276) asserts, creates an
“ideological smokescreen that avoids the underlying issue, namely, the social relations of
technology”. Lidskog and Sundqvist (2012) argue that, in the public policy arena, what is presented
as a democratic risk decision is actually based on a techno-scientific framing of risk. The authors
contend that in these circumstances, lay people (non-experts, such as potentially affected people)
are reduced to a dualistic role in which they trust or distrust experts; they are called to say “yes or
no to already decided proposals” and are restricted to “only discussing the local and concrete
aspects of a project” (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2012, p. 1020). Freudenburg and Gramling (1994, p.
51) use the term ‘diversionary reframing’ to describe the process in which powerful actors [such as
project proponents] divert attention away from lay people’s concerns about a technological
development [or coal mining] by accusing them of being opposed to ‘science’ in general. Wynne
(1998) holds a similar position when he comments on the influence of the epistemological
assumptions of ‘good science’:
Established concepts of ‘good science’ which lend politically privileged
authority to particular scientific subcultures and exclude others, are not
naturally given but culturally validated – and the reciprocal validation occurs
too. A new domain of debate is therefore opened up, concerning the
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articulation of different public values and intellectual perspectives, with criteria
of ‘good science’ that come to be institutionalised and exercised in many
economic, technological, medical, health, educational and environmental
domains [emphasis in original]. (Wynne, 1998, p. 74)
Lockie and Measham (2012, p. 6) describe this type of phenomenon as “the contested and dynamic
nature of dominant conceptualisations of risk”.
I draw on Wynne’s (1992) exploration of dominant conceptualisations of risk in his study of
Cumbrian sheep farmers in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear accident to understand the
potential for conflict between coal project teams, who hold the dominant conceptualisation of risk,
and potentially affected people and other actors. Wynne identifies a “cultural dislocation” between
the different types of knowledge held by the scientists and farmers, arguing that the scientists’
culture is focused on prediction and control, while the farmers’ culture is underpinned by the
assumption that there are many environmental and social factors that cannot be controlled (Wynne,
1998, p. 289). Given their construction of risk, scientists and government authorities dismissed the
farmers’ local expertise, in much the same way that project team members can dismiss the risk
perspectives and knowledge of potentially affected people. This behaviour triggers what Wynne
describes as a “negative cycle of polarization”. In this cycle, lay people’s anxiety about a
technological development [or a coal project] is interpreted and framed by experts as ignorance or
irrationality. Having their identity, rationality and the legitimacy of their position repudiated by
experts exacerbates lay people’s anxiety, thereby continuing the cycle of polarisation (Wynne,
1992). The solution to this dilemma, Wynne contends, is to acknowledge that both types of
knowledge are conditional and their different assumptions hidden:
The key is to recognize that this will always be true, and to explicate the buried
conditional assumptions or commitments, so that the debate and negotiation
can address these dimensions. Too often the social world is portrayed as
deficient because it does not match the assumptions of the technologists or risk
analysts. Negotiations about these social models would be more constructive,
and would constitute a more reflexive learning process. (Wynne, 1992, p. 286)
Explicating the buried conditional assumptions so that the debate and negotiation can address these
dimensions is the focus of my approach to collaborative decision-making.
There are many examples in the literature of concepts for collaborative decision-making. Three
concepts that I explored are the consensus building approach developed by Canada’s National
Round Table on the Environment and the Economy in the early 1990s (Cormick et al., 1996);
soft systems methodology adapted from systems engineering to deal with the complexity of human
interactions with technology (Checkland and Poulter, 2010); and Wong’s (2017) Hybrid Risk
Governance Framework. What the proponents of these three approaches have in common is a
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realisation and acceptance that different actors can have different world views and different
constructions of risk; that an understanding of these differences – particularly the buried conditional
assumptions – is required before an agreement on how to address the risks or challenges can be
negotiated; and that the actors have a role to play in identifying risks, and implementing and
monitoring risk mitigation measures or the solutions to the challenges being discussed. These
factors form the basis of my understanding of collaborative decision-making.
The previous subsections presented the rationale for the principle of inclusiveness. The following
paragraphs describe how the principle is applied in the thesis. In using the principle of
inclusiveness, I am testing for the extent to which project team members acknowledge that
potentially affected people, the regulating authority, the local council and other actors may have
different risk perspectives from their own. To what extent does the project team use diverse social
engagement mechanisms to maximise inclusiveness, such as face-to-face, individual interviews;
social events hosted by the project team; the establishment of a project shop front so that people can
come for project updates, ask questions and look at displays, models and 3D simulations; risk
assessment workshops led by an independent facilitator; and technical and risk mitigation
workshops? Are social engagement mechanisms selected based on the needs of potentially affected
people and other actors? When engaging with indigenous Australians, for example,
O’Faircheallaigh (2011) observes the importance of adopting this strategy. He explains that
conventional engagement practices may not be appropriate and he recommends: making greater use
of graphical materials; conducting small meetings on traditional lands with separate meetings for
men and women, elders and young people; holding informal discussions; and undertaking field trips
so that indigenous groups can see similar mining projects elsewhere and, thereby, gain a greater
understanding of the risks they may face. He also notes that culturally or politically sensitive
information may be inappropriate to share with members of the opposite sex or non-indigenous
people.
In applying the principle of inclusiveness, I am also examining the extent to which potentially
affected people and other actors are able to discuss their risk perspectives, concerns and aspirations
for the project and for those views to be considered in designing the mine. Do potentially affected
people have an opportunity to question experts, and is their knowledge and experience integrated
into the project evaluation process? Do project team members share their risk perspectives,
organisational requirements and any ‘non-negotiables’? Is the level of uncertainty around risks
discussed and are the results of the commissioned studies shared? Are decisions made
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collaboratively about how to mitigate risks and what monitoring is required? Are interested parties
able to participate in monitoring activities and is monitoring data made publicly available?
The objective of the collaborative decision-making process is for the project team and other actors
to agree on a mine plan and a suite of risk mitigation measures that the parties can live with, even if
they do not agree on individual elements of the plan. With this in mind, I am testing the extent to
which the project team includes a realistic social engagement schedule in the project timeline and
allocates time for changes to be made to the mine plan. Does the project team also budget for
comprehensive risk mitigation measures? Does the team communicate with potentially affected
people and other actors on an ongoing basis, so they are aware of the final mine plan and the EIS
before these documents are submitted to the regulating authority as part of the development
application? In other words, has the team limited the potential for actors to be surprised by what is
in the development application and, thereby, reduced the likelihood of conflict?
The risk governance principle of multidimensionality
The principle of multidimensionality builds on the principles of multidisciplinarity and
inclusiveness. The principle requires different types of knowledge, such as techno-scientific, local
and indigenous knowledge, to be integrated into the project evaluation process so that proponents
are in a position to make informed risk decisions. It is also about project teams considering
psychological and sociocultural factors as a means of seeking to understand alternative risk
perspectives. In developing this principle, I draw firstly on the knowledge integration literature and
then on the psychology and sociology of risk literatures. Miller et al. (2008) coin the term
‘epistemological pluralism’ to recognise that there are different ways of knowing. The authors
assert that accommodating epistemological pluralism – by focusing on social processes and values
involved in knowledge production and through a continuous process of negotiation – can lead to
better, more integrated outcomes.
In the mining project environment, techno-scientific knowledge is already well-integrated into the
evaluation of coal projects; techno-scientific experts dominate project teams and the consultancies
that undertake the series of studies during feasibility. These studies include geotechnical
assessments of open-cut pit designs or underground mining conditions; structural integrity of
tailings dams; and the EIS studies that include assessing noise, blasting, air quality, ecology, surface
water, groundwater, Aboriginal archaeological values, historic heritage, greenhouse gas and energy,
and traffic impacts, as well as a preliminary hazard analysis. What I am looking for in applying the
principle of multidimensionality is the extent to which other types of knowledge, such as local and
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indigenous knowledges, are considered in the project evaluation process. Before these types of
knowledge are explored in this section, I note that indigenous knowledge is not a key feature to
emerge from my research data. However, indigenous knowledge is included in this discussion of
multidimensionality because there are many mining contexts around the world, and in Australia, in
which indigenous knowledge is a key feature. In addition, there has been a push for greater
integration of indigenous knowledge in scientific assessments such as the United Nation’s
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (Obermeister, 2017). Furthermore, the exploration of indigenous knowledge
raises important points of debate, such as knowledge ownership, which is explored later in the
section.
Local knowledge, according to Maclean and Bana Yarralji Bubu (2015, p. 4) is “understood in
relation to the connection to the place where it evolved”; that is, “place-based knowledge”.
Raymond et al. (2010, p. 1768) explain that although local knowledge can include “expert
knowledge”, it usually refers to the knowledge of lay people, and tends to be informal, personal and
often implicit or tacit. Sutherland et al. (2013) explain that local and indigenous knowledge can
provide complementary perspectives due to shared observation and experimentation that may not be
evident in techno-scientific knowledge.
Indigenous knowledge is defined by Berkes (1999, p. 8, in Obermeister, 2017, p. 82) as “a
cumulative body of knowledge, practice and belief, evolving by adaptive processes and handed
down through generations by cultural transmission, about the relationship of living beings
(including humans) with one another and with their environment”. For Stevenson (1996, p. 280), it
is the “knowledge, experiences, wisdom and philosophies that aboriginal people can bring to bear”.
Some scholars (Agrawal, 1995; Stevenson, 1996) argue that delineating between indigenous and
other types of knowledge is problematic. Agrawal calls the separation of indigenous and ‘western’
knowledge, for example, an “artificial divide”. Rather than focusing on the differences between
these types of knowledge, he asserts that it would be more useful to identify the similarities.
Furthermore, indigenous knowledge does not remain isolated from other influences: “Certainly
what is today known and classified as indigenous knowledge has been in intimate interaction with
western knowledge since at least the fifteenth century” (Agrawal, 1995, P. 422). This is a point also
made by Stevenson (1996) when he writes that most indigenous people have also accumulated
significant non-traditional knowledge through their interaction with non-indigenous people and
cultures.
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Notwithstanding Agrawal and Stevenson’s concerns, I join other scholars and scientific
organisations in considering knowledge integration to be a worthwhile endeavour (e.g. Miller et al.,
2008; Raymond et al., 2010; IPBES, 2012; Sutherland et al., 2013; Tengӧ et al., 2014). I 
acknowledge, however, that knowledge integration is not without its challenges. Stevenson (1996),
for example, raises questions about knowledge ownership in his examination of the way proponents
of industrial developments, such as mining, oil and gas, and hydro, in the Yukon and the Northwest
Territories of Canada, incorporate indigenous knowledge into environmental assessments. He found
that proponents tend to lack understanding of how their projects affect indigenous peoples’ lands
and lifestyles, particularly in relation to local ecosystem health. Many indigenous people, he
contends, view the extraction of their knowledge from its original sociocultural context during
environmental assessments “as a form of theft and, understandably, have been reluctant to share the
depth and breadth of their knowledge with outsiders” (Stevenson, 1996, p. 282). Stevenson uses this
quote from the Yellowknives Dene First Nations people to reinforce his point:
Since [we] indigenous peoples have our own worldview […] we feel that no
industrial developer should be expected to collect, interpret and present the
views and concerns, the knowledge, or the understanding of indigenous
peoples. Instead, indigenous peoples should be given the opportunity to
document and present our circumstances and our own evaluation of potential
impacts from major developments on our people, culture, and lands [….] When
Western scientists include the knowledge of selected local people in their
studies, our people are passive contributors, and our knowledge, removed from
our people’s worldview, is subjected to interpretation through the Western
worldview. (Yellowknives Dene First Nation, 1995b, pp. 7–8 in Stevenson,
1996, p. 283)
The need for indigenous people to lead the collection and distribution of their knowledge in relation
to significant development projects is a point also raised by O’Faircheallaigh (2011):
Indigenous control of SIA maximises the ability of Indigenous groups to
ensure that appropriate methodologies are employed and that relevant issues
are not just included in the ToR [terms of reference] but are actually explored
in practice, and that any additional issues important to Indigenous participants
can be explored. (O’Faircheallaigh, 2011, p. 145)
O’Faircheallaigh’s views stem from his management of an Aboriginal SIA of the proposed
Kimberley LNG precinct in Western Australia. The Canadian and Australian examples presented
here highlight the importance of the principle of inclusiveness in providing a foundation for
multidimensionality. By encouraging a shared framing of risk through diverse engagement
mechanisms, project proponents are exposed to how different actors construct project risk. This
awareness can provide the basis or space needed for proponents to consider commissioning
environmental and social assessments that are led by indigenous or other potentially affected
people.
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Raymond et al. (2010) note that knowledge integration can also face ontological, epistemological
and application challenges. They propose a framework based on four themes and seven questions to
address these challenges, which they applied across three knowledge integration case studies.
Through this work, the authors found that there was a need for project proponents to improve their
knowledge integration processes in four key areas:
(1) the identification of the different epistemological beliefs which underpin
knowledge claims; (2) the engagement of different knowledges, including how
the knowledge integration methods established different ways of knowing;
(3) the evaluation of how the knowledge integration mechanisms and processes
supported learning and shared understanding, and (4) the level of application of
knowledge integration outputs by multiple stakeholders during the project and
after project completion. (Raymond et al., 2010, p. 1775)
Raymond et al. (2010) conclude from these insights that there is no single optimum approach for
knowledge integration.
Tengӧ et al., (2014, p. 580) present an alternative approach that they call multiple evidence base 
(MEB), which considers different types of knowledge in parallel. The authors distinguish between
integration, synergies and co-production of knowledge. MEB has three stages: collaborative
definition of problems and goals; discussion and evaluation of similarities, complementarities and
contradictions across knowledge systems; and reflection of results, reassessment of knowledge gaps
and opportunities for further collaboration. MEB and the framework developed by Raymond et al.
(2010) reflect the same reasoning evident in collaborative decision-making: an acceptance that
different actors can have different world views and different constructions of risk; that an
understanding of these differences – particularly the buried conditional assumptions – is required
before an agreement on how to address the risks can be negotiated; and that the actors have a role to
play in identifying risks, and implementing and monitoring risk mitigation measures.
In the preceding paragraphs, the concept of knowledge integration was presented. The terms ‘local
knowledge’ and ‘indigenous knowledge’ were defined. The contentious nature of delineating types
of knowledge was highlighted. Key challenges facing knowledge integration and two methods used
to address those challenges were explored. While I acknowledge the challenges inherent in
knowledge integration, I suggest that a willingness to consider different types of knowledge, discuss
the “similarities, complementarities and contradictions” (Tengӧ et al., 2014, p. 580) and negotiate a 
path forward will enable project proponents to make better informed risk decisions.
I now turn to the psychology and sociology of risk literatures to provide an overview of heuristics
and sociocultural biases; that is, factors that influence how people construct risk. Unlike many
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social science scholars (such as Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982;
Slovic, 1987), I consider psychological and sociocultural factors to be equally important in
analysing risk perspectives. From a psychology of risk perspective, when simplifying complex
decisions, people make inferences based on their knowledge about the phenomenon under
consideration, their subjective interpretations of probability, and their personal beliefs. These
inferences are called judgement heuristics and understanding this process could help project teams
to make risk-related decisions. Tversky and Kahneman identify a number of common examples of
heuristics, including the easier it is to recall an example of something, the more common it must be
(the availability heuristic); the first information people consider prior to making a decision
influences that decision (the anchoring effect); and probabilities are evaluated by the degree to
which one characteristic resembles another (representativeness).7 Slovic (1987) extends the types of
heuristics that people use in relation to risk. For example, people are more concerned about risks if
the potential for harm is beyond their control, if the benefits go to some and danger to others, and if
they do not choose to engage the risk. Slovic found that people worry more about a new risk and
when the risk is unobservable. In addition, he found that people tend to be more concerned if many
people are exposed to the risk or when the risk affects them directly (Slovic, 1987).
While judgement heuristics are valid in some circumstances, Slovic et al. (1982) and Zinn (2009)
note that they often lead to systematic deviations from optimal decisions. Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) call these deviations ‘cognitive biases’ or ‘errors’. Consoli (2011) links Tversky and
Kahneman’s work on heuristics and biases with Simon’s (1982) concept of ‘bounded rationality’,
arguing that both concepts are strongly dependent on the broader context in which individuals
operate. Bounded rationality recognises that when dealing with a problem of choice, actors have a
limited capacity to process relevant information, and their decisions will be influenced by cognitive
or cultural biases (Simon, 1982). Armed with this understanding of risk psychology, project team
members may be in a position to better understand why their own constructions of risk could differ
from those held by potentially affected people and other actors.
The way people construct risk is also influenced by their sociocultural biases. In applying a
sociocultural risk lens, I assess the collection of values and beliefs people, such as techno-scientific
experts or potentially affected people, hold to make sense of their risk perspectives and actions. The
way people construct and respond to risk can be understood within the framework of their cultural
background and membership of social groups (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Douglas (1992)
argues that when making risk decisions, actors “come already primed with culturally learned
7 The conjunction rules states that the conjunction of two events (Linda is an active feminist and a bank teller) cannot be more probable than any of
the two events alone (Linda is a bank teller) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983).
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assumptions and weightings” (Douglas, 1992, p. 58). These “learned assumptions” are referred to as
“cultural biases” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, p. 8). Since it is not possible for a person to
consider all risks at once, the risks must be prioritised in some way. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982)
assert that risk prioritisation, which is undertaken in accordance with a person’s cultural biases,
means that knowledge about risk is necessarily partial and limited. People follow social rules about
which risks to address and which to ignore; what is in and what is out: “The different social
principles that guide behaviour affect the judgment of what dangers should be most feared, what
risks are worth taking, and who should be allowed to take them” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, p.
6). In seeking to understand the risk perspectives of different actors, it may be helpful for project
team members to consider the cultural backgrounds and social group memberships of those actors.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the conceptual framework of mining project risk governance. The
framework has three interrelated principles – multidisciplinarity, inclusiveness and
multidimensionality – which are based on the premise that different actors construct risk differently.
Diverse risk perspectives and knowledges, therefore, need to be canvassed in order to understand
those differences and to make informed risk decisions. In addition to acknowledging the diversity of
risk perspectives, applying the principles of risk governance requires a willingness to include
potentially affected people and other actors in identifying risks, teasing out any buried conditional
assumptions, negotiating an agreement on how to mitigate the risks, and implementing and
monitoring risk mitigation measures. At the heart of this conceptual framework is a contention that
project evaluation is not a standalone process; it is one of three components of mining project risk
governance in Australia. When assessing social risk, there is value in proponents conceptualising
project evaluation in the context of risk governance.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHOD
Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can
be counted.
– William Bruce Cameron in Informal Sociology, 1963.
Introduction
This chapter presents and justifies the research method. Patton (2002) states that qualitative
methods are useful in answering ‘how’ questions and, given that the primary research question of
this thesis is a ‘how’ question, that is the approach taken. The research design incorporates two
consecutive data generation methods: an exploratory review followed by case research.
Chapter 4 has 10 sections. The paradigm which underpins the research – constructivism – is
articulated in Section 4.2, followed by an outline of my background in Section 4.3. The next three
sections describe the research design, data generation and data analysis. An examination of the
trustworthiness of the research is presented in Section 4.7. The limitations of the research and the
ethical considerations are explored in the next two sections. Section 4.10 concludes the chapter. A
summary of the research method is presented in Table 4.E at the end of the chapter.
Research paradigm
This research is predominantly framed using the constructivist paradigm. The foundation of
constructivism is that ‘reality’ is socially constructed (Guba, 1990; Crotty, 1998; Riegler, 2012;
Obermeister, 2017). Creswell (2013) presents four philosophical assumptions about constructivism
which are adapted from Lincoln et al. (2011) and they broadly align with Lincoln and Guba (2013).
For Creswell, constructivist ontology is about multiple realities; epistemologically, reality is co-
constructed; inductive methods are the means of acquiring knowledge; and from an axiological
perspective, individual values are honoured and negotiated.
Guba and Lincoln (1990) argue that constructivism begins with the premise that the human world is
different from the natural, physical world and, therefore, it must be studied differently. In The
Constructivist Credo, Lincoln and Guba (2013) state that the presumptions they make are only
intended to apply to the human sciences and that the experimental ‘scientific method’ may be the
most useful means of examining the physical, natural world. This is not to say that they support
positivism; indeed, the contrary is the case. Guba (1990, p. 25) declares that the positivist
paradigms are “badly flawed and must be entirely replaced”. What they are saying in The
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Constructivist Credo is that scientific methods are a valid means of understanding the physical
world. In this thesis, social risk from coal mining projects is taken as sitting at the intersection
between the physical world (the project) and the human world (the risks the project poses to
people); therefore, there is value in drawing on both techno-scientific and social scientific expertise
when assessing social risk.
Researcher background
In addition to being positioned within a constructivist paradigm, this research is influenced by my
personal and professional background. I am a middle-aged, middle-class, Caucasian Australian
woman interested in social justice. I have worked in the mineral resources sector for more than 25
years, predominantly in communication management roles at the nexus between mining companies,
government and mining-affected people. In my professional life I have worked closely with
engineers and scientists to communicate their work to diverse audiences and I have helped explain
external actors’ views to mining personnel. In some ways I have acted as a conduit for the sharing
of meanings. Through this process I have observed a level of frustration among different groups of
actors at not being understood nor having their views considered valid by others. My observations
have meant that I am driven to unpack these dynamics in my research.
The decision to focus my research on coal mining projects in Australia stems from my professional
experience in this environment and my interest in the tale of two projects (see Chapter 1 for more
details).
Research design
According to Mason (2002), research design should be driven by the research questions. She
suggests that consideration be given to the type of data needed to answer the questions and that data
generation methods be selected on that basis. The primary research question for this thesis is: How
is social risk constructed and assessed by team members of Australian coal mining projects? Three
secondary questions have been developed:
1. What conceptualisations of social risk are predominantly used by team members of Australian
coal mining projects?
2. What paradigmatic assumptions underpin their construction and assessment of social risk?
3. How do these assumptions influence how project team members construct and assess social
risk?
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This research seeks to understand how a specific group of actors (team members of coal mining
projects) think and work (construct and assess social risk) in a natural context (the Australian coal
mining project environment) from their own perspective. Naturalistic inquiry is a research approach
in which data is generated in naturally occurring settings rather than in a laboratory or other
contrived environments (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The research design is not about achieving
experimental control nor is it about establishing causal relationships. It is not trying to test
hypotheses. The objective is to explore the research questions through immersion in the data and
uncovering patterns and themes using inductive rather than deductive analysis. Richness of data is
the focus. In framing the research questions, terms such as ‘conceptualisations’ and ‘paradigmatic
assumptions’ are used, which are indicative of a qualitative orientation (Guba and Lincoln, 1990;
Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).
The rationale for focusing on team members of coal mining projects stems from the considerable
power and control mining proponents have over the way they develop their projects. Understanding
how they construct and assess social risk is important because proponents drive key components of
risk governance in mining. Furthermore, insights around how they make risk decisions in this
context could lead to improvements in SRA practice and opportunities to avoid or limit project-
generated social risks.
The research design comprised two methods of data generation which were undertaken in
consecutive stages: an exploratory review, followed by case research. Using more than one data
generation method enabled the data to be triangulated or corroborated. The exploratory review
comprised interviews with industry participants. In keeping with the risk governance principles of
multidisciplinarity, participants were selected from diverse roles and different types of
organisations.
In stage two, case research was selected to generate rich data about a specific mining project so that
two different but complementary levels of data could be generated – broad data from the across the
Australian coal industry and rich data from a specific project. Case research enabled a deeper
evaluation of a specific project and the triangulation of research participants’ experiences and
perspectives of the same project. I considered applying an ethnographic approach to the case
research by tracking a project from concept through to the application for development consent.
However, project evaluation can take in excess of three years, making it unsuitable for PhD
research using traditional ethnographic methods. Identifying a project before the concept stage and
being ready to start research at that time also presented a logistical challenge. In addition, it was
unlikely I would have been given the type of access required for such a lengthy study. From my
Sandy Worden Chapter 4 57 | P a g e
mining industry experience, I note that proponents tend to be unwilling to put themselves under
scrutiny if there is the potential for them to be seen in an unfavourable light, such as failing to
obtain development consent, even if they are offered anonymity. This view was reinforced by the
unwillingness of proponents who failed to obtain development consent to participate in this
research.
4.4.1 The exploratory review (Stage 1)
The types of interviews selected for the exploratory review were semi-structured, in-depth and
predominantly face-to-face. Patton (2002) describes three ways of structuring interviews: open-
ended, semi-structured and structured (standardised). Semi-structured interviews offer the flexibility
to follow topics of importance to the research participants and to probe when interesting
information is presented, while also providing a level of consistency in topics covered so that
comparisons can be made between the points raised by the research participants. Face-to-face
interviews provide an environment conducive to the establishment of rapport and conversation
between me and the research participants. Johnson (2001) describes this process as building the
kind of intimacy required for personal disclosure, which is integral to the generation of rich data.
According to Robson (2011), face-to-face interviews also enable non-verbal cues from research
participants to be observed and used in the interpretation of their verbal responses. Face-to-face,
semi-structured in-depth interviews offered the best opportunity to engage the research participants
in conversation and to generate the richness of data needed to answer the research questions.
4.4.2 The case research (Stage 2)
Case research is a well-established research strategy (Robson, 2011) and a valuable form of social
science analysis (Yin, 1993). The focus is on one or multiple cases; that is, individuals, groups,
organisations, cultures, settings, neighbourhoods, regions, ‘real-life’ events and so on (Leonard-
Barton, 1990; Moore, 2001; Patton, 2002; Robson, 2011). Case research was selected for three
reasons:
1. It enables ‘how’ questions to be answered with a comprehensive understanding of the nature
and complexity of the case being analysed (Farquhar, 2012; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Meyer,
2001). The primary research question of this thesis is: How is social risk constructed and
assessed by team members of Australian coal mining projects?
2. It is designed for the exploration of new processes or behaviours that are not well understood
(Hartley, 1994 in Meyer, 2001). The key objective of the research is to explore how social
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risk is constructed and assessed in the coal mining project environment precisely because the
phenomenon is not well understood in this context.
3. It enables in-depth analysis (Gagnon, 2010; Hamel et al., 1993; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Yin,
1993, 2012) of “phenomena in context” (Gagnon, 2010, p. 2). The phenomenon being
examined is the construction and assessment of social risk within the context of the Australian
coal mining project environment. The specific context is the Koala Extension Project, which
is located in the Eucalyptus Pits region.8
The key criticisms of case research, according to Farquhar (2012), are that it is neither objective,
rigorous nor generalisable. In his case study work, Flyvbjerg (2011) compares the strengths and
weaknesses of case research against statistical analysis, a purely quantitative method. The
weaknesses he presents – a poor understanding of the phenomena under study in the general
population; unclear or unknown statistical significance; and that selection bias may overstate or
understate relationships – are aligned with the criticisms identified by Farquhar. These paradigmatic
criticisms are addressed in the section Research Trustworthiness.
From an epistemological perspective, Koala is an exploratory case. According to Scholz and Tietje
(2002), the term ‘case study’ is most frequently associated with the exploratory case study, which is
undertaken to develop propositions, models or theories through deep examination of the subject
matter. In other words, exploratory case studies are conspicuous by the absence of preliminary
propositions (Streb, 2010). This point is reiterated by Yin (2003), who describes the exploratory
case as a mechanism for developing the questions and propositions needed to undertake future case
studies. For Streb (2010), exploratory cases are particularly useful in examining an emerging topic
that has received little scholarly attention. He asserts that the principal characteristic of the
exploratory case is its usefulness in studying social phenomena in context, particularly when other
research methods are not possible.
In discussing the grounds for a single-case design, Yin (2003) identifies five rationales for case
selection: (1) a critical test of an existing theory, (2) an extreme or unique circumstance, (3) a
representative or typical case, with (4) a revelatory purpose, or (5) a longitudinal purpose.9 Scholz
and Tietje (2002) also present five rationales for choosing a single-case design: (1) the unique case,
(2) the prototypical case, (3) the salient case, (4) the revelatory case, and (5) the critical case. The
Koala Extension Project represents the revelatory case. Yin (2003) describes the revelatory case as
8 Pseudonyms have been used for the purpose of anonymity.
9 Yin (2003) argues that the single case is comparable with the single experiment undertaken in quantitative research, and that many of the same
justifications apply.
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a situation in which a researcher is given access to observe and analyse a phenomenon not
previously accessible to other researchers. To my knowledge, I am the first researcher to be given
access to team members of a contemporary Australian coal mining project and the associated
documentation for the purpose of examining how social risk is constructed and assessed. The Koala
Extension Project case, therefore, met the conditions for undertaking a single case study.
Data generation10
Two methods of data generation were undertaken in consecutive stages: an exploratory review
followed by case research.
4.5.1 Generating data from the exploratory review
Face-to-face, semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with 31 industry participants.11 A
four-step data generation method – similar to that outlined by Robinson (2014) – was used to guide
the research. The steps were to: define the sample boundaries, select a sample size, develop a
sample strategy and source the samples. The sample boundary was defined as people who have
experience working directly or indirectly with mining project teams. People with project experience
in commodities in addition to coal were considered. People with mine operational experience but
limited project experience were excluded.
There is significant debate among scholars about the optimum sample size for qualitative research.
The sample sizes recommended by Creswell (1998), van den Hoonaard (2012) and Edwards and
Holland (2013), for example, range from six to more than 30. I set a target range between 25 and 30
interviews. The rationale for targeting the upper end of the recommendations was to get as close as
possible to data saturation while considering the practicalities of access to industry personnel, and
time and financial constraints. Data saturation is a concept that was introduced by Glaser and
Strauss in 1967. Mason (2002) and Francis et al. (2010) explain that data saturation occurs when no
new data of material significance emerge from the research; in other words, when the researcher is
able to paint a picture of what is happening and is able to explain it. Mason (2002) notes a number
of criticisms of the data saturation concept, including its ad hoc and unsystematic nature, and the
lack of specific measurement criteria. While one can never be certain that data saturation has been
attained, I felt that on completion of the interviews that I had sufficient data from an exploratory
10 Mason (2002) argues that it is more accurate to use the term ‘data generation’ rather than ‘data collection’ because the researcher co-constructs
meaning with the research participants: “as a researcher you do not simply work out where to find data which already exist in a collectable state.
Instead, you work out how best you can generate data from your chosen data sources” (Mason, 2002, p. 52).
11 Two interviews were conducted by phone due to access issues and one was conducted using Skype, as the participant does not live in Australia.
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perspective to explain how members of Australian coal mining project teams construct and assess
social risk.
When considering which type of sampling strategy to use, I wanted to maximise the potential for
rich data and diverse participant perspectives, so I selected purposive sampling. The aim of
purposive sampling, according to Mason (2002), is to include a range of experiences,
characteristics, processes, types, categories, cases or examples so that the researcher can make
strategic and cross-contextual comparisons in order to answer the research questions. For Patton
(2002), the strength of purposive sampling is the ability of researchers to select information-rich
cases. Industry representatives with rich knowledge about the research questions were approached
to participate in the research. In keeping with the risk governance principle of multidisciplinarity
and the aim of purposive sampling, people were targeted who
• were employed in a cross-section of relevant organisations – including small, mid-tier and major
mining companies; EPCM companies; and consultancies (including sole operators) specialising
in mine planning, environmental impact assessments and SIAs;
• represented a range of professional backgrounds – including engineering, environmental
science, other science, risk management, project management, community relations and
communication management; and
• were from either Queensland or New South Wales (the two major coal mining states).
I initially selected research participants from within my business network. To build on that
foundation, the snowball technique was used, which involves asking participants to recommend
colleagues who may be suitable for the study (Robinson, 2014). Table 4.A provides a description of
the research sample.
Table 4.A: Description of the exploratory review research sample
Sample Description
Size 31
Characteristics 9 female research participants
22 male research participants
25 research participants with 10+ years’ mining industry experience
16 research participants with 20+ years’ mining industry experience
30 tertiary educated research participants
11 research participants from New South Wales
9 research participants from Queensland
1 research participant from outside Australia
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Current roles Approvals coordinator/manager; corporate affairs manager;
chairman; community relations manager; director; environment and
community manager; environmental scientist/manager; external
relations general manager; general manager health, safety,
environment and community (HSEC)/sustainable development;
managing director; principal consultant mine planning; project
general manager/manager; risk manager; social planner
Undergraduate discipline Applied science, archaeology, built environment, communication,
civil engineering, mechanical engineering, mining engineering,
environmental science, geology, industrial studies, language studies,
metallurgy, occupational hygiene, rural technology, science,
sociology/human geography
Once a list of potential research participants had been generated, a two-page research overview and
information sheet (see Appendix A) was developed which provided the researcher background, a
summary of the project and why it was important, and the rationale for selecting the potential
participant. Information was also provided about:
• How the data would be collected and used
• What was expected of the participant
• How anonymity would be maintained
• The voluntary nature of the research
• Ethics clearance
Contact details for the researcher, the primary supervisor and The University of Queensland human
ethics coordinator were included. The information sheet was emailed to potential participants with a
request to participate in the research. Follow-up emails and phone calls were made to some people
if they had not responded of their own volition.
Once agreement in principle to participate was received, an informed consent form (see Appendix
B) and a short demographic survey (see Appendix C) were emailed to the participants. An interview
guide was developed, pre-tested with three colleagues (an engineer, a risk manager and an
economist) then modified slightly. In response to feedback from the first research participant, the
guide was further modified to include a description of the structure of the interview, and questions
about risk and the project lifecycle, and the project the stage-gate process (see Appendix D).
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Table 4.B: Description of the exploratory review interviews
Method Description
Technique Face-to-face, in-depth interviews
Instrument Semi-structured interview protocol
Duration 60 to 105 minutes
Location At the participant’s office or an alternative venue of his/her choice
Recruitment Voluntary, confidential
The exploratory review interviews were conducted from July 2015 until October 2015. Table 4.B
describes the interviews. Apart from one interview that was conducted jointly with two colleagues,
the remaining interviews were conducted with individual research participants. In 28 cases, the
interviews were conducted face-to-face at participants’ places of work, home offices or other
nominated venues. Two interviews were conducted by telephone. One interview was conducted via
Skype. Prior to the start of each interview, the consent form was collected (if it had not been
provided already). Research participants were reminded that their participation was voluntary and
that they were free to withdraw until the time I planned to start data analysis (a timeframe was
provided). All interviews were recorded with an audio recording device and transcribed verbatim.
There were 37 hours of interviews. Once the transcripts were completed they were emailed to the
relevant participants for their records. Some follow-up emails, phone calls and mini-interviews were
conducted to clarify points or to request further information. Broad insights from the exploratory
review interviews were used to inform the case research.
4.5.2 Generating data from the case research
In seeking to identify potential case studies, I used my industry knowledge in addition to reviewing
the status of mining projects on the two state government websites:
(http://majorprojects.planning.nsw.gov.au/page/ and https://www.statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/
infrastructure-delivery/list-of-prescribed-and-critical-infrastructure-projects.html). Approaches were
made to five project proponents. Proponent approval was given to proceed with an exploration of
the Koala Extension Project in August 2015.
Yin (2003) argues that one of the most important sources of case study information is the interview,
and interviews with Koala Extension Project team members were a key component of the case
research. Based on the research specifications provided, a liaison from Marsupial Coal nominated
potential research participants to be approached and their contact details were provided. Before the
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approaches were made, the company liaison discussed the research with the potential participants
and advised them that organisational approval had been obtained for them to participate should they
wish to do so. I approached 12 people, nine of whom had worked directly on the Koala Extension
Project team, and three of whom were consultants who had worked on the project EIS or SIA. The
same two-page research overview and information sheet used in the exploratory review was
emailed to the potential case research participants. One person was unavailable and the remaining
11 agreed to participate. An informed consent form (see Appendix B) and a short demographic
survey (see Appendix C) were then emailed to them. Fieldwork was conducted in November 2015.
Table 4.C provides a description of the research sample.
Table 4.C: Description of the case research sample
Sample Description
Size 11
Characteristics 1 female research participant
10 male research participants
6 research participants with 10+ years’ mining industry experience
5 research participants with 20+ years’ mining industry experience
11 tertiary educated research participants
Current roles Approvals manager, approvals coordinator/environmental scientist,
environment and community manager, environment and community
general manager, environmental consultant, logistics manager,
project manager, social impact practitioner
Undergraduate discipline Civil engineering, construction management, hydrogeology, mining
engineering, environmental science, law, psychology, surveying
All interviews were conducted using face-to-face methods. A description of the interviews is
provided in Table 4.D (over page). Ten interviews were conducted at the participants’ place of work
and one at the participant’s home. Prior to the start of each interview, the consent form was
collected, if it had not been provided already. Research participants were reminded that their
participation was voluntary and that they were free to withdraw up until the start of data analysis. A
timeframe was provided. The interview guide used in the case research (see Appendix E) was
different from the one developed for the exploratory review as I wanted to generate richer data and
to facilitate participants’ recall of Koala Extension Project activities and events. The interviews
comprised three stages. In stage one, research participants were invited to discuss their recollections
of the activities undertaken as part of the project, such as key achievements and milestones, and any
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barriers or roadblocks that they had observed. As each interview progressed, I captured the major
points the research participants made on butcher’s paper. Stage one was allocated 30 minutes.
In stage two, participants were invited to draw a project timeline on the butcher’s paper provided, to
plot the activities captured in stage one on the timeline, and to identify any relationships between
the activities. Stage two was allocated 30 minutes. In stage three, 60 minutes were allocated for a
semi-structured interview to be conducted. During the interview process, I noted that for some
research participants, drawing the project timeline and being able to review it had triggered
memories about the project. Other research participants found it helpful to write or draw diagrams
on the butcher’s paper to aid their memory. All interviews were recorded with an audio recording
device and transcribed. There were 25 hours of interviews. Once the transcripts were completed,
they were emailed to the relevant participants for their records.
Table 4.D: Description of the case research interviews
Method Description
Technique Face-to-face, in-depth interviews
Instrument Semi-structured interview protocol
Duration 60 to 218 minutes
Location At the participant’s office or an alternative venue of his/her choice
Recruitment Voluntary, confidential
Analysing two data sets
Denzin and Lincoln (2000) identify two stages of data analysis: the organisation and categorisation
of data, followed by the construction of meaning from that data. In this research, NVivo 10 was
used to help organise and categorise the data, which comprised interview transcripts in MS Word
and other documents in PDF. All data sources were imported into an NVivo database established
specifically for this research. In preparation for the data importation, the heading styles used in the
Word documents were standardised to assist with auto-coding, and the names of the research
participants, and other people mentioned in the interviews, were removed from the transcripts. A
first-name pseudonym was assigned to each research participant. The names were selected
alphabetically – the first participant was given the pseudonym Aaron, the second Braydon, and so
on – taking into account the participant’s gender. Human names were used in preference to
‘Participant 1’ or some other naming protocol to make it easier for the reader to engage with the
thesis content.
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Based on the research questions and patterns emerging from early readings of the interview
transcripts, a preliminary thematic coding framework was developed. This framework was the basis
from which the initial data were openly coded. Patton (2002) describes ‘open coding’ as the process
of inductively analysing the data to identify categories, patterns and themes. New codes were
established inductively from the data so that as the coding progressed, further codes were added to
the framework. Where the text was applicable to multiple codes, it was applied to each relevant
code. From time to time, the framework was reviewed to adjust the hierarchical relationships of the
codes and to rationalise the coding protocol. Similar codes were merged and codes renamed to
enhance clarity of meaning.
Due to the differing focuses of the exploratory review and case research, the data sources from each
research stage were coded separately; however, this resulted in the duplication of codes and
inconsistencies in their hierarchical relationships. To address these issues and in keeping with
Patton’s (2002) recommendation to test the completeness of the classification system, a major
rationalisation of the coding framework was undertaken. The rationalisation process resulted in 257
individual codes being distributed across four tiers (parent, child, grandchild and great-grandchild
nodes) and eight meta-codes (parent nodes). The meta-codes are: (1) governance, (2) project
approvals, (3) risk, (4) issues/topics raised, (5) influence (positive, negative, neutral), (6) values (of
importance to the research participants, such as honesty, deliver on commitments), (7) risk
paradigms, and (8) background (of the project and the research participants).
Through the risk paradigms meta-code, I was able to track examples of techno-scientific and social
scientific risk approaches in the data. Yin (2003) argues that using a pattern-matching logic that
compares an empirically based pattern (what is in the data) with a predicted one (theoretical
propositions) can help to strengthen the internal validity of the research, so it was useful to link
what the research participants said with the relevant risk paradigm. Yin (2009, p. 130) describes this
process as “generalising to theoretical propositions”. While I have used an unusually complex
coding framework, a summary of which is provided in Appendix F, I felt that the framework was
appropriate for this research given the diversity and richness of the data. I found that this structure
enhanced my ability to interrogate the data, as did the text searches, and coding and matrix queries
that I ran in NVivo. Once the data had been organised and categorised to my satisfaction, I
examined the content against the research questions and the conceptual framework of the thesis.
The outcomes of this examination formed the basis of my findings and discussion chapters.
Sandy Worden Chapter 4 66 | P a g e
Research trustworthiness
There is considerable debate among scholars about the most appropriate criteria for assessing
research quality. Sandelowski (1986) comments that qualitative research methods are commonly
criticised for not meeting the requirements of scientific rigour (validity, reliability, generalisability
and objectivity). Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that the quality of qualitative research should,
instead, be linked to trustworthiness, a term which signifies that the research is of sufficiently high
standard that the results can be trusted and acted upon. Guba (1981) has articulated four criteria for
assessing trustworthiness: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. This section
describes the criteria and how they were addressed in this research.
The first criterion is credibility. Sandelowski (1986) argues that a qualitative study is credible when
it presents such accurate accounts of a human experience that the experience would be immediately
recognisable by the research participants, or when people who have only read about the experience
can recognise it when they come face-to-face with it. Shenton (2004) proposes a range of actions
aimed at producing credible research, including: the adoption of well-established research methods,
the development of an early familiarity with the culture of participating organisations, triangulation,
peer scrutiny of the research project, member checks, and thick description from the phenomenon
under scrutiny. ‘Thick description’ is a term used by Lincoln and Guba (1985) for the process of
describing a phenomenon in sufficient detail that one can determine whether the conclusions made
are transferable.
I have met the criteria for credibility by adopting well-established data generation methods: face-to-
face, semi-structured, in-depth interviews and case research. Having worked in the mineral
resources sector for more than 25 years, I am very familiar with the culture of the industry and
various organisations. To familiarise myself with the culture of Marsupial Coal, I reviewed the
project application documents submitted to the state government and published online, and the
project information on the proponent’s website prior to starting data generation. I employed data
and methodological triangulation. My research was peer-reviewed by my advisory team and a
senior social performance specialist experienced in project evaluation and who has no connection to
the research. To ‘check in’ with research participants, I carried out some follow-up emails, phone
calls and mini-interviews to clarify points or to request further information. In addition, the case
research findings were reviewed by two Marsupial Coal senior sustainability specialists, who had
indirect responsibility for Koala Extension Project, to verify the accuracy of my project description.
I have also provided thick description of social risk in the literature review and how social risk is
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constructed and assessed by team members of Australian coal mining projects in the findings
chapters of the thesis.
The second criterion – transferability – is defined by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as the ability to
transfer research findings from one context to another. For Leavy (2017) it is a way of making
research findings useful in other contexts. Guba (1981, p. 81) introduces the term ‘fittingness’ to
describe the degree of similarity required between two contexts for the research findings to be
transferable: “The naturalist does not attempt to form generalizations that will hold in all times and
in all places, but to form working hypotheses that may be transferred from one context to another
depending upon the degree of ‘fit’ between the contexts.” Guba (1981) recommends that
researchers conduct theoretical/purposive sampling, collect thick descriptive data, and develop thick
descriptions of the research context to enable readers to make those determinations. Whether the
research findings are transferable raises questions about who determines transferability. Shenton
(2004) suggests that it is the reader rather than the researcher who must determine the transferability
of the research to other situations based on the results and conclusions presented. I have met the
three transferability criteria stipulated by Guba (1981): I conducted purposive sampling; collected
thick descriptive data, as discussed in the previous paragraph; and I have completed a chapter that
describes the Australian coal mining project evaluation environment and one that describes the
Koala Extension Project to provide thick description of the research context.
Guba (1981) explains that the third criterion of trustworthiness – dependability – incorporates the
stability element of reliability with the ability to track variances in instrumentation; the researcher
being the instrument. Guba and Lincoln (1985) explain that dependability can be achieved through
the establishment of a chain of evidence, which Sandelowski (1986) proposes is evident when the
rationale of the project researcher can be readily followed by another researcher and when another
researcher can arrive at similar conclusions as the project researcher, given the same data,
perspective and situation. Chapter 4 provides a chain of evidence for the research by describing the
process in detail. The conceptual framework also provides guidance on how to interpret the findings
and discussion chapters.
According to Shenton (2004), the fourth criterion of trustworthiness – confirmability – is about
ensuring that, as far as practical, the research findings are derived from the research participants’
experiences and ideas rather than from the researcher’s predispositions. To enhance the
confirmability of my research, I articulated my paradigmatic assumptions and personal biases in this
chapter, and discussed the influence of my predispositions have had on the research. My advisory
team has acted as peer reviewers to ensure that I acknowledged the different voices in the thesis text
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– the research participants, authors of scholarly and grey literature, secondary research data
(documents) and my own voice. While my advisers did not conduct a review of my data sources,
they pushed me to justify my arguments with citations from those sources. In addition, the influence
of my predispositions was assessed by Marsupial Coal specialists when they reviewed my account
of the Koala Extension Project. They made no suggestions for amendments, an indication that I was
able to represent the case from the proponent’s and research participants’ experiences rather than
my own.
Limitations of the research
Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) concept of trustworthiness and its four criteria – credibility,
transferability, dependability and confirmability – was used as the benchmark for research quality
rather than using criteria from quantitative methods (i.e. validity, reliability, generalisability and
objectivity). In particular, no claims of generalizability are made. However, after reviewing Chapter
4 and then the subsequent chapters, readers should be in a position to determine whether the
findings from this research are transferable to their particular situations.
The scope of this research is limited to Australian coal mining project teams. Although I critically
analysed the data, the research presents the construction and assessment of social risk from the
perspectives of proponents and project teams. The perspectives of potentially affected people and
other external actors are considered from a theoretical perspective and by using secondary sources
(i.e. project team members’ interpretations), but the research does not capture these perspectives
through primary data.
Designing a research project requires making choices based on the researcher’s priorities. In the
case research my priority was to conduct a detailed examination, so I chose to limit my research to
one case, because the Koala Extension Project represents the revelatory case. Koala is a
brownfields, open-cut project that obtained development consent. The findings from this research
may not be transferable to greenfields projects, underground projects or projects that have not
obtained development consent.
Ethical considerations in undertaking the research
Before any work started on data generation for this research, clearance was obtained from the
Sustainable Minerals Institute’s Student Research Ethics Committee at The University of
Queensland, in accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council’s guidelines.
Sandy Worden Chapter 4 69 | P a g e
The generation of data in the exploratory review and the case research was not highly sensitive in
nature, and the research did not focus on indigenous or vulnerable peoples. Nevertheless, there were
a number of important ethical considerations:
1. Obtaining informed consent from the research participants
2. Maintaining anonymity of the research participants and, in the case research, the project, the
proponent and the region in which the project is located
3. Maintaining confidentiality of the research participants’ personal details
4. Managing potential conflicts of interest in relation to my professional relationships with some of
the research participants
Points (1) and (2) have already been addressed in the sections on data generation and data analysis.
In the process of contacting potential research participants, I collected a list of names, phone
numbers and email addresses, which were stored in a password-protected computer only accessible
by me. No other personal information was collected.
As I noted in the data generation section, I had initially selected research participants from within
my business network. I was previously acquainted with 17 of the 42 participants, some of whom I
had worked for in a consulting capacity. Since starting my research, I have not undertaken any
consulting work with any research participant nor any of the companies with whom they are
employed. I have not benefited financially from undertaking the research.
Conclusion
This chapter presented and justified the research method used in this thesis. The paradigm which
underpins the research – constructivism – was articulated. The two-stage research design,
comprising an exploratory review followed by case research, was then explained and justified.
Approaches to data generation and data analysis were presented, followed by an examination of the
trustworthiness of the research. A summary was then provided of the ethical considerations.
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Table 4.E: Summary of the research methodology
Research questions Research
method and data
generation
Data sources Justification Practicalities Ethical issues
Primary question
How is social risk
constructed and assessed
by team members of
Australian coal mining
projects?
Secondary questions
• What
conceptualisations of
social risk are
predominantly used by
team members in
Australian coal mining
projects?
• What paradigmatic
assumptions underpin
their construction and
assessment of social
risk?
• How do these
assumptions influence
how project team
members construct and
assess social risk?
Research paradigm
Largely constructivist
• Ontology: Relativism
• Epistemology:
Transactional
subjectivism (Lincoln
and Guba, 2013)
• Methodology for
acquiring knowledge:
Qualitative
research methods
• Qualitative methods are useful in
answering ‘how’ questions (Patton,
2002).
• Qualitative research aims to
understand what people “do, know,
think and feel by observing,
interviewing and analysing
documents” (Patton, 2002, p. 145);
therefore, qualitative research supports
the ontological, epistemological and
methodological requirements of the
constructivist paradigm.
Exploratory
review – semi-
structured, in-depth
interviews with 31
industry
participants
Interview
transcripts
• In keeping with a relativist ontology,
purposive sampling of participants
(diverse disciplinary backgrounds,
employer types, and geographic
location) was used to explore
‘multiple realities’ (Creswell, 2013).
• In-depth interviews are useful in
obtaining rich data in situations in
which people involved in the same
type of activity have multiple
perspectives on some phenomenon
(Johnson, 2001), and when
researchers are interested in the
identification of common patterns or
themes (Warren, 2001).
• Achieving data
‘saturation’ while
seeking to capture
diverse perspectives
• Scheduling interviews
at different locations in
blocks to minimise
travel costs
• Obtaining informed
consent from research
participants
• Maintaining
confidentiality and
anonymity of research
participants
• Managing potential
conflicts of interest
(existing professional
relationships with
some research
participants)
Case research –
the Koala
Extension Project
• Semi-structured,
in-depth
interviews with
11 members of
• Interview
transcripts
• The SIA report
• Corporate
policies,
standards and
guidelines on
Case research is applicable when:
• The focus is on a contemporary
phenomenon within a real-life context.
• Complex, contextual conditions are to
be assessed (Yin, 2013).
• ‘How’ questions are being asked.
• Proponents of projects
that were subject to
broad opposition were
less willing to
participate in the
research than
proponents of projects
• Obtaining informed
consent
• Maintaining
confidentiality and
anonymity of research
participants, the
project, the proponent
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Naturalistic (in the
natural world) (Guba,
1990), inductive
(Creswell, 2013)
• Axiology: Values are
inherent the
generation of
knowledge (Lincoln
and Guba, 2013).
the Koala
Extension
Project team
• Secondary
research
project
evaluation, risk
assessment and
social
performance
• Examples of
corporate PR
collateral about
the project
Single cases are appropriate for:
• Revelatory cases – the researcher has
an opportunity to examine a
phenomenon previously inaccessible
to researchers (Patton, 2002)
• Special cases that highlight a
successful endeavour (Patton, 2002),
or provide better understanding of a
particular case (Denzin and Lincoln,
2005)
that were accepted or
tolerated by actors.
• Accessing project team
members after the
awarding of
development consent
(relocation of team
members) is
challenging.
• The number of cases is
limited to maximise
data richness and depth
of analysis.
and the region in
which the project is
located
Researcher’s
insights from 25+
years’ experience
working in the
mineral resources
sector and from
conducting the
research
• The researcher’s personal experiences
and insights are central to the analysis
and understanding of the phenomenon
(Patton, 2002), and can provide
context for the research.
• The integrity between the researcher
and researched should be recognised
and used (Lincoln, 1990).
The researcher can never
be “authentically
objective” (Lincoln and
Guba, 2013, p. 38), so the
position from which the
research is undertaken
needs to be stated
explicitly.
Researcher’s
observations made
during data
generation
Triangulation of data
The researcher can act as a ‘translator’
(Lincoln, 1990, p. 238) of different
perspectives among research participants,
and of their behaviour during the
interviews and other engagement
opportunities.
Making useful
observations while
focusing on what was
being said by research
participants
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CHAPTER 5: THE EVALUATION OF COAL MINING PROJECTS
Introduction
Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters that form the basis of the exploratory review. Taking into
account Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) contention that phenomena can only be understood within the
context in which they are situated, this chapter provides the context in which the construction and
assessment of social risk is undertaken by team members of Australian coal mining projects. By
‘context’ I mean the project evaluation environment, encompassing the evaluation activities
undertaken over the project lifecycle; the perspectives of the people responsible for the evaluation
process; the priorities proponents allocate to project evaluation objectives; and the challenges the
project team faces during the evaluation process. In other words, the context is the workplace
setting in which project team members construct and assess social risk.
Primary data are used in this chapter to explore how mining proponents evaluate their projects. The
primary data consist of transcripts from interviews with knowledgeable persons, such as project
team members; project managers; project sponsors; corporate executives responsible for project
governance; EPCM contractors; and social and environmental consultants. Consistent with the risk
governance principle of multidisciplinarity presented in Chapter 3, research participants were
purposively selected to represent the range of disciplines required to assess project risks. A key
finding from this work is that project team members are under pressure to manage costs, maintain
the project schedule and obtain development consent. This environment fosters a propensity for
team members to frame project evaluation from the proponent’s perspective, raising questions about
whether these conditions are conducive to the assessment of social risk, given that in this thesis
social risk is risk to individuals and civic entities from the project; that is, risk to others.
The chapter has five sections. Section 5.2 examines the project evaluation process. It describes the
relationship between project evaluation and project risk governance, and identifies where project
evaluation is situated in the mining lifecycle. The section also explores the role of the project
governance committee, project stage gates, reviews and audits, and risk assessments. Proponents’
project evaluation objectives and their prioritisation are examined in Section 5.3, while Section 5.4
explores the challenges project teams face in the evaluation environment. Section 5.5 concludes the
chapter.
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The process proponents use to evaluate coal projects
In keeping with the conceptual framework articulated in Chapter 3, project evaluation is considered
to be one of three key components of mining project risk governance in Australia. Based on van
Asselt and Renn’s (2011) concept of risk governance, project risk governance for mining
proponents is the framework used to provide guidance on the ways proponents expect project risk
information to be collected, analysed and communicated, and for project risk decisions to be made.
This process is also called project evaluation, which is undertaken over three defined stages; in this
thesis, called ‘concept’, ‘prefeasibility’ and ‘feasibility’.
The primary project evaluation activities undertaken by proponents are presented in Figure 5.A on
page 73. This figure was developed from the primary research data; that is, comments made by
research participants during their interviews, as well as secondary data provided by them. The mine
lifecycle stages presented in Figure 5.A are based on the lifecycle used by McGill (2014) and
adapted in line with comments made by the research participants. Mechanisms to govern risks
during project evaluation include the project governance committee; project stage gates; reviews
and audits; risk assessments; and organisational policies, standards and guidelines. For ease of
examination, Figure 5.A separates risk assessment and risk assessment tools from other project risk
governance mechanisms, while the discussion in this chapter has been grouped together under the
section heading ‘Project evaluation’. Comments from research participants primarily focus on
activities during the prefeasibility and feasibility stages of the project lifecycle.
5.2.1 The role of the project governance committee
The project governance committee, also called the project steering committee or project control
group, is accountable to the company’s senior executive and the board for the successful delivery of
the project in accordance with the company’s business requirements and the key performance
indicators established for the project. According to the research participants, successful delivery
includes obtaining development consent. The committee provides the project team with the
resources it needs for project planning and delivery; specifies what constitutes an acceptable risk
profile; offers support, direction and advice; resolves issues that have been escalated, such as
increased costs and project delays; monitors project progress; and approves, rejects or requires
modifications to the proposed mine plan. The frequency at which the project team is required to
report to the project governance committee varies, depending on the evaluation stage and corporate
requirements. As indicated in Figure 5.A, examples include quarterly, monthly and fortnightly
reporting regimes.
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Figure 5.A: Mining proponents’ project evaluation activities
Source: Transcripts of interviews with research participants; documents provided by research participants.
Key
BBRA: Broad-brush risk assessment PGC: Project governance committee EIS: Environmental impact statement ML: Mining lease PEA: Preliminary environmental assessment
RA: Risk assessment SEARs: Secretary’s environmental assessment requirements ToR: Terms of reference
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According to Inez, a corporate affairs manager, the project governance (steering) committee
provides guidance to the team as the project progresses. She gives examples of events that need to
be reported to the committee:
A steering committee that oversees a project expects to hear updates of that
risk every meeting and how you are managing it and what’s the new risk that’s
come into the scenario. That could be anything from […] the widgets we
bought for the project […] failed […] right up to […] the Lord Mayor is saying
this in his column in the local newspaper and it looks like we’re going to hell in
a handbasket. All of those things should be reported by the project lead to the
steering committee and appropriate decisions made in the management of the
project going forward. (Inez, a research participant, 2015)
Inez’s comments reveal the active and ongoing nature of project risk governance, and the
importance of regular and reflexive communication between the project governance committee and
the project team. According to the research participants, once a project obtains development consent
and is approved by the governance committee, it is referred to the board for the final investment
decision.
5.2.2 Project stage gates
Project stage gating is a progressive, standardised and planned evaluation process that incorporates
a series of control points, known as stage gates. Stage gates, also called tollgates or gateways, occur
at the end of concept, prefeasibility and feasibility (see Figure 5.A). Research participants state that
funding for the next stage is contingent on the project having met a standard of performance that is
stipulated in the company’s project management standard, or equivalent, and to the satisfaction of
the project governance committee:
In the sorts of projects that I’ve worked with […. they have] a common
approach to identifying, assessing, evaluating and describing what management
steps are in place, or will be put in place, to move to the next stage […. It]
includes all of the actions that are deemed to be necessary to be taken during
that next phase. (Braydon, a research participant, 2015)
The purpose of the stage-gate process is to reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding the project.
As Jacob, a project manager, explains, the demand for accuracy in project evaluation outputs
increases over time:
Accuracy of the work will increase at the various levels of stage gates, so there
is a greater level of scrutiny to go from one phase to another, [… and] there is
[…] increased accuracy on the technical assessment and the financial results of
the project. (Jacob, a research participant, 2015)
This approach protects the investment; as more work is done and the level of uncertainty declines,
proponents release more financial resources into the project.
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In order to raise capital for development of the mining operation, proponents need to have done
sufficient work at the right level of detail to convince investors that the project has an acceptable
risk profile. However, what is deemed an acceptable risk profile for one company may be
unacceptable for another. Kevin is an environmental and community relations consultant working
on a project for a small mining company. Since his appointment, the project has changed ownership
several times. This experience has shown him the impact that ownership, scale and context can have
on a project’s risk profile:
It started out as a very big project for a small Australian company […] then [it]
ended up becoming […] a very small project for a big multinational company
[…] The risk and viability process of toll-gating through the original company
was quite different [from] what it was for [the larger company], especially
when it came to ranking and finding an economically viable [project]. When it
came to [the larger company], they no doubt added a couple more layers of risk
review and accountabilities. (Kevin, a research participant, 2015)
With lower overheads, smaller mining companies may have lower thresholds for what constitutes
an economically viable project. Kevin’s experience reinforces that different proponents can have
different project objectives and performance criteria, and that project teams should adopt a fit-for-
purpose approach to the way they evaluate projects.
In the following paragraphs, research participants’ perspectives of the various stages of the project
lifecycle are examined. The rudimentary nature of the concept stage is noted by Jacob, who
describes evaluation in this stage as “high level”. Vincent, a project manager, describes the concept
stage as “a first pass evaluation”:
You’ve got that many variables that at concept you’re effectively looking for
the overall viability of a project. […] You’ll look at fundamental economics
[….] and, from an environmental [and] social [perspective], are there any real
issues that I can never address? Because if I can never address [them], why put
the money into a prefeas and feasibility? (Vincent, a research participant, 2015)
For Leo, a project manager and risk specialist, the concept phase is about identifying the “fatal
flaws” and “big picture risks”: “I like that language because it really says we’re not here to do the
101 nitty gritty risks that we all know are probably going to exist and need dealing with” (Leo, a
research participant, 2015). The focus, Leo says, needs to be on risks that are not “business as
usual”.
In prefeasibility, project proponents work through the mine design options to determine the best
project option in terms of size; scope; and economic, technical, production, environmental and
social considerations. This process is articulated concisely by Ryan, a mining engineering
consultant, and more colourfully by Inez:
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The prefeasibility study should be an options analysis and should say we’ve got
[…] all these options on the table. Which one is the best? So that when you go
to feasibility study, you’re only looking at one. (Ryan, a research participant,
2015)
Prefeasibility [is] looking at a range of options to begin with, so there’s a
sausage factory or a funnel process through which the concepts in the prefeas
stage travel towards the best looking outcome to progress. This is a process
[…] set around an internal investment approvals framework that the business
governs. You have to jump through a number of hoops to progress towards
getting the money to spend on a project. It pretty much begins by looking at
[…] this situation; there’s a number of ways we could go with it […] and
through a process of risk assessment and refinement, you come up with the best
case scenario to go forward with. (Inez, a research participant, 2015)
Participants note that in the prefeasibility stage, proponents confirm that the other options
considered are inferior and will not re-emerge as viable alternatives. Peter, a project approvals
manager, advises that some proponents start preliminary work on the EIS and SIA in prefeasibility
once the preferred option has been confirmed, but the majority of the EIS studies are undertaken in
feasibility. A plan is developed for the feasibility stage.
The aim of the feasibility stage is to convince financial investors of the viability of the project and
the rigour of the project evaluation. Project proponents are looking to determine whether the project
has an acceptable risk profile. Research participants often refer to feasibility as ‘the studies phase’
due to the number of studies commissioned. Ryan says that feasibility is about reducing uncertainty:
The feasibility study is really, in my view, an ongoing series of studies where
you improve your knowledge and reduce the level of risk in a project, so it’s
not a one-off study. A lot of people think […] it’s a one-off study. You do it
and hey we’re ready to go. My view of feasibility is [that] it’s a voyage of
discovery (emphasis added). (Ryan, a research participant, 2015)
This voyage of discovery is a lengthy and comprehensive process which, according to Hugh, an
environmental services manager, includes a technical work program and an impact assessment
process; that is, the regulatory approvals process. The studies are undertaken to examine the breadth
and depth of risks to the project and those generated from the project in order to reduce uncertainty.
Kevin, Leo, Ryan and Vincent explain that another important objective of the feasibility stage is to
cost the mine plan and to confirm whether the project will be internally funded or will require “debt
and equity funding” (Leo, a research participant, 2015).
In the first part of this subsection, participants’ perspectives on the principles of stage gating were
presented. Some of the poor stage-gating practices that they have observed in their own companies
and elsewhere are now examined. During his extensive experience in the mining industry (more
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than 20 years), Ryan has witnessed the pressure that project teams can be put under to quickly
advance projects and get the feasibility study out to potential investors:
The biggest risk is that people don’t do these studies progressively and
diligently. They want to jump […] from concept to prefeas [… but] you need
to spend more time getting the concept right as best you can before you get [to
prefeasibility]. (Ryan, a research participant, 2015)
Ryan adds that rushing projects can have significant adverse consequences, including that the cost
of advancing two or more mine designs is carried forward by the project or that the wrong decision
is made on which option to progress. It can also mean that a project design is rushed without
adequately considering the aspirations and concerns of external actors.
Owen and Gabrielle find that despite the social performance requirements for each stage gate being
specified in corporate documents, the assessment of social risk is not always a high priority nor is it
always carried out competently. For Owen, most stage-gate processes are driven by an engineering
perspective, and this, he says, has an implication for the assessment of other risks:
The social and environmental quantification isn’t as good as what it could be
because most of the focus is really on the engineering aspects. You don’t end
up with that level of focus or the right people in the room pushing or
understanding it [social risk]. (Owen, a research participant, 2015)
Gabrielle is a community relations consultant with more than 10 years’ experience in mining. She
notes that even with stage-gate requirements clearly specified in the company’s project management
standard, the requirements may not be applied on the ground:
So even if it’s [the requirement to consider social risk] at the right level in the
documentation – and I say this because I’ve edited three companies’ gateway
processes and put it in at the right level – whether the project manager
undertakes it to that level’s another matter. (Gabrielle, a research participant,
2015)
Gabrielle goes on to say that project managers have significant opportunity to steer the direction of
the evaluation process according to their own agendas. She asserts that experienced managers can
be less open to addressing social risks compared with less experienced project managers.
5.2.3 Using reviews and audits to assess project performance
Research participants confirm that at each stage gate, a review or audit is conducted to assess the
studies undertaken, the current mine plan or plans, and the residual risks. Reviews are usually
conducted by peers or co-workers and are used to detect errors early in the project lifecycle, resolve
inconsistencies and identify potential improvements. Audits, also called due diligence reviews, are
undertaken by subject matter experts external to the project, and sometimes external to the
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company. According to Muiño and Akselrad (2009), audits are more structured than reviews and
are used to examine the validity and reliability of the project proposal. A project can undergo a
number of reviews and/or audits during the studies phase. Braydon, a project manager and risk
specialist, explains that reviews and audits are a standard project management technique “to ensure
that those things, if set up properly, are done the way they’re intended” (Braydon, a research
participant, 2015). Research participants note that some tier one mining companies have established
a specialist team that is tasked with carrying out reviews across a portfolio of projects. 12
Reviews provide a level of assurance for Xanthe, a community relations manager, who
acknowledges that the project environment can be demanding:
Often we’ll have a couple of project people that will oversee a number of
different projects, so there’s opportunity for it to slip, but the [review] process
and the HSEC [review] process look at risks and assure that the risks [are being
addressed]. (Xanthe, a research participant, 2015)
Craig, a studies manager, considers peer reviews to be an important project risk governance
mechanism, along with the use of a project governance committee:
Peer reviews is a really important aspect as well, whether it’s internal peer
reviews or [….] external peer reviews, depending on the complexities of those
studies [….] It’s about the ability to communicate that internally at a board or
committee level. Normally companies or coal mines have got a committee that
you need to go forward with, continuously update and communicate with them
on a monthly basis, a quarterly basis, a six-monthly, what have you, in order to
get them across the line to say: “Yes. Yes, this project’s got legs on it.” (Craig,
a research participant, 2015)
Gabrielle, however, asserts that the composition of the review teams is not always appropriate; for
example, there may not be an experienced community relations specialist in the team. Without
subject matter experts, the associated subject matter may not be reviewed with due diligence. She
has also observed instances in which the review teams were too lenient; that some projects received
positive review results despite not meeting the criteria stipulated in the project management
standard. This observation is supported by project management scholars who have shown that
project teams tend to be overly optimistic about the risk profile and viability of projects (Royer,
2000). An enthusiasm to ‘get projects up’ may encourage overly optimistic assessments of project
proposals.
Gabrielle’s experience contrasts with Dylan’s experience. A project executive with an engineering
background, Dylan has noted the advancement of projects despite “technical evaluation groups”
finding serious inadequacies with the proposals. Technical evaluation groups are multidisciplinary
12 Tier one mining companies are the largest or most important companies in the market, such as BHP, Rio Tinto, Anglo American and Glencore.
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teams used to peer review project stage-gate results. The teams are external to the project but are
generally drawn from within the proponent’s broader employee base. Dylan links a spate of “recent
disasters […] in investment decisions” by mining companies to project governance committees
failing to heed advice from technical evaluation groups. He cites Rio Tinto’s 2011 acquisition of
Riversdale Mining and its coal assets in Mozambique as one such “disaster”. “Riversdale […], there
were questions about the resource quality. Well that’s fundamental and yet the investment decision
was made” (Dylan, a research participant, 2015). Rio Tinto acquired Riversdale Mining for
$3.9 billion in 2011. Within two years, the assets were “impaired” by US$3 billion, Rio Tinto sold
them for US$50 million, and wrote down a further US$470 billion in assets from its balance sheet
(Ker, 2014). For Dylan, project proponents need to put greater credence in the advice they are given
by technical evaluation groups if they are to reduce project risk.
Although Gabrielle and Dylan identify different reasons why poor quality projects are progressed to
construction and operation – that is, project teams being overly optimistic and the advice from
technical evaluation groups being ignored – the potential outcomes are similar. If a decision is made
to progress poor quality projects, they are likely to be developed into poor quality mines that do not
generate acceptable returns on investment or which may create risks that result in harm to people or
other negative impacts. Boards are then faced with the decision of whether to continue operating the
mine, putting it into care and maintenance or divesting it. While stage gating, reviews and audits
provide a process and structure for project risk governance, the successful application of these
mechanisms is dependent on the experience, aptitude and will of the participants, and the
proponent’s organisational culture.
5.2.4 The purpose and scope of risk assessments
This section outlines participants’ views on risk assessments, including the purpose and structure of
risk workshops, and multidisciplinary approach to selecting risk assessors; the consideration of risk
perspectives outside those held by the project team; the duration and frequency of risk workshops;
types of risk assessments; and the types of risk assessment tools used. In addition, Figure 5.A (page
73) lists a range of different risk assessments referred to by research participants that are used
across the project lifecycle.
Research participants identify risk workshops as the principal forum used for risk assessment. Leo,
a project manager and risk specialist, considers workshops to be an efficient risk assessment
process:
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I think the predominant tool is the risk workshop forum […] because it’s
probably seen as a time-effective process to get a result in a defined period of
time. Traditionally it’s getting the right people in the room for that exercise, for
risk identification and then the analysis of that risk. (Leo, a research
participant, 2015)
The “right people” are defined by participants as specialists representing the range of
disciplines/roles required to assess project risks, such as technical (engineering, mine planning,
geology, coal quality), environmental science, occupational health and safety, and community
relations. This practice is aligned with the risk governance principle of multidisciplinarity. Subject
matter experts external to the project team may be included (although participants admit this is rare)
and an independent facilitator used to run the workshops. Owen describes this practice as a means
of preventing ‘tunnel vision’:
I think some of the most successful types of risk assessment [are] where there’s
been external people come through and they bring a different set of eyes and
different perspective. [They] actually question: “Well why are you doing that?
Have you considered this coz […] we’ve seen this work really well in other
situations?” (Owen, a sustainable development executive, 2015)
Dylan, a project executive, considers it useful to have a designated person responsible for “running
the risk process” and managing the risk register. This could be done by the independent facilitator,
allowing project team members to focus their attention on other aspects of project evaluation
(Dylan, a project executive, 2015).
Peter discusses the importance of project team members being open to other constructions of risk:
If you come in with your blinkers on and really only bring your own attitudes
and your own experience to the risk workshop, you’re likely to get it wrong
because you won’t be just working in that domain of what you see the risks to
be. You need to understand what other stakeholders are going to bring to the
table and you only do that by engagement with those people. Before you do
your risk [assessment], even your early risk workshop, [your understanding]
needs to be informed by early consultation. Quite often that [will not] be a
formal part of the project that you’re working on, but especially for a
brownfields operation […], you’re interacting with those key stakeholders all
the time, so you bring that to the table. (Peter, a research participant, 2015)
Here Peter reinforces the importance of engaging widely to ensure that diverse risk perspectives are
captured and understood; a view that is aligned with the risk governance principle of inclusiveness.
He also identifies a distinction between greenfields and brownfields projects: in greenfields
projects, proponents may not have the established relationships with external actors, such as local
government decision-makers, residents of nearby towns and villages, community leaders,
indigenous groups and special interest groups, that are common with brownfields projects. Without
those relationships, it is much more difficult to collect qualitative social data and to develop an
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understanding of what risks those actors consider to be important. Social data are the quantitative
and qualitative details collected by project team members and the social consultants. These details
include potential changes to the social profile of potentially impacted communities, such as the
geographic location, history, governance, employment, household expenditure, land use, and
resource development. Social data also include information on risks to recreational pursuits, health
and wellbeing, sense of community and social cohesion, community sustainability and
intergenerational equity. In the context of this thesis, they also include the values, preferences and
risk perspectives of potentially affected people.
The duration and frequency of risk workshops, Leo contends, have changed over the past decade
from being a one-off, tick-the-box exercise to an integral part of project evaluation. Now, they are
conducted in various formats throughout the project lifecycle and range in duration from a half-day
to several days. Full risk workshops are usually held at the start of each stage of the project
lifecycle. Peter discusses the need for “supplementary risk workshops” to be held on an ad hoc basis
throughout the project to update a specific risk, address concerns from external actors as they are
raised, and so on. Braydon describes the use of “mini workshops” – a subset of the larger workshop
group, nominally four or five people – that are used to address specific issues. For example, the
environmental scientists may break out from the full workshop to assess biodiversity issues then
report back to the larger forum.
Research participants also discuss different types of risk assessments. Leo, for example, provides a
description of the broad-brush risk assessment:
It usually starts in the very first instance with what we call broad-brush risk
assessment, as distinct from the quantitative risk assessments that happen a bit
later in the project, as your details become firmer. So in the broad-brush risk
assessments [….] they’ll have a list of standard headings that you ought to
consider [….] and that’s from everywhere from the typical aspects of mining,
including some of the water linkages associated with mining, through to the
environmental impacts, social impacts, reputation impacts, financial risk. It’s a
very wide ranging risk assessment. [….] If there are matters that, during the
broad-brush risk assessment, you determine will need particular attention, then
you’ll do a specific risk assessment on that particular issue. We always have a
stakeholder engagement plan and it’s in [that] plan that you start to draw out
the less technical risks associated with the project. (Leo, a research participant,
2015)
Leo explains that risk assessors can also use quantitative techniques to assess risk:
Quantitative techniques can be employed using software like At Risk to do a
probabilistic review of many risks and how they might play out on a project,
rather than just single line items dealing with one specific risk. Quantitative
Sandy Worden Chapter 5 83 | P a g e
techniques [are] ideal for looking at overall impact, and potential cost and
schedule impacts to the project. (Leo, a research participant, 2015)
Leo says quantitative data are used to formulate contingencies and, during the project, to track
progress against the budget.
Research participants provide some high-level insights into the risk workshop process. Participants
with experience facilitating workshops highlight the need for pre-workshop preparation, including
understanding the company’s business objectives and meeting with the project sponsor, project
manager and study manager to discuss risks, select workshop participants, and consider the
workshop scope.13 Common workshop processes and tools articulated by the research participants
include:
• Confirming the workshop scope
• Using a strawman proposal, a basic brainstormed draft proposal intended to generate discussion
and encourage the generation of new ideas
• Brainstorming
• Considering the likelihood and consequences of risks using a corporate risk and opportunity
matrix, then setting risk priorities
• Analysing and evaluating risks in greater detail using bowtie analysis, also called cause-
consequence analysis, a risk assessment tool that integrates features of fault-tree and event-tree
analyses (Burgess-Limerick et al., 2014)
• Propagating a risk register and keeping it live
• Developing a risk management plan with ‘ownership’ assigned to each risk and actions
identified
Research participants consider propagating the risk register to be an important part of the risk
assessment process. For Aaron, the risk register is the “one source of truth” (Aaron, a risk manager,
2015), where all the project risks are housed. For Braydon, the risk register provides a historical
record of the project evaluation process (Braydon, a project manager and risk specialist, 2015).
Hugh describes how the process of using the risk register could change across the project lifecycle:
starting with a single risk register and expanding to include sub-risk registers for specific categories
of risk, such as environmental or social risks. The sub-risk register categories can be rolled up into
the overall project risk register. In addition to listing the individual risks, the risk register captures
risk mitigation actions and names the people responsible for carrying out those actions. It can also
13 For George, a project executive (2015), a study manager is responsible for creating maximum value from the project and progressing the approvals
process, whereas the project manager is more focused on costs and schedules, and is responsible for project execution.
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capture how the expectations of external actors may change over time. Hugh, who has worked for a
large EPCM contractor, identifies a challenge with maintaining project risk registers in that
environment: social and environmental risks are not usually captured in the project risk register;
they are held in the owner’s risk register. This division of risks could result in incomplete risk
assessments and the potential for some risks to be overlooked. To assist in the risk assessment
process, research participants use a range of software products, ranging from Excel to Stature, At
Risk and Cura.
5.2.5 Organisational policies, standards and guidelines as control measures
Collectively, policies, standards and guidelines are the company’s internal control measures for
carrying out the business functions. Examples of policies include sustainability; HSEC; climate
change; and business conduct policies. Policies often have associated standards; for example, the
environmental standard or the community standard. Proponents also have standards and guidelines
relating to project approvals, project development, stage gating, and risk management. They may
also engage with external policies, standards and guidelines, such as the United Nations’ Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights. Michael, the managing director of a mining contracting
company, and Aaron, a risk specialist, have different perspectives on the application and purpose of
corporate policies, standards and guidelines. Michael discusses how these mechanisms encourage
consistent behaviour:
Some organisations will assess risk – to put it bluntly – on the back of a
napkin. They’ll have a kick around conversation – ‘everything feels about
right, off we go’. Other organisations are much more robust in their risk
standards and process and, therefore, you know in that instance if you’ve got a
structured risk process, irrespective of where you are in the cycle, you’ll apply
the same process. (Michael, a research participant, 2015)
Aaron comments on the value of considering the importance of context when applying corporate
policies and standards. He describes how his company has reduced the level of detail in these
mechanisms to facilitate the adoption of a “fit-for-purpose approach”:
We’ve changed the policies and standards a little bit recently and made them
more principles based […] The new standard is still pretty clear at a high level,
it just doesn’t go into the details in terms of what you have to do quite as much
and it says you have to have [a] fit-for-purpose approach. (Aaron, a research
participant, 2015)
This approach means that the mining company expects its employees to consider the specific
operating environment when making decisions about how to apply the corporate standards; that is,
avoiding a ‘cut and paste’ approach. The standards specify the broad corporate requirements while
the specific activities may change from project to project.
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Project evaluation priorities: the proponent’s perspective
A key theme to emerge from my interviews with the research participants is that proponents have
specific priorities in relation to the project evaluation process in addition to risk governance. In this
section, I have categorised these priorities chronologically as: managing project costs,
confirming the value and financial viability of the project, and obtaining development consent. Leo
asserts that project management is all about estimating and managing costs:
The classic PM101 triangle of cost, schedule/time and scope (or quality). So
risk, uncertainty, is going to play out in one of those three spectrums and some
would argue that everything points back to cost – a key metric of the project
world. Even a community risk or societal risk can play out with dollars to
either fix it or the impact from compensation, reputation. (Leo, a research
participant, 2015)14
The focus proponents put on the financial aspects of project evaluation is a matter of common sense
for Ethan, a project executive with more than 20 years’ experience in mining. He states that mining
companies are businesses operating for financial gain: “That’s what we’re there for, to generate a
profit” (Ethan, a research participant, 2015). Inez states that the cost to the bottom line is a key
consideration in the assessment of project risk. Her company has a risk matrix that equates
community risk (social risk) to a financial value. The purpose for this, she explains, is to determine
the materiality of the risk. Risks that represent “a significant cost to the business” are material and
therefore prioritised.
Estimating project costs is a challenging endeavour. Dylan suggests that project teams can be overly
optimistic when estimating costs, particularly in relation to engineering and construction; that is,
what it takes to get a project built:
That’s why, in my view, a lot of the projects you see the costs increase quite
dramatically on a steady slope – or an asymptotic slope – from concept, let’s
say $100 million, $500 million to order of magnitude, $700 million to pre-feas;
might be a billion plus [at feasibility]. It’s because you’re better defining it and
the numbers applied early in the evaluation are ±50%, ±35% [….] Mostly those
costs underestimate what it takes to get the project up and running. (Dylan, a
research participant, 2015)
With the accuracy of data limited to between ±35% and ±50%, one would expect the cost estimates
to increase over the project lifecycle as the data accuracy improves due to results from the studies
being finalised. Ethan explains that another impact on costs is project delays and, therefore, teams
are focused on maintaining the project schedule. He says that managing project costs can lead to
conflict between project actors who may have different objectives. Hillson (2009), for example,
14 PM101 refers to project management 101, an indication of practices which underpin project management.
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identifies conflict between the project sponsor and the project team. Ethan describes a conflict that
occurred when the cost forecast increased as the project he was working on moved from concept to
prefeasibility:
Sometimes those guys that are up there [the senior executive] are the ones that
are driving the project and this is where I used to get very frustrated […]
because I had some of these […] results-orientated types who would say to me,
“but you know, you presented […] a concept study that said this project was
worth a billion dollars and it was going to cost $600 million to build. You
come back and now it’s gone up, it’s going to cost us $1.2 billion to build.
You’ve doubled the cost and the […] net present value’s only going to be $500
[million]. How can you do that?” (emphasis added) (Ethan, a research
participant, 2015)
Several years later when news of a merger was announced, Ethan realised that the financial pressure
his team had endured from the senior executive was about the company maximising its capital value
in preparation for the merger. Not only does his experience illustrates the point made by Dylan
about the challenge of estimating project costs, it also illustrates the ramifications of not providing a
platform for frank discussion about discrepancies between corporate imperatives and project
objectives. This is what Wynne (1992, p. 286) calls “the buried conditional assumptions or
commitments” and I would add hidden drivers, motivations and objectives. If the assumptions and
conditions are not drawn out and discussed, it is unlikely alignment of perspectives will be
achieved, potentially putting the proponent’s investment at risk.
According to research participants, obtaining a high net present value (NPV) and internal rate of
return (IRR) for the project are key priorities for proponents. Tyla, a community relations manager,
says that proponents do not invest in projects that fail to meet their NPV and IRR thresholds, and
that the cost of risk mitigation can influence decision-making. The economic climate, taxation
regimes and coal price are also important factors. Jacob explains that proponents run comprehensive
economic models to determine the value and viability of projects. In running a scenario to delay the
start of production for a project he was working on by 12 months, his team calculated a potential
cost of $70 million:
So if you use that in the broader context of a delay in the approval process; a
12 month delay [….] has an effective net present value of around $70 million.
So any of those delays has a significant project impact and, potentially, the
delays then put you into a different economic regime, which we currently are.
The global economic climate is not particularly supportive of capital
investment in the resources industry [….] If it does push you into a different
economic climate […], it can have major consequences as to whether the
project proceeds or doesn’t proceed (emphasis added). (Jacob, a research
participant, 2015)
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Sally, a social planning consultant, concurs, saying that there is a “tipping point” at which the price
of coal will represent a NPV that is so low that project development is not economically viable.
Alternatively, the price may surpass the tipping point, making the NPV suitable for project
development (Sally, a research participant, 2015).
George and Ethan explain that it is the role of the study manager to generate project value. They
delineate between the role of the study manager and the project manager:
Study managers’ responsibilities are [to] create maximum value and to
progress the approvals process. A project manager is more focused around the
implementation rather than extracting maximum value from the deposit [….]
Once we’ve defined [the project] to a certain level say, perhaps, part way
through the prefeasibility stage, then a person who is more focused on the
delivery would be brought in to the team. I would call that person the project
manager or project director. The study manager would continue in that team
until the point of board approval (emphasis added). (George, a research
participant, 2015)15
For George, the role of the study manager is to create value, whereas the role of the project manager
is to protect value.
The remainder of this subsection deals with the objective of obtaining development consent.
Research participants refer to the uncertainty surrounding the attainment of development consent as
‘approvals risk’. In her consulting work, Sally finds that approvals risk is the number one risk for
project teams. Francis, an environmental manager, agrees: “The whole aim of risk assessment was
on our ability to get this project approved. It was targeted at what’s […] going to prevent us from
getting all our ticks” (Francis, a research participant, 2015). Other participants have had similar
experiences: “our main risk I think [….] was about getting approval” (Tyla, a research participant,
2015); “You look at basically all of the things that might affect the project timeline, so anything that
could affect the approval of the project” (Jacob, a research participant, 2015); “ultimately [it’s] the
process of getting approvals. So at a very senior level in the organisations they’ll say what do we
have to do to get approval? We have to do this. Well, how long is that going to take? It’s going to
take 18 months” (Felix, a research participant, 2015). Xanthe says that approvals risk is even
identified as an ‘unwanted event’ – a term used in bowtie analysis: “Engineers will tell you what
their unwanted event is – I don’t get the permits [development consent] or they stop my operation”
(Xanthe, a research participant, 2015). The priority given to development consent is reflected in the
titles given to critical project roles, such as approvals manager and approvals coordinator.
15 In this thesis, the term ‘project manager’ is used to encompass both these roles.
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Project evaluation challenges and other experiences
In addition to the challenges outlined in Section 5.3, some research participants discussed the
challenges they face from engaging with the social dimensions of mining. While they consider
social engagement to be an integral component of the project evaluation process, they say they are
uncomfortable undertaking it themselves. Vincent, a project manager with an engineering
background, admits that he does not like engaging with potentially affected people and says it takes
“a certain type of person” to engage well (Vincent, a research participant, 2015). While fully
supporting the practice of social engagement, Vincent prefers to leave it to the social performance
specialists. According to Xanthe, a community relations manager, many mining people do not
understand the “social space”, a point endorsed by Ethan, a project executive. He says the most
difficult part of his job is interacting with people and that the ‘social space’ is “a difficult thing for
us engineers to get our minds around” (Ethan, a research participant, 2015). Peter, a project
approvals manager, attributes this difficulty to the non-physical characteristics of social dimensions
of mining: “It’s not something you can just go out and measure with a measuring tape” (Peter, a
research participant, 2015).
Research participants with techno-scientific backgrounds spoke more readily about the scientific
rather than the social aspects of project evaluation and, at times, they seemed bewildered by the
“emotional” and “unscientific” response of external actors. Jacob, for example, is frustrated by the
legitimacy of the studies’ outcomes being questioned by external actors: “it’s quite an intense piece
of science that’s done […] before the EIS is submitted; [….] then the science might be challenged
by some people [even though it] is actually backed up with absolute fact” (Jacob, a research
participant, 2015). For Peter, project evaluations cannot be carried out rigorously without science:
“how else can you manage something to be predictable and consistent and understood without
science?” (Peter, a research participant, 2015). George is perplexed by “emotional” responses from
activists and potentially affected people: “it’s an emotional debate often, as we’re starting to see in
some areas. Even though there may be good metrics and good science you can apply to it, it still
ends up as an emotional debate” (George, a research participant, 2015). These views are strongly
aligned with positivist constructions of risk. Conor touches on political risk when he discusses the
inability of a coal project to gain development consent when the application was submitted in the
lead up to a state election: “You know [name of project] got knocked on the head and, at the end of
the day, the outgoing [party] government thought it was an opportunity to buy votes […]
irrespective of […] the project’s science and factual information about its real level of impact”
(Conor, a research participant, 2015). Elizabeth, a HSEC general manager, makes an interesting
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observation about existing risk assessment frameworks and she explains that some risk perspectives
can be difficult to understand:
Some [risks] can be understood more easily than others and so that makes them
easier to be able to feed into our typical risk framework or matrix. I think
where this gets difficult is when you’re talking about perception; this idea
about [how] people perceive that this is what it’s going to be, but the science
says it’s not. That doesn’t work in with our risk frameworks particularly well
(emphasis added). (Elizabeth, a research participant, 2015)
The type of challenge Elizabeth identifies was a key factor in the development of the IRGC’s risk
governance framework. This framework provides a mechanism for integrating different risk
perspectives as well as “the science” into the assessment of risk. Elizabeth’s use of the term
‘science’ is aligned with the way many research participants use it – oriented towards physical or
nature science rather than including social science.
Some participants, such as Jacob, argue that mining companies need to improve the way they frame
their discussions about projects and the project evaluation process:
Despite all of the science that you put out, you’re on the back foot then to try
and get your approvals through. So it’s important in terms of assessing that
risk, to understand those things up front and get onto the front foot; to get the
messages out before the people argue; to try and control a balanced argument
and the balanced set of views that need to be considered in any development
(emphasis added). (Jacob, a research participant, 2015)
This comment from Jacob illustrates a preoccupation with control. It also epitomises the frustration
a number of participants express about the predominance of the anti-mining voice, particularly in
the media. Research participants want their opinions about the value of mining projects and the
technical rigour of their project evaluations to be acknowledged. In other words, they want the coal
industry’s voice to be heard. Participants are frustrated by what they see as the industry’s inability
to effectively present its case as a legitimate and important player in the Australian economy.
Participants seem to suggest that if only the industry would improve the way it communicates then
the level of opposition to coal projects would diminish. For example, “I don’t think we’ve done a
very good job of being […] frank with some of those groups and getting our message about some of
the benefits of our industry out there” (Craig, a research participant, 2015); “I think the biggest
challenge is credible information that’s readily digestible by […] the broader community or the
stakeholders that you’re trying to communicate with” (Michael, a research participant, 2015); and
“in terms of [how] the coal industry is viewed by, you ask people in [a metropolitan centre], it’s
poorly, absolutely poorly […] because they vacated that area of communication and participation”
(Kevin, a research participant, 2015). These comments indicate an alignment with the deficit model
(Wynne, 1993). The deficit that Wynne refers to is an information deficit; that is, a belief that if the
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public were better informed then it would adopt a more ‘rational’ approach to risk. However, this
assumption rarely plays out in practice, as Herkert (1994) and Barclay et al. (2009) discuss.
According to Botterill and Mazur (2004), the way people construct risk does not always correlate
with measurable probabilities of risk. Psychological factors, such as personal experience and
memory are influential. Once people have formed opinions, these opinions can be difficult to
change, as Covello et al. (1987) have stated. Ben-Porath’s work on the way the media frames news
is useful in understanding why simply providing better formulated information may not help to
position the Australian coal industry in a more favourable light:
At times, individuals may resist or ignore this new information and they will tend to see,
understand, and remember things they always have. Therefore, media effects, such as
framing, may be conditional on the extent to which a frame is compatible with
individuals’ pre-existing knowledge structures and with the prevailing beliefs in a given
culture. Some frames may simply not register with their audience. The less congruent
the media frame is within an individual’s schemas [worldviews], the lesser the
likelihood of frame transfer. (Ben-Porath, 2009. p. 7)
Improving the way the coal industry frames and delivers its messages is unlikely to dramatically
alter the way anti-mining actors consider the riskiness of coal mining projects.
Conclusion
Chapter 5 presented the context in which the construction and assessment of social risk is
undertaken by team members of Australian coal mining projects. The chapter identified that project
evaluation is one of three components of mining risk governance, and that project governance
committees; project stage gates; reviews and audits; risk assessments; and corporate policies,
standards and guidelines are used by proponents to govern project risk. There are four main findings
from the chapter. First, having project risk governance mechanisms in place does not guarantee that
project risks will be comprehensively assessed and mitigated. In addition, having the mechanisms in
place does not guarantee that mining proponents will take into account the results from the project
evaluation work. Research participants gave examples in which the different objectives of project
sponsors and project teams caused conflict and resulted in sub-optimal outcomes in which stage-
gate reviews were overly optimistic, and project governance committees ignored the advice from
technical evaluation groups.
Second, project team members are under pressure to manage costs, maintain the project schedule
and obtain development consent. This environment fosters a propensity for team members to frame
project evaluation from the proponent’s perspective, raising questions about whether this
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environment is conducive to the assessment of social risk, given that in this thesis social risk is
defined as risk to individuals and civic entities from the project; that is, risk to others.
Third, some research participants with techno-scientific backgrounds find it challenging to engage
with the social dimensions of mining and would prefer to leave this work to community relations or
social performance specialists. This preference may have further repercussions for engagement with
external actors who appreciate engaging with a range of company representatives, not just
community relations practitioners. It also reinforces the importance of adopting the risk governance
principle of multidisciplinarity. Without team members experienced in the social dimensions of
mining, project and peer review teams may struggle to assess social risk.
Fourth, there is a proclivity among research participants to engage with the deficit model; that is, to
make the assumption that if the public were better informed, it would adopt a more ‘rational’
approach to risk. This position prioritises the project team’s construction of risk over other risk
perspectives, raising questions about whether project team members with such inward focus are
able consider how the project may generate risk to external actors. In other words, are team
members who take this position able to assess social risk?
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CHAPTER 6: THE CONSTRUCTION AND ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL
RISK
Introduction
Chapter 6 examines how social risk is constructed and assessed by team members of Australian coal
mining projects. It identifies the main strengths and weaknesses of existing SRA practices, and
finds that the way project team members construct social risk has direct implications for the
assessment process. The chapter has five sections. Section 6.2 explores the research participants’
conceptualisations of social risk and how these concepts are applied in the assessment of risk during
the project evaluation process. The types of social risks identified by participants are examined in
Section 6.3 and physical and non-physical risks are differentiated. Section 6.4 evaluates
participants’ experiences of SRA and SIA and highlights the factors that enable social risk to be
assessed in the project environment. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
Three conceptualisations of social risk
The research participants use a range of terms to discuss the social dimensions of mining,
depending on the context and activity being undertaken. These terms can be broadly categorised
into three sets: ‘stakeholder engagement’ and ‘community engagement’; ‘community risk’, ‘social
risk’, ‘social impact’, ‘social aspects’, ‘social issues’, and ‘social licence’. Within these sets,
research participants sometimes use the terms interchangeably. The most commonly used terms, in
order of frequency of use, are social risk, social impact and social licence. This finding is the result
of a brief analysis of the interview transcripts using the ‘find’ function in MS Word. Terms used by
the interviewer were eliminated. Instances in which the terms were used in response to the
interviewer’s use of the terms were not omitted.
The meaning research participants attribute to social risk can be categorised according to who or
what is at risk; that is: risk to people, risk to the project, or risk to people and the project. Thirteen
participants consider social risk to be risk to people; five participants define it as risk to project;
while the remaining 13 describe social risk as risk to people and the project.16 I coin the term ‘dual
orientation of social risk’ to describe risk to both people and project. For Owen, social risk
represents risk to people:
16 Risk to people from the project includes Bella’s ‘community risk’ definition, as it is oriented towards risk to people.
Sandy Worden Chapter 6 93 | P a g e
Social risk is the changes on the community/society affected, either directly or
indirectly, from any new resource development. It is particularly important to
recognise the impacts on the minority, vulnerable or indigenous groups. The
risk may come from any number of activities associated with the development,
e.g. loss of land, livelihoods, environmental impacts, loss of cultural sites and
cultural degradation, resettlement, health impacts (environmental and also
imported disease, HIV, etc), law and order issues, human rights violations.
(Owen, a research participant, 2015)
For Braydon, social risk is risk to the project:
I take a very selfish viewpoint; that of the organisation exposed to social
expectation; that is, I am interested in the risk to the organisation posed by
social groups. (Braydon, a research participant, 2015)
For Peter, social risk includes both risk to people and risk to the project:
There’s many aspects to [...] social risk. If you look at it from a member of
society, it’s risk to society in general – the way that people live their life, direct
impacts to communities – that’s all social risk. Or you can look at it from the
perspective of the approvals process; well there’s a social risk to the approvals
process, to reputation of the company etc. (Peter, a research participant, 2015)
Owen, Braydon and Peter exclude opportunities from their constructions of social risk, only
considering threats. Although Yasmin, Sally and Aaron conceptualise social risk as having a dual
orientation, they acknowledge that when assessing social risk during project evaluation, it is more
likely that the focus would be on risk to project: “people tend to think that when we’re talking about
social risk within the business [that] we’re only talking about the risk to the business” (Yasmin, a
research participant, 2015); “I think we’re always thinking of it more in the context of a proponent”
(Sally, research participant, 2015); and “I would probably see most people thinking about it in terms
of the impact [to] the company” (Aaron, a research participant, 2015). Later chapter sections show a
tendency for research participants to frame their discussions of risk in terms of its effect on the
project rather than taking a perspective that relates to both people and the project. This tendency
indicates a possible discrepancy between participants’ espoused position – what they said when
asked to define social risk – and their revealed position – how they engaged with the term in a less
confronting environment; that is, when they were not required to respond to a direct question. Their
revealed position is the meaning they sustain during discourse. In other words, what people say may
not reflect what they do in practice. The discrepancy between what research participants may say
and do raises questions about what the dual orientation of social risk means conceptually. Are both
orientations used concurrently or are they used one at a time? Does one orientation dominate in all
circumstances or only in specific circumstances?
Table 6.A (on page 94) illustrates the breakdown of participants according to the orientation of their
social risk definitions. The table shows that participants’ profession – field of undergraduate study
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or current role – is not a reliable indicator of the way they orient their espoused constructions of
social risk. Note the diversity of professional backgrounds in the first two columns. Based on my
own orientation of social risk (risk to people), I had expected the social performance and
community relations specialists to construct social risk in the same way, but their definitions are
evenly divided between risk to people and the dual orientation of social risk. All participants who
define social risk as risk to the project have techno-scientific backgrounds.
The term ‘social risk’ is used most frequently by research participants who work in social
performance/community relations – Tyla (community relations manager), Xanthe (community
relations manager), Adam (community relations manager), Gabrielle (community relations
consultant) and Sally (social planning consultant) – and risk management – Aaron (risk specialist)
and Leo (project manager and risk specialist). Aaron works predominantly in enterprise-wide risk
management; that is, the risk management process used across an organisation that is linked to
strategic business objectives. Leo works on major projects within the extractives industries. Both
Aaron and Leo facilitate risk workshops. That the term ‘social risk’ is predominantly used by
research participants from within social performance/community relations and risk management,
indicates that social risk is part of the professional vocabulary of these fields of practice.
Chapter 2 identified that in the grey literature, the terms ‘social risk’ and ‘social impact’ tend to be
coupled or used interchangeably. In my interviews, I asked participants who have experience in, or
have responsibility for, community relations to differentiate between the two terms. Sally, a social
planning consultant, says she is “completely confused” by the terms (Sally, a research participant,
2015). Adam, a community relations manager, uses the terms interchangeably. He does not consider
them to be “mutually exclusive” (Adam, a research participant, 2015). Tyla, a community relations
manager, describes how social risk and social impact connect in the assessment process: “I think the
SIA process is completely informed by what the risks are; so the list of social risks would then
translate over to the questions we ask about potential impacts” (Tyla, a research participant, 2015).
Yasmin, a community relations manager, also identifies a connection between impact and risk but
has a different perspective from Tyla:
The impact is what generates the risk. You can have a tonne of different
impacts. A project can create a tonne of impacts and generate a tonne of
change. Not all of those are going to present risks to the community or risks to
the project, so they are two different sets of information. (Yasmin, a research
participant, 2015)
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Table 6.A: Research participants’ definitions of social risk
Risk to people Risk to people and to the project Risk to the project
Name Undergraduate
degree
Current role Name Undergraduate
degree
Current role Name Undergraduate
degree
Current role
Ethan Engineering Project executive Aaron Engineering Risk specialist Braydon Engineering Project manager and
risk specialist
Francis Rural technology Environmental
manager
Craig Environmental
science
Project studies
manager
Dan Engineering Project manager
Inez Industrial studies Corporate affairs
manager *
Dylan Engineering Project executive Jacob Engineering Project manager
Leo Engineering Project manager / risk
specialist
Gabrielle Geology Community relations
consultant *
Hugh Metallurgy Environmental
services manager
Owen Environmental
science
Sustainable
development
executive *
Kevin Environmental
science
Environmental and
community relations
manager *
Willa Environmental
science
External relations
general manager*
Ryan Engineering Mining engineering
consultant
Michael Engineering Managing director
Vincent Engineering Project manager Nathan Engineering Chairman
Adam Human geography Community relations
manager *
Peter Environmental
science
Approvals manager
Bella [Communication]
17
External relations
general manager *
Sally Social planning Social planning
consultant *
Conor Environmental
science
Approvals
coordinator
Tyla Science Community relations
manager *
Elizabeth Environmental
science
HSEC general
manager *
Xanthe Applied science Community relations
manager *
Felix Occupational
hygiene
OHS consultant Yasmin Language studies Community relations
manager *
* Participants with experience in or responsibility for
community relations18
George Engineering Project executive Zach Archaeology Cultural heritage
consultant *
17 Bella does not hold a degree, but her experience is predominantly in communication management.
18 Note that only two participants with responsibility for community relations studied social science at the undergraduate level. This observation is in line with Kemp’s (2004) finding that the majority of people involved in
community relations work in the minerals industry do not hold qualifications in social science.
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In her comparison, Yasmin considers risk to have one dimension – a threat. These comments from
participants indicate that, in general, there is not a clear understanding of the difference between
social risk and social impact. The relationship Tyla identifies between social risk and social impact
aligns with the relationship presented in Chapter 2.
This section showed that just as there is no consensus on the meaning of social risk in the literature,
research participants attribute different meanings to the term, with risk categorised according to
who or what is at risk; that is, people, project or people and project. In general, their professional
backgrounds had little influence on the orientation participants used to define social risk. Although
social risk is part of the vocabulary used in community relations and risk management practice,
research participants in these roles attributed different meanings to the term, raising questions about
consistency of usage across professional groups. In addition, research participants did not delineate
between the terms ‘social risk’ and ‘social impact’ in the same way.
An examination of different types of social risk
This section presents the types of social risk most frequently cited by the research participants and
examines their perspectives of three risks that have both physical and non-physical dimensions –
indigenous cultural heritage, FIFO/drive in, drive out (DIDO), and social identity/a sense of social
amenity. The rationale for considering the types of social risks the research participants discussed
during the in-depth interviews is that it may provide insights into how they prioritise risks and it
may help to identify any inherent biases they may have. When coding the in-depth interviews, I
identified 35 different topics discussed by the research participants in relation to the social
dimensions of mining. Depending on the context in which these topics were discussed, they could
refer to social risks – uncertainty and ambiguity about the physical or non-physical consequences of
future events or activities on individuals and civic entities (a future occurrence) – or social impacts
– the consequences to groups of people, or society as a whole, arising from a decision or an action
(something that has already happened or is happening now) (Ziller, 2012). To ensure that the data
generated related to social risk rather than social impact, I went back to the interview transcripts in
NVivo to determine the context in which the topics were discussed. Based on temporal indicators,
references to social impacts were excluded. The 16 most frequently cited social risks are presented
in Table 6.B on page 96. They include 14 threats and two opportunities (employment and
employment aspirations, and community investment). Sixteen risk types were selected to provide
diversity. The frequency of social risks cited diminished beyond the 16 listed in Table 6.B and,
therefore, they are of less significance and were excluded.
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Table 6.B: Types of social risk (top 16)
Risk Frequency
Noise 31
Air quality 29
Community services and infrastructure 28
Water 28
Community changes (general) 24
Resettlement and land acquisition 20
Employment and employment aspirations 19
Community health and safety 19
Indigenous cultural heritage 17
FIFO / DIDO 17
Infrastructure and infrastructure corridors 10
Subsidence 14
Community investment 12
Social identity and social amenity 12
Cumulative impacts 10
Traffic 9
Most of the risks in Table 6.B are physical risks. Non-physical social risks such as inequality, social
dislocation of vulnerable sections of society, quality of life, solastalgia and intangible cultural
heritage are not widely discussed by the research participants. Solastalgia according to Albrecht et
al. (2007, p. S95) is “the distress that is produced by environmental change impacting on people
while they are directly connected to their home environment”. There are three social risks
participants discuss that have non-physical dimensions: indigenous cultural heritage; FIFO/DIDO;
and social identity/a sense of social amenity. Indigenous cultural heritage has both physical and
non-physical dimensions. The physical dimension is the archaeological assessment and
identification of artefacts, such as grinding grooves. Aboriginal grinding grooves are rock
depressions made by the repeated movement of hard stone artefacts against a softer stone surface to
sharpen tools or to grind materials, such as grass seeds (ACT EPSSDDE, 2016). The non-physical
dimension relates to intangible Aboriginal heritage. According to Kuutma (2013), the term
‘intangible’ is used to define cultural expressions and practices such as storytelling, craftsmanship
and rituals. For Zach, an archaeologist who has consulted to mining companies on cultural heritage
for more than 10 years, intangible Aboriginal heritage relates to story places and sacred sites. Zach
has observed that, in general, proponents do not engage with non-physical concepts well. He notes
that Aboriginal people have difficulty, particularly in the populous regions of eastern New South
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Wales, convincing non-Aboriginal people of the validity of their intangible heritage. Some research
participants, such as Dylan, frame their discussion of indigenous cultural heritage in terms of risk to
Aboriginal people:
We had quite a number of Aboriginal advisers, staff members on our team,
working with different language groups to try and figure out what their
concerns were so we could bring that to the project. (Dylan, a research
participant, 2015)
While others, such as Xanthe, take a more internal perspective, with their attention primarily
focused on risk to the project, in this case, not being granted development consent:
Mining’s about land, and access to land, so the first part of the risk assessment
is about access to land […] what’s the legislation? What are the things in it?
Which traditional owner group? (Xanthe, a research participant, 2015)
Xanthe may well have gone on to consider risks to traditional owners in her risk assessment (she
did not elucidate during the in-depth interview), but my point is that her focus is risk to the project
(project risk), not risk to traditional owners (social risk).
FIFO/DIDO also has physical dimensions, such as housing affordability, capacity of community
services to be delivered, changes in rental prices, and worker fatigue. It also has non-physical
dimensions including absence of a sense of home and disconnection from family. Any discussion of
FIFO/DIDO is framed according to who or what is at risk, for example, the workforce or the
permanent residents of the host community. The most common frame used by research participants
is risk to the workforce. Risk to the families of FIFO/DIDO workers was not mentioned. This
finding raises questions about whether considerations of social risk should be place-based, which
includes neighbouring landholders and residents of nearby towns, or whether they are distributed.
When considerations of social risk are distributed, they include potentially affected actors living
outside the geographic location of the project. Overall, participants are opposed to FIFO/DIDO due
to what they describe as the detrimental health effects on workers. Tyla, a community relations
manager, provides insights into how FIFO/DIDO is framed by permanent residents of a dormitory
town. In her role as a community relations manager, she is involved with the social engagement
activities associated with new mining developments. She describes the challenge of deciding where
to locate the FIFO/DIDO accommodation village for a particular project:
The shopkeepers […] want to have people co-located in town because then
they could access the shops and go to the pub and do all those sorts of things.
But another part of the community didn’t want them in town because they
didn’t want […] 500 potential ‘paedophiles’ and ‘rapists’ within walking
distance of their kids, so we put the accommodation village just outside of
town. (Tyla, a research participant, 2015)
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According to Botterill and Mazur (2004), the lay public tends to be more concerned about
significantly negative consequences – irrespective of the low probability of occurrence – than
experts are. For parents in this dormitory town, the catastrophic consequence of their children being
sexually abused, regardless of the likelihood, resulted in zero tolerance of this risk. For them, there
were no circumstances under which having the accommodation in town would be tolerable. From a
techno-scientific (largely positivist) perspective, this response is considered ‘irrational’. Aven and
Renn (2010, p. 170) describe this type of risk construction as “emerging danger (fatal threat)”,
which is often underpinned by a sense of inequitable risk-benefit distribution and loss of personal
control over the risk. For the merchants, on the other hand, the potential benefits of increased
revenues from a larger consumer base far outweighed any downside risks. Aven and Renn (2010, p.
170) describe this construction of risk as “the gamble for monetary gain” and for Adams (1999, p.
11) it is “the rewards” of risk.
The risks associated with social amenity and social identity have non-physical dimensions: they
describe the comfort or enjoyment from social relationships, how people connect with each other,
the sense of, or absence of, wellbeing those connections generate, and how the connections relate to
people’s sense of identity. To further explain sense of identity, I use two fictitious examples: “I am
a farmer and my family has been producing wheat in this region for five generations” and
“Greenville is a small country town. We know everyone here and we look out for each other”.
Participants discuss disruption to the sense of community that mining activities may cause, and their
discussions are predominantly related to land acquisition.19 One participant, Vincent, a project
manager, discusses his desire not to “dismantle communities” and laments that mining can change
community demographics. George, a project executive, describes how land acquisition could
disrupt a cross-generational connection farmers may have to the land:
One of the unfortunate things about mining in Australia is that the regulations
[…] drive a mining company to buy all of the land associated with [a] mine
and form substantial buffers around that mine […] The family [that owns the
land] has to make a decision about selling something that’s been in the family
for some time. If it doesn’t, then it’s off to the Land Court we go. There are
various compensation deals that are done [but] we’re just set up for a poor
outcome. So we do change the amenity of people’s lives; there’s no doubt
about it, that’s the downside. (George, a research participant, 2015)
The rationale for mining’s approach to land acquisition is questioned by Adam, a community
relations manager:
We really need to think about the implication of our decisions and reflect on
those. Again I go back to acquiring land. The biggest impact that you can have,
19 While participants focused on risks to residents, changed amenity in a mining region can also affect non-residents who have a connection to the
land, whether spiritual or simply an appreciation of the visual amenity.
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[the] quickest and biggest change in the social fabric of the community is when
you buy land. It should not happen. (Adam, a community relations manager,
2015)
Adam acknowledges that land acquisition is a risk mitigation measure; forming buffers around the
mine to protect neighbours from potential mining impacts. However, he asserts that this practice has
other social ramifications that need to be considered, such as risk to the community’s social fabric.
Adam has also observed that project teams focused on compliance often find it difficult to consider
different risk perspectives from their own. He argues that consideration needs to be given to the
values of potentially affected people:
Understanding the community, talking to them about their values […] Once
you get an understanding of those values then you can understand risk; you
understand [that] though you’re in compliance [with state government
legislation], you know that person’s lifestyle will change (emphasis added).
(Adam, a community relations manager, 2015)
In other words, simply focusing on whether the project is meeting regulatory requirements (such as
noise limits) is not sufficient when assessing social risk.
Hillson and Murray-Webster (2012) identify three factors that influence how people think about
risks: conscious factors (the visible and measurable characteristics of risk, subconscious factors
(heuristics and other sources of cognitive bias), and affective factors (gut feelings and emotions).
Subconscious and affective factors can be considered to be non-physical dimensions of risk. Failing
to address all three factors can lead to community outrage. Drawing on Slovic’s risk perception
work, Sandman has made the concept of ‘outrage factors’ well known in business circles. He
identifies a weakness in the way traditional risk assessments are conducted:
Many risk experts resist the pressure to consider outrage in making risk
management decisions; they insist that ‘the data’ alone, not the ‘irrational’
public, should determine policy. But we have two decades of data indicating
that voluntariness, control, fairness, and the rest are important components of
our society’s definition of risk. When a risk manager continues to ignore these
factors and continues to be surprised by the public’s response of outrage – it’s
worth asking just whose behaviour is rational. (Sandman, 1988, pp. 237–8)20
For one participant, Peter, a project approvals manager, it is not so much about ignoring community
outrage, but making sense of it. He calls outrage factors the “less tangible factors”:
Physical factors you can go out and measure; whereas some community
disquiet or outrage, what’s going to make a particular part of your community
or the broader community tick, or what’s going to make them go to an outrage
20 Sandman (1988, p. 236) defines risk as “the sum of hazard and outrage”. In many circumstances (those unrelated to psychological stress,
community divisions and so on), ‘outrage’ is indicative of business risk rather than social risk.
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scenario is sometimes difficult to understand. (Peter, a research participant,
2015)
Literature on the psychology of risk (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987; Sandman, 1988; Hillson
and Murray-Webster, 2012) addresses the points that Peter raises.
Two mechanisms used to assess social risk
Research participants discuss two mechanisms used to assess social risk in the project evaluation
environment – SRAs and SIAs. SRAs can be conducted at any stage of the project lifecycle
(concept, prefeasibility or feasibility) and tend to be conducted in-house, although external
facilitators may be used. SIAs are generally conducted in late prefeasibility or feasibility once the
preferred mine plan has been confirmed, and are generally outsourced to a specialist consultancy.
Research participants indicate that SRAs and SIAs are undertaken as discrete mechanisms and
undertaken by different assessors – SRAs by project team members and other internal assessors,
and SIAs by specialist external consultants. Participants from techno-scientific backgrounds do not
generally discuss SIAs and some, most notably Jacob, express a lack of understanding about what
SIAs entail and what they deliver. The lack of integration between these two assessment
mechanisms means that social data may not be optimised in risk decision-making.
6.4.1 Research participants’ experience of SRA
Assessing social risks within a risk workshop environment – either in the full workshop or in a
break out group of social performance specialists – is the most common SRA process the research
participants discuss. Xanthe, a community relations manager, describes how social risks are
assessed in her company. The community standard stipulates that SRAs must be conducted for all
projects and they are generally conducted outside the broader project risk workshops. An external
social expert is required to participate in the SRA workshop, usually in the role of facilitator. All
level three and level four risks are recorded in the project risk register, ensuring that social risk data
are available to the project team.21 The workshop comprises about six or seven assessors, including
an internal community relations specialist and other representatives from the business. The
workshops are usually conducted over two non-consecutive days. In regions where the company has
multiple operations, data from previous SRAs are shared across the sites. A risk matrix with
community elements is used to trigger discussion and, over the past few years, the company has
started to use bowties to analyse social risks. Xanthe has found the introduction of bowtie analysis
to be useful in helping teams to focus on critical risks, capture unwanted events in the risk register,
21 These are the risks that the assessors have determined to be the most likely to occur and/or have the highest severity ratings.
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and test mitigation measures. The results of the SRA are fed into a risk management plan and the
community relations plan. “Refresher” SRAs are conducted annually (Xanthe, a research
participant, 2015).
Aaron, a risk specialist, does not support the process of separating the SRA from the project risk
workshop because he says it limits the transfer of information. Social specialists need to be in the
same room as techno-scientific risk assessors so that knowledge about the social risks and the
implications can be shared and then considered in “technical, managerial and strategic decision-
making”:
Integrating into the bigger picture is important because if you have a group of
social-focused people who get together and do a social risk analysis, you don’t
have the leaders and other decision-makers in the room […] it’s more likely to
be put on the shelf – “yes, we’ve done that, tick the box”. (Aaron, a research
participant, 2015)
Aaron’s preference aligns with the risk governance principle of multidisciplinarity; that is, for
project teams to have the disciplinary backgrounds and experience needed to assess the diversity of
risks the project generates and to commission and review the associated studies.
In Peter’s company, SRAs are conducted within the larger workshop group with community
relations practitioners providing specialist input. Although not standard practice in his company,
Peter supports direct representation from external actors at risk workshops, particularly for
controversial projects. This perspective aligns with the risk governance principle of inclusiveness.
Inviting community members to participate in SRAs is recommended in the corporate
documentation of Xanthe’s company, but she admits she is not aware of this having occurred in
practice.
SRAs are not yet as integrated in Adam’s company as they seem to be in Xanthe’s company. In his
role as a group community relations manager, Adam provides support and guidance across all the
company’s operations. He has been working to integrate social monitoring plans into risk registers
and adapt traditional risk assessment tools and processes, such as the likelihood and significance
(risk) matrix and trigger, action, response plans, to make them more appropriate for social risks. He
says that traditional risk assessment tools are oriented towards regulatory compliance and cost to the
business. Rather than focusing on lost production and reputation, he is adapting the tools to better
reflect community values and to capture mining-induced changes in social amenity. I would
describe what Adam is seeking to do as bringing different ontological perspectives to the way social
risk is considered within risk assessments across the business. My research supports Adam’s point
about the focus of traditional risk assessment tools. Most likelihood and significance matrices orient
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risk towards the project or business, although there are examples of matrices that specify risk to
external actors. Examples of external indicators are: severe, widespread community health, safety or
severity impacts (more than 1000 households); human rights violations; complete destruction of
more than 1000 houses or community infrastructure.
None of the research participants discuss the relationship between SRA and SIA of their own
volition, nor do they make reference to one assessment when talking about the other. They tend to
treat the two assessments as discrete mechanisms with little relationship between them.
Furthermore, as discussed in the next section, techno-scientific participants do not have a strong
understanding of what an SIA entails or what it can deliver, which raises questions about their
ability to scope, commission and evaluate SIAs, particularly given that project team members are
predominantly from techno-scientific backgrounds and that social practitioners tend to only provide
advice to the team on an ad hoc basis.
When discussing social risk, there is a strong tendency for the research participants to frame the
discussion in terms of cost – primarily damage to reputation or delay to project. For example,
Gabrielle, a community relations manager, says that:
When you’re looking at likelihood and consequence, still from the project point
of view, you look at it in terms of potential damage to reputation, delay to
project, additional cost; I think those things still apply. (Gabrielle, a research
participant, 2015)
Inez, a corporate affairs manager, describes what drives risk decision-making – the financial cost of
risks:
Dust, noise, health, anything that might have a flow-on effect to the immediate
community […] what is the reputational impact of having to do that? And
added onto that are financial risks. That’s the bottom line by which many
things are measured. So, if the project doesn’t go ahead because of the height
of this community risk, what is the financial cost? (Inez, a research participant,
2015)
These results reflect a broader phenomenon: when working within the social dimensions of mining,
practitioners have learned to position their work in terms of financial implications to the business;
that is, to orient their discussions towards ‘the business case’. In their analysis of a large-scale,
contemporary mining operation in West Africa, Kemp and Owen (2013) find that community
relations practitioners have become adept at framing their work in terms of risk to the business and
presenting cost-benefit analyses in order to gain legitimacy and resources. Franks et al. (2014)
endorse this focus on financial value in their work on conflict within the natural resources
extraction industries by translating social risk into business costs. Kemp and Owen (2016) argue
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that the danger of focusing on the business case is that it represents a particular form of rationalism
that does not take full account of external perspectives: “This approach is often used within the
industry for promoting or defending an idea, not for considering all of the information available to
make a good, balanced set of decisions” (Kemp and Owen, 2016, p. 960).
Another important factor in relation to SRA is the different priorities given to social risks in project
risk workshops compared with other risks and uncertainties. Craig, a project studies manager, says
that social risks represent as little as 25 per cent of the analysis up to “the lion’s share of the risk
assessment process” (Craig, a research participant, 2015). There is general agreement that
prioritisation of risks is project-specific. In other words, some projects may require limited SRAs
due to their specific conditions whereas others may require comprehensive SRAs. Hugh, an
environmental services manager, identifies population size and land use as key indicators for the
level of SRA required in projects:
For example in the Bowen Basin, […] there are so many coal mines and there
are so few people [that] everyone’s familiar with the coal industry and another
coal mine, it just doesn’t matter. It’s not controversial. Though on Liverpool
Plains, for example, [it] is quite a different situation. [The projects] are more
controversial and there’s more interested stakeholders. (Hugh, a research
participant, 2015)
The psychology of risk literature argues that the more that people are familiar with a risk, the less
risky they consider it ( e.g. Fischhoff et al., 1978; Hillson and Murray-Webster, 2010). However,
conflict around the cumulative impacts of mining in Moranbah at the height of the mining boom –
particularly in relation to dust and access to services and amenities – generated significant
opposition to new mining projects from residents, local government and special interest groups.
This situation indicates that factors other than familiarity, specifically voluntariness, personal
control and equity, influenced the way local people constructed risk. According to Fischhoff et al.
(1978) and Slovic (1987), people consider activities to be riskier if they do not choose to engage
with the risk, if the potential harm is beyond their control and if some groups benefit from the risk
at the expense of others.
This subsection explored the SRA practices employed by some of the mining companies operating
in Australia. It identifies a tendency for social risks to be framed in terms of economic costs and
benefits. It also illustrates the influence that familiarity, voluntariness, personal control and equity
can have on the construction of social risk.
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6.4.2 Research participants’ experience of SIA
SIA is a key mechanism for understanding and managing mining-generated risks. In Queensland
and NSW, it is a regulatory requirement for SIAs to be conducted as part of the EIS for state
significant developments (NSW) and coordinated projects (Queensland). Although the government
regulations stipulate that impact assessments for these types of projects must be submitted along
with the development application, they do not stipulate at what stage in the project lifecycle the
assessments are to be conducted. Data used in this subsection comes from participants who have
conducted SIAs or have commissioned them. Participants with little direct exposure to SIAs did not
contribute significantly to this discussion.
Xanthe explains that while SIAs are scoped internally, they are generally outsourced to specialist
consultancies to complete “because the reality is, to do an impact assessment, you need a range of
skills that we don’t have” (Xanthe, a research participant, 2015). In other words, SRAs and SIAs are
generally not conducted by the same assessors. Unless responsibility is allocated to a project team
member for the management of social data, the information from the SIA may not be optimised in
risk decision-making and mine planning. Peter says SIAs are undertaken once the mine plan has
been confirmed in late prefeasibility or during the feasibility stage.
Research participants outline the various components of an SIA, including the collection of
quantitative data, such as demographics, labour and employment statistics, and the availability of
social services and housing; the establishment of a social baseline for project-affected communities;
the identification and mapping of stakeholders; and the collection of qualitative data through social
engagement. Social baseline studies use a set of selected indicators to measure conditions before the
start of a project so that any changes over time can be tracked and compared with conditions prior
to mining (Vanclay et al., 2015). Participants also stress the importance of monitoring programs to
track mining impacts. Craig discusses the importance of stakeholder mapping and the influence that
external actors may have on project success:
Part of the process, of course, involves identifying who those stakeholders are,
being able to map their relationships, their association with different groups
[and] understanding what their level of influence is on a project. Some of them
might have a very low level of influence, whereas others can quite easily stop a
project from going forward. (Craig, a research participant, 2015)
Stakeholder mapping can also include genealogy studies. Owen explains that when engaging with
indigenous groups, a genealogy study may be used to determine familial relationships and to assist
in negotiating compensation agreements.
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Research participants discuss the way SIAs are undertaken. Jacob, a project manager, describes the
process as a “black art” and he says “it’s an area of expertise that I don’t understand” (Jacob, a
research participant, 2015). As a project manager, Jacob is responsible for delivering projects,
including their risk profile, to the proponent’s project governance committee. The lack of
understanding that he acknowledges can result in the consideration of the SIA as a standalone
process; that is, not integrated into project planning. This can affect the accuracy of the risk profile.
The way social impact assessors approach their assessment work may differ from assessor to
assessor, and this can result in diverse standards of SIAs being submitted to the regulator. To
combat this variance, SIA guidelines have been published by regulating authorities. One objective
for the NSW Department of Planning to publish its guideline, for example, is to “support informed
decision-making by strengthening the quality and relevance of information and analysis provided to
the consent authority” (NSW DPE, 2017, p. 2). For Adam, some SIA approaches are “very
mechanical”:
It’s not just a cost-benefit analysis. If you’re putting a project into a little
community like [name], you can’t just look at regional or state data. You
actually have to look at that community and realise just how much that
particular mine means to that community, what the expenditure is, where the
people live, where they spend their money, where they socialise and all of that
sort of stuff – not just looking at a formula that […] averages it out across the
state. (Adam, a research participant, 2015)
Adam prefers to take a more ethnographic approach to impact assessment. He recounts his
experience of a particular SIA he undertook in a small, rural community:
I’ve spent three days […] a week in the [name] area for the past […] three
years, so understanding the community, talking to them about their values,
what’s important to them [….] I’d go and meet with people at their house [and
ask]: “Why do you live here?” “Well I live here because […].” “What brought
you here?” “I built the house to take in that view.” [….] And so I got to
experience, not everybody’s, but a lot of people’s life and values – what they
thought were important (emphasis added). (Adam, a research participant)
For Adam, potential mining impacts cannot be assessed without experiencing how people live,
identifying what is important to them and what their values are.
The ability of assessors to undertake SIAs is not only influenced by the approach they take, but it
can also be affected by external factors. Sally talks about the challenge of keeping SIA data up-to-
date, given the duration of the project evaluation process and the often uncertain market conditions.
Let’s choose Moranbah, because it’s a good case example. There are multiple
mining companies involved in multiple and significant scale projects which are
going ahead and delayed, going ahead and delayed. They’ve all got different
social impact assessments, different social management procedures and
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different timelines for implementation. Then [you add in] a dynamic housing
market, [it …] is very difficult. (Sally, a research participant, 2015)
As Sally infers, the social impact assessor is required to continually update the SIA to accommodate
the changes in social data over time. Sally also talks about the challenges assessors face in trying to
isolate the impacts from a particular project in a district that hosts multiple mining and industrial
operations, and trying to determine the cumulative impacts of mining.
This subsection explored the experiences research participants have had with SIAs. It highlighted
components of the SIA process, the differences in practice, the release of regulatory guidelines, and
the challenges social impact assessors face in managing social data. Research participants’
experience with SIA reinforces the importance of having project team members experienced in the
social dimensions of mining so that they can scope the SIA in line with the specific project’s needs,
assess the standard of the report delivered, and integrate the findings into the mine plan.
6.4.3 Factors that enable the assessment of social risk
Research participants were asked to identify factors that enable social risks to be assessed in the
project evaluation environment. Many of the factors raised by participants can be considered to be
enablers as well as barriers: that is, doing the activity enables SRA; not doing it or not doing it well
is a barrier to SRA. In addition, many of the factors are interrelated. For example, the most critical
factor participants identify – social engagement – is closely related to communication and
established relationships. Yasmin, a community relations manager, emphasises that without
baseline data and relationships with actors, social risk cannot be assessed:
Risk assessments are usually collaborative affairs and it’s a discussion amongst
a group of people. It can also be informed by either formal studies that the
project is doing or, and most importantly, the relationships on the social side
that the project has with external stakeholders. So if a project has no
relationships with anyone external to the project and no baseline information
about what’s going on in the external context, they’re not going to be able to
assess social risk. (Yasmin, a research participant, 2015)
Of course, in order to assess social risk, assessors also need to be cognisant of the proposed mine
plan; that is, to have project data. The primary goals of social engagement, according to
participants, are to share information, understand the critical concerns of external actors, and to be
in a position to track changes in those concerns and views over time. As Yasmin notes, without
establishing relationships and engaging with actors, proponents are not able to obtain all the data
they need to assess the social risks generated by their projects. Hugh, an environmental services
manager, explains how social engagement was critical to the success of a project he worked on:
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Engagement with […] the different […] groups and NGOs allowed all their
issues to be understood and then incorporated into the location of key
infrastructure to support that project. (Hugh, a research participant, 2015)
Ethan, a project executive, finds that engagement enhances the two-way communication between
proponents and actors, and enables both parties to understand each other’s priorities and risk
perspectives. He gives an example from an open-cut project he led a number of years ago to
illustrate this point. The viability of a neighbouring landowner’s business was being threatened by
visual amenity changes generated by the project. Ethan met with the landowner to discuss social
amenity risks. Once he understood the landholder’s perspectives, he was able to work with his team
to identify mitigation measures that addressed the landholder’s concerns and met the project’s
needs. While a significant cost to the project, mitigating the social amenity risks reduced approvals
risk, which made the cost acceptable to the proponent.
Research participants acknowledge that not only is it important to engage with external actors, but
how that engagement is carried out is also critical. Tyla, a community relations manager, argues that
claiming ‘consultation fatigue’ to justify poor data quality is an indicator of poor engagement:
People are not sick of being consulted, they’re just sick of being consulted in
the way they were being consulted, [...] the format that’s being used. “Come
and have a meeting. Sit down. We’ll provide tea and coffee. Sit around the
table. Now tell me […] what do you think your impacts are gunna be?” If
you’ve gotta do that a number of times, it becomes boring. (Tyla, a research
participant, 2015)
Tyla goes on to say that ‘disengagement’ is exacerbated by proponents failing to provide feedback
to the people they seek to engage. This perspective links social engagement with two-way
communication practice. Another participant, George, a project executive, states that using
ineffective forums, such as town hall meetings, can be counterproductive. He finds that because
these types of forums encourage “disenfranchised” residents to vocalise their concerns, there is the
potential that proponents could get a “distorted view” of the community’s perspectives of risk.
George is making the point that the benefits projects can deliver – the upside risks – are rarely
discussed in town hall meetings, and this skews the discussion towards downside risks. The way
project team members respond to concerns from participants; that is, their effectiveness, also
contributes to how these types of meetings are judged.
According to research participants, greenfields and brownfields projects present different dynamics
in terms of social engagement and communication with actors. Kevin, an environmental and
community relations manager, admits that trying to assess social risks for greenfields projects is
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much more difficult than it is for brownfields projects, primarily due to the absence of established
relationships and baseline data:
You have a credibility deficit […] How you communicate to stakeholders can
just make that worse, or [you] can just chip away and make for [a] slightly
more informed understanding of the project. (Kevin, a research participant,
2015)
Kevin’s experience highlights the importance of ensuring that adequate lead time is scheduled for
social engagement and relationship building, particularly for greenfields projects that are isolated
from the proponent’s existing operations, so that data can be collected for the assessment of social
risk.
Participants also discuss internal communication challenges. Although brownfields projects have
the advantage that specialists from the operating site are nearby, communication between project
and operations teams can be ineffective. Craig, who has worked on site as an environmental
manager, describes the existence of ‘turf wars’ and a ‘silo mentality’:
I think internally […] within mining companies, there’s a level of culture […]
that people are oftentimes seen to be wanting to protect their turf. It’s about
that level of engagement with other key discipline areas [that] tends to be
fractured. It hasn’t properly evolved and that, I think, is a real barrier too. The
mining industry has got to realise [that it has] to start to look at the […] culture
of the project groups [and] how they interact with operations. (Craig, a research
participant, 2015)
Some mining companies have established separate project hubs and Craig suggests that this
segregation from operating mines exacerbates poor communication between the two groups. Project
teams come in to ‘do the project’ and hand it over to operations with very little crossover: “There’s
a gap there because the operational personnel […] haven’t been involved from the outset” (Craig, a
research participant, 2015). Without that involvement, project teams are unlikely to benefit from the
relationships already established with key external actors and the communication mechanisms that
are in place. Furthermore, effective communication between the two teams can enable aspects of the
mine plan to undergo ‘ground truthing’ ahead of implementation, to help the handover from project
to operation to be as seamless as possible, and to limit the potential for commitments made by the
project team to be lost in transit.
Research participants say it is also challenging to determine the optimum time for initiating social
engagement. On the one hand, it is important to form constructive relationships with landholders,
for example, as early as possible in the project lifecycle, such as during the exploration stage. On
the other hand, the preferred mine plan is not selected until the end of prefeasibility, so the project
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team does not have specific details to share until then. Hugh explains that this level of uncertainty
makes identifying social risks complicated:
Trying to communicate uncertainty is a complex business. Early on in the
project phase, you don’t know what the project looks like so it [is] very
difficult talking to people about [it …] The change between now and when it
might get built, it could look substantially different. There’s that tension in
there always […] Not being able to tell them anything […] can be perceived as
hiding things or keeping things secret. (Hugh, a research participant, 2015)
A lack of transparency, even the appearance of a lack of transparency, can undermine social
engagement and, thereby, affect SRA.
Other factors that participants consider critical to enabling SRA include corporate leadership, the
passion and commitment of individual employees in championing the exploration of diverse risk
perspectives, and analysts’ SRA experience. According to Owen, a sustainable development
executive, senior management leadership is just as important as SRA systems and process: “It gets
back to leadership and it gets back to what are the […] core values of that leadership team” (Owen,
a research participant, 2015). Another participant, Yasmin, agrees, saying that leadership is about
championing SRA: “A formal way of addressing social risk […] is […] the leadership support to
say ‘yes you will do that’” (Yasmin, a research participant, 2015). Complementing leadership is the
passion and commitment of individual employees on the ground. Dylan, a project executive,
describes the importance a senior community relations specialist played in promoting a balance
between social and technical dimensions on a project he had worked on:
The joy of working with [name of specialist] was she had an absolute passion
for [promoting the view that] people should not be worse off. She would say
people have got to be better off; and that’s a mindset change [….] It was great
to see that she could bring that enthusiasm to the project. I don’t see that in a
lot of other people [….] She had to combine passion with practicality [….] She
was organised, fiercely determined and carried the day. (Dylan, a research
participant, 2015)
Dylan’s recollection highlights the symbiotic relationship he experienced between corporate
leadership and execution: without leadership, individual employees do not have the endorsement
needed to affect change; without dedicated, driven individual employees on the ground, the vision
of leaders may not be brought to fruition.
This subsection outlined the factors that participants consider are needed to assess social risk in the
project evaluation environment. Five specific factors were examined: social engagement,
communication, relationships with external actors, leadership, and the role of individual employees.
These factors indicate that the research participants consider the assessment of social risk to be
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more than just sequentially completing a list of activities and maintaining the project schedule. The
context of each project is important. To understand how potentially affected people and other
external actors construct and prioritise social risk, project team members need to take time and
effort to engage with those actors. The project schedule, therefore, needs to accommodate sufficient
time for social engagement to be undertaken. Furthermore, research participants indicate that while
having project risk governance mechanisms (systems and processes) in place is critical, having
effective leaders and motivated project team members is just as critical.
Conclusion
This chapter analysed how research participants working in the mining industry think about,
prioritise and assess social risk in the context of project evaluation. There are five key findings in
relation to the construction of social risk. First, research participants do not attribute the same
meaning to social risk. The way they construct social risk can be categorised according to who or
what is at risk; that is, risk to people, risk to project, or risk to both people and project. Second, their
professional background is not a key indicator of how they orient their constructions of social risk.
Third, while social risk can be considered part of the professional vocabulary of community
relations and risk management practitioners, research participants working in these roles attribute
different meanings to the term, indicating that it is not used consistently across professional
domains. Fourth, it is more common for research participants to discuss physical rather than non-
physical social risks, suggesting that non-physical risks may not be given priority in the assessment
process. Fifth, research participants consider mine workers and permanent residents of the host
communities to be at risk from FIFO/DIDO employment practices, raising questions about whether
social risk is a place-based or distributed phenomenon. In other words, are risks to family members
of FIFO/DIDO workers also considered to be social risks?
In relation to the assessment of social risk, the chapter has five findings. First, the most common
mechanisms used to assess social risks are SRA workshops and SIAs. These mechanisms are
conducted by different assessors as standalone activities rather than as an integrated process; that is,
with responsibility allocated to the management of social data, and data from SRA workshops and
the SIA being considered in developing the mine plan. Second, participants tend to frame social
risks in terms of economic costs and benefits, prioritising social risks according to their financial
risk to the project. Framing social risk in this way positions the project rather than people as the
subject of risk. Third, it is not common for external actors, such as community or government
representatives, to participate in risk workshops, which indicates potential to improve the level of
inclusiveness adopted by project teams. Fourth, research participants rate having corporate
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leadership and motivated project team members as just as important in facilitating the assessment of
social risk as having project risk governance mechanisms in place. Fifth, SRA is a context-specific
process that requires more than just sequentially ticking off a list of activities. To assess social risk,
project team members need to be immersed in that context – not only in relation to the project being
developed, but the physical and social environment. Research participants confirm the importance
of social engagement to that immersion process.
Overall, this chapter has shown that there is no consensus on the meaning of social risk; different
people frame and prioritise social risks differently, which makes the identification, assessment and
mitigation of social risks challenging. How can social risk be assessed if there is no agreement on
who or what is at risk? The risk governance principle of inclusiveness can help to address this
dilemma. The principle promotes a shared framing of risk. This approach aims to unearth the
hidden assumptions participants may hold so that they are cognisant of each other’s perspectives
and can then move on to develop a shared framing of risk. Once there is agreement on who or what
is at risk, the assessment can proceed.
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CHAPTER 7: THE KOALA EXTENSION PROJECT
Introduction
Chapter 7 describes the processes used by the proponent, Marsupial Coal, to evaluate the Koala
Extension Project. The key finding from this chapter is that prioritising social engagement and
taking an inclusive approach to the assessment and mitigation of social risk can provide a
foundation for delivering a competitive advantage for mining proponents in terms of obtaining
development consent. Addressing the priority social risks of external actors can also help
proponents to maintain the constructive relationships they need with those actors in order to
continue to develop mining operations in highly contested environments; representing a longer-term
business strategy compared with obtaining development consent for a single project.
The chapter comprises seven sections. An overview of the project is provided in Section 7.2.
Section 7.3 describes the Koala Extension Project team and explores team dynamics and
relationships. The Marsupial Coal culture and the influence the culture had on the Koala Extension
Project are examined in Section 7.4. The chapter then provides an overview of the project strategy
in Section 7.5, followed by an exploration of the risk governance mechanisms used in the project in
Section 7.6. These mechanisms include the project governance committee; the corporate systems,
policies, standards and guidelines; project stage gates; and risk assessment. Section 7.7 concludes
the chapter.
An overview of the Koala Extension Project
Marsupial Mining is a diversified global mining company. Its coal business, Marsupial Coal, owns
and operates thermal and coking coal mines in a number of countries, including Australia. The
company has been operating in the Eucalyptus Pits region for more than three decades.22 In addition
to coal mining, the region supports other industrial activities, diverse farming and agriculture, and is
host to a substantial network of small businesses. Land-use conflict, including in relation to mining,
coal seam gas and other industrial developments, has been evident in recent years.
Koala Extension Project, located in Eucalyptus Pits, is a proposal to extend the life of the existing
Koala operation by more than 20 years without changing the current approved maximum annual
production rate. The existing Koala mine is a large operation, employing significantly more than
22 Marsupial Coal and its predecessors. The Marsupial Coal assets have been subject to a number of mergers and acquisitions.
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500 people.23 The extension project will enable the continued employment of these people, plus up
to 300 contractors at the peak of the project construction phase. Construction is expected to take
around four years to complete. Although Koala Extension Project will utilise existing mine
infrastructure, the project represents a significant capital investment. Mining will be by open-cut
methods.
A simplified organisation chart for Marsupial Coal is provided in Figure 7.A.
Figure 7.A: Marsupial Coal organisation chart.
Introducing the Koala Extension Project team
The size and composition of the Koala Extension Project team changed as the project transitioned
through the various stage gates and as the workload increased. In addition, some team members
moved onto other roles external to the project and some left the company. Research participants
identified the following team roles that were held at various stages of the project life: project
manager, approvals manager, mine planner (mining engineer), project accountant (economic
modelling, day-to-day finances; part-time), infrastructure superintendent, environmental scientist,
approvals coordinator, geologist and geotechnical engineer.
23 To retain the project’s anonymity, I am not using specific data here.
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Figure 7.B: Koala Extension Project team organisation chart.
Eleven research participants were interviewed for the Koala Extension Project case study. The
participants and their roles are shown in Table 7.A, and the project reporting structure is illustrated
in Figure 7.B. Mackenzie, Noah, Jack, Harrison, Karl and Oliver are members of the Koala
Extension Project team. Jack, Karl and Oliver were already employed by Marsupial Coal, while
Mackenzie, Harrison and Noah were appointed from outside the company. Liam is a corporate
representative who peer-reviewed the stage-gate reports and provided advice to the project team as
needed. Isaiah is employed by the existing Koala mine and had a part-time role with the project
team, while continuing to report to the Koala General Manager. Phoebe, Randall and Sam are
specialist consultants engaged by Marsupial Coal to manage the EIS, including the technical studies
and SIA. Randall and Sam work for Environmental Consulting. The specific roles held by the
research participants are described in the next paragraph.
Table 7.A: Research participants and their roles in the Koala Extension Project
Name Role Employer
Liam General Manager Environment and
Community (Marsupial corporate)
Marsupial Coal
Mackenzie Project Manager 1 Marsupial Coal
Noah Approvals Manager 1 Marsupial Coal
Jack Environmental Scientist / Approvals
Manager 2
Marsupial Coal
Harrison Operations Specialist / Project
Manager 2
Marsupial Coal
Karl Infrastructure Superintendent Marsupial Coal
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Oliver Approvals Coordinator Marsupial Coal
Isaiah Manager Environment and
Community (Koala mine)
Marsupial Coal
Phoebe SIA Consultant Self-employed
Randall Lead Environmental Consultant /
Environmental Consulting’s Project
Director
Environmental Consulting
Sam EIS Manager / Environmental
Consulting’s Project Manager
Environmental Consulting
The construction of the project team, including consultants, indicates an alignment with the risk
governance principle of multidisciplinarity. In addition to team members with techno-scientific
skills, there are team members with social science qualifications (Phoebe) and experience working
with communities (Liam, Noah and Isaiah), who are able to assess social risk.
The internal team is introduced here. Mackenzie, the project manager, was responsible for
delivering Koala Extension Project to the project governance committee, headed by Vaughan. He
oversaw the development of the mine plan and its amendments, and engaged with a range of actors,
including federal, state and local government representatives; infrastructure agencies and utilities;
and landholders. The project team members reported to Mackenzie. Harrison was brought into the
team to manage a smaller project associated with the overall mining project, but he also provided
input into mine planning and the siting of infrastructure. He took over Mackenzie’s role when Koala
moved from feasibility into “execution readiness and execution” (Harrison, a research participant,
2015); also known as the construction phase. Noah was the initial approvals manager. He was
replaced by Jack following his promotion to a corporate role midway through the project. Noah and
Jack managed the consultants undertaking the studies, liaised with Isaiah and the Koala operations
team, carried out day-to-day project activities, and provided progress reports for the project
governance committee (Jack, a research participant, 2015). In his role as approvals coordinator,
Oliver assisted Noah and Jack, and also managed the Aboriginal cultural heritage assessment
consultants. Infrastructure superintendent, Karl, managed the infrastructure location/relocation
requirements for the Koala Extension Project, such as the coal handling preparation plant, water
management dams, tailings facilities, out-of-pit emplacements (for the waste earth covering the
coal), powerlines and access roads. He appointed and liaised with the “partners” to carry out the
design, relocation and construction work (Karl, a research participant, 2015). Isaiah and his team
provided environmental review and community engagement support to the project team.
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Phoebe was one of the primary consultants. She carried out the SIA and the project’s community
engagement program as part of that assessment. She worked closely with the project team and the
environmental consultants. Randall was the external environmental consultancy lead, responsible
for delivering the multi-volume EIS document to Marsupial Coal, coordinating the technical
specialists (Environmental Consulting’s in-house specialists and the numerous sub-consultants) and
liaising with the environmental regulatory agencies. Sam managed the preparation of the EIS and
was the primary contact between the Koala Extension Project team and Environmental Consulting.
He was also involved in finalising some prefeasibility constraints assessment work before starting
the EIS. Having described the project team, I now turn to a discussion about relationships and team
dynamics.
The importance of relationships is a common theme raised by the research participants –
relationships between project team members as well as those between the project team and the
operations team and with Environmental Consulting. Comments made by the research participants
indicate that, overall, there was a cohesive dynamic within the Koala Extension Project team. Oliver
says the team communicated well. Randall comments on the constructive dialogue between the
mine planner and the approvals manager and coordinator, and the flexibility the team had around
amending the mine plan to address issues raised in the environmental and social impact
assessments. He says project team members tended to be open about the issues the project faced,
how they were trying to deal with them and what progress was being made. Mackenzie discusses
the team’s attributes and signals that, despite the overall cohesion, there were some frustrations
within the team:
Other than Harrison, we worked well together. We were on the same page. We
knew what the plan was. […] I think we had a good team. I think we had a very
experienced team. I think we had a mature team. I think we had an empathetic
team. (Mackenzie, a research participant, 2015)
The inference I draw from this comment is that Harrison did not have the same project perspectives
as the other team members, although Mackenzie is the only research participant to mention this.
Given that Mackenzie considers empathy to be an admirable trait for project team members to have
(he includes it in his description of the team and I cite another reference to it on page 126), his issue
may have been related to Harrison’s lack of social engagement experience and empathy. Harrison
has a civil engineering and construction management background. He acknowledges that initially he
did not understand nor see the value of social engagement, and that he faced a “steep learning
curve” in relation to the social dimensions of the project. However, he now sees “definite benefits”
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from engaging with local communities (Harrison, a research participant, 2015).24 An alternative
explanation for Mackenzie’s comment could stem from a perceived professional slight; Harrison
replaced him as project manager at the end of the feasibility stage. Another example of frustration
within the project team is exhibited by Noah, who comments on Mackenzie’s lack of project
experience and the implications this had on the development of the mine plan:
The project manager was a mining engineer who’d spent his life doing mine
design so his answer [….] to all these issues was extremely technical [….]
Because he’d never done [a major mining project] before, every time we got an
answer back from the noise consultant, it was a drama and we had to redesign
the whole mine [….] We did 40 something versions of the mine design to try
and fix [those] problems which was way over the top; cost us a lot of time [….]
We come up with a good end result but we could have done it more efficiently.
(Noah, a research participant, 2015)25
While acknowledging the need to amend the mine plan so that Koala Extension Project’s impacts
could be addressed, Noah is critical of Mackenzie’s reactive approach. He suggests that a more
strategic approach could have saved time and money.
Comments from the research participants indicate that the Koala Extension Project team and
Environmental Consulting had an integrated approach to their work. In addition to the monthly
reports prepared by Environmental Consulting, informal emails and phone calls, there were monthly
face-to-face meetings held between the project team, the operations team and Environmental
Consulting. The consultants attended via teleconferences during heavy EIS writing periods to save
on commuting time and to limit disruption to their writing. Weekly meetings were held during peak
times. Phoebe and her team were included in regular meetings. Randall says taking an integrated
approach to project delivery was important because the components of the project were interrelated
and needed input from all parties; for example, the mine planner needed to understand the
implications of the dust, noise and water studies’ results in order to minimise mining impacts when
designing the mine. This approach is aligned with the risk governance principles of
multidisciplinarity and, to a certain extent, inclusiveness. Phoebe notes the importance of having the
project and operations teams working together, given that the operations team had to deliver on the
commitments made by the project team.26 She considers Koala’s integrated approach to be leading
practice, and she acknowledges the project team’s willingness to canvas different views around the
table during meetings:
24 A review of the transcript of my interview with Harrison confirms that he quite often spoke of the importance of social engagement and its place in
the Marsupial Coal culture (although he did not use the term ‘culture’).
25 Although an experienced mining engineer, prior to Koala Extension Project, Mackenzie had not managed a large mining project.
26 However, comments from Noah indicate that, initially, the relationship between the project and operations teams was not a highly collaborative
one: “The project manager at the time didn’t have a strong relationship with the ops guys, so it wasn’t easy to bridge that gap” (Noah, a research
participant, 2015).
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So you get me saying [that these are] the issues for community [….] and then
from an engineering perspective, how can we handle that, or environmental –
and that’s where you get the real interplay [….] It’s about a willingness to
listen, to integrate. I think the integration is the key, to be honest. It’s a
multidisciplinary process. It’s not just an environmental or an engineering or a
social [process ….] It’s about having an integrated project team. (Phoebe, a
research participant, 2015)
Having an integrated approach did not preclude robust discussions between different participants.
Nevertheless, Phoebe says that her views were considered:
There were times at those [project] meetings [that] they were quite heated
[laughs], banging the table a few times, probably, but I think again that’s part
of it [….] We felt that we were being heard. There wasn’t always agreement
but we wouldn’t expect there to be. (Phoebe, a research participant, 2015)
Randall explains that given the intensity and duration of the project evaluation process, it was not
surprising that at times the specialist consultants gave the project team advice that it did not like,
“but that’s part of our job; to tell them what the risks and opportunities are” (Randall, a research
participant, 2015). Providing space for different views to be expressed and interrogated helped to
improve the rigour of the mine plan, as Sam indicates:
They had a good technical team that would actually review what was put
forward and whether it was feasible around water management and those sort
of things. Our water people worked quite closely with them on the design of
the water management systems. There was some push back from the
operational guys on what was necessary in terms of noise controls and noise
barriers but, ultimately, it was necessary for the project to have the low-level
impact. (Sam, a research participant, 2015)
The “pushback” identified by Sam is a common tension in mining projects. It is about maintaining a
balance between enhancing project value and expending capital to address community expectations
and regulatory requirements.
The significance of the Marsupial Coal culture to project evaluation
One of the strongest themes to emerge from my interviews with the research participants is the
culture of Marsupial Coal, as distinct from the parent company, Marsupial Mining. The theme is
raised frequently. Participants employed by the company speak with pride about the culture and use
it to differentiate Koala from other operations in Eucalyptus Pits. Harrison explains that at the heart
of Marsupial Coal’s culture is a recognition that mining is not just about production:
The operations […] don’t just concentrate on business drivers [of] safety, cost
and production. Part of that is [… that] it comes from the top down, as they
believe we have to have a licence to operate. Part of that licence to operate is
involving the community and listening to the […] broader community about
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how we can coexist. Umberto and his team […] set that vision; but everyone –
even down to our operators – have that same ethos and vision, that we’re not
just here to dig a hole in the ground and get paid good money for driving trucks
round in a circle. We’re also here to try and minimise our impact on the
community and environment. (Harrison, a research participant, 2015)
Liam discusses the influence the senior leadership team’s priorities have on organisational culture.
If production is the focus, then employees at all levels of the business would prioritise production
over other activities. He says that at Marsupial Coal, environment and community are given the
same priority as health and safety (and production). His perspective is supported by comments from
project team members who describe how Liam rejected the project development plan presented at
the prefeasibility stage gate because the social and environmental risks were unacceptable to him,
and that he had the support of the project governance committee to do so.27 His local knowledge led
him to consider that the risks would be unacceptable to the community. Furthermore, the final mine
plan required the sterilisation of some coal reserves (Harrison, a research participant, 2015; Randall,
a research participant, 2015), which showed a willingness to lose project value in order to minimise
social and environmental risks.28 Liam says the project governance committee’s support of his
position derived from the constructive and mutually respectful relationship he has with the
committee and that, over time, he has proven the business case for addressing social and
environmental risks.
Marsupial Coal’s culture is underpinned by business imperatives. The company has a long-term
strategy to continue operating in Eucalyptus Pits (Liam, a research participant, 2015). According to
the research participants, Marsupial Coal recognises that its ability to develop new projects depends
on keeping its reputation with the regulators and local communities intact:
Our corporate culture comes from Tanner and Umberto down. They’re people
who understand [….] the value of the community to the business [….] There’s
a clear connection with the bottom line in terms of access to future resources.
That’s what projects are and […] we’re a mining company. We don’t have
projects to build playgrounds and highways. We have projects to dig holes and
get things out of the ground. Access to those resources is generally controlled,
timewise, by the community – our relationship with the community, their
willingness to participate in the processes […] and our environmental and
community performance over time. Those two aspects, I think, are probably the
key drivers for whether or not we get access to new resources in an appropriate
timeframe. (Noah, a research participant, 2015)
27 Whitney, who holds a senior management role within Marsupial Coal, and Isaiah, the Koala Manager Environment and Community, were also
involved in the peer review of the prefeasibility report.
28 Sterilisation of coal reserves occurs when the proponent chooses to leave saleable coal in the ground due to social, safety or other risks.
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In other words, investing in relationships and in the company’s social and environmental
performance makes good business sense.
Research participants regularly speak about the values that underpin the Marsupial Coal culture.
These values were described as: being a good neighbour; trust and the conscious decision to build
trust; openness and transparency; a willingness to listen; following through on commitments made;
consistency of behaviour; being genuine, particularly in developing relationships; honesty; respect;
fairness and justice; integrity; and loyalty. Liam says that building trust with local communities is
one of Marsupial Coal’s “mantras”:
We started [building trust] back in [year] through [year]. Isaiah took over from
me […] and continued building that relationship. There’s been ongoing
dialogue, ongoing community support, and that’s been a deliberate decision.
We wanted those communities to want us to be around, [to see] value in us
being around. (Liam, a research participant, 2015)29
Liam is saying that in having shown a willingness to engage with local communities over an
extended period of time and not just when it wanted to undertake a new project, Marsupial Coal has
been able to develop a level of trust with those communities. One of the contributing factors, he
says, is the stability of Marsupial Coal’s team and the ability of team members, therefore, to
develop long-term relationships with landholders, local residents and other actors. He explains that
unlike other mining companies, Marsupial Coal does not rotate its high potential professionals
through a series of short-term appointments across the business. The company’s approach provides
continuity of key personnel and enables them to nurture the relationships that have been established.
Another aspect of the organisational culture identified by research participants is the open access
employees have to the senior leadership team. Karl describes his experience:
If I’ve got a problem, it doesn’t take too many steps to go to a director. You
hear people talking about [another mining company] and places like that; it’s a
challenge. So if I’ve got a problem and Harrison’s not around, or Mackenzie
wasn’t around, you’d have the discussion with Vaughan; it wouldn’t be an
issue [….] And all the jobs have been like that. (Karl, a research participant,
2015)
The willingness of Marsupial Coal’s senior leaders to be available to employees beyond their direct
reports means that they are more likely to be kept abreast of, and therefore able to respond to, issues
that could affect the business.
29 I have not published the dates in order to retain Marsupial Coal’s anonymity.
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In concluding this section on Marsupial Coal’s culture, I note the importance the research
participants attribute to the role of individuals in fostering the culture, and the following quotes
highlight who they consider to be driving it: “Our corporate culture comes from Tanner and
Umberto” (Noah, a research participant, 2015); “Umberto, Liam […] those individuals set the
character of the business” (Isaiah, a research participant, 2015); “Vaughan and Umberto were the
keepers of the keys to say, ‘No, that’s not what we’re looking to do’” (Jack, a research participant,
2015); and “Isaiah knows those local people and there’s an investment there – a personal as well as
a business investment – and I think that makes a difference” (Phoebe, a research participant, 2015).
Karl explains the importance of following through on commitments made to local communities and
identifies who is delivering on this corporate value:
I think over the years that’s what this site has done. It’s built up honesty and
trust. When Jack, Noah and Mackenzie had the conversation, people felt they
could […] express their view, and if they said something was going to get
done, that [it] has been. (Karl, a research participant, 2015)
Karl’s comment is about individual Koala Extension Project team members living the
organisational values and, thereby, continuing to foster the Marsupial Coal culture.
Taking a strategic approach to project evaluation
The influence of Marsupial Coal’s culture permeates through the company’s management practices;
of particular interest to this chapter is the strategy adopted for the Koala Extension Project.30 The
key features of the strategy are outlined by the research participants. Harrison, for example,
discusses the importance given to social engagement:
That’s something that’s driven the project planning process – through the
prefeas and the feasibility – to get that stakeholder engagement and feed that
into the mine plan so that we do get a balance of what’s good for business and
what’s good for the community. (Harrison, a research participant, 2011)
Other research participants use terms such as ‘sustainable’ and ‘coexistence’ to describe the team’s
objectives for the project:
We wanted to build a sustainable project. We wanted to try to aim for
something that, after a short period, we were starting to reduce our noise and
dust impacts on the people. (Jack, a research participant, 2015)
The senior project people […] within Marsupial Coal as an organisation, they
have a good understanding that they have to find a way to coexist and they
need to put forward a quality project. (Randall, a research participant, 2015)
30 ‘Project strategy’ is a term I am using to describe a collection of factors raised by the research participants as important to the project team but that
may not have been articulated by the team as the project strategy.
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Not only was the project strategy aligned with the Marsupial Coal culture, but it signified a business
response to the prevailing social environment; the evaluation of Koala Extension Project was
undertaken at a time of strong opposition to the development of new coal projects in the region. The
research participants discuss how, as a consequence, the project team adopted a deliberate strategy
to differentiate Koala from the other coal projects in order to gain a competitive advantage in terms
of obtaining development consent (Jack, a research participant, 2015; Noah, a research participant,
2015). They explain that the strategy was successful, with community organisations, the local
government and regulators favourably contrasting Koala’s approach with that used by other project
proponents and, significantly, that it was granted development consent. Other projects were refused
development consent or faced extensive delays as the proponents undertook legal action to
challenge the initial determination. Randall says that the local communities “might not be happy
[about having another mine], but they at least felt that this project was done properly and that they
had an opportunity for engagement” (Randall, a research participant, 2015).
Doing it properly, according to Randall, means investing time and substantial financial resources to
engage widely and to ensure that the concerns of community and government actors are addressed
in the mine plan. The research participants give specific examples that reflected this feature of the
project strategy. Randall, for example, discusses the response to concerns about potential mine
water releases offsite – the team decided to build a very large dam so when the mine was
operational, onsite water could be managed to limit releases offsite. Noah talks about how the
project team chose to recontour the out-of-pit emplacement material, creating a large bund
(vegetated earth wall) to protect the local community from social amenity risks, including noise,
dust, night lights and visual amenity, generated by the mine. Community members were involved in
designing the bund. Oliver mentions Karl’s willingness to move the location of an out-of-pit dump
and relocate some infrastructure in order to avoid impacts to a hill that holds cultural significance to
local Aboriginal people. However, research participants acknowledge that not all community
expectations were met by the project. Oliver says that in circumstances in which expectations were
not met, project team members provided actors with an explanation: “People want to understand
why you can’t” (Oliver, a research participant, 2015). Karl further discusses the project team’s
communication approach:
At all stages on the infrastructure side, we kept everybody fully informed. We
didn’t try and hide anything, and we engaged them right from the beginning.
Where they had something that they wanted and we could, without too much
detriment to us, we would assist them with that. (Karl, a research participant,
2015)
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Underpinning the project strategy was the decision to address all the major issues identified in the
studies and raised by actors before submitting the development application to the state government,
a strategy supported by Phoebe:
It was a good process. I think […] that the project probably was viewed
reasonably favourably by all parties [….] The company felt comfortable with
the project they put forward. The community felt reasonably comfortable; the
government did too. And […] when it comes to approval processes, it’s a much
better space to be in when all that is resolved before the document is lodged. So
government, there’s no surprises, if you like. There were no surprises to the
community; in fact they didn’t need to read the EIS because they knew what
was in [it]. (Phoebe, a research participant, 2015)
Randall explains that this is not a strategy commonly used by mining proponents who operate in
Eucalyptus Pits. It is more common to design a mine that maximises the value of the project and for
issues raised by actors to be addressed once the public submissions are reviewed, following the
submission of the development application.
This section illustrated how the strategy for undertaking Koala Extension Project was closely
aligned with the Marsupial Coal culture. Relationships with key actors, such as local communities
and the local government, were considered important, and priority was given to social and
environmental factors. Furthermore, participants explain that the strategy was underpinned by
business imperatives: the willingness to amend the mine plan in response to feedback from actors
differentiated Koala Extension Project and, thereby, provided a competitive advantage in terms of
obtaining development consent.
Project risk governance: a proponent’s approach
In order to obtain the approvals required by legislation for mining projects
[…], a significant business investment must be made in undertaking the
required environmental and social impact assessments. These complex and
multidisciplinary studies require a high level of project management in order to
meet the statutory requirements in a reasonable timeframe and within budget.
(Marsupial Coal, n.d., p. 9)
This quote from Marsupial Coal’s Sustainable Development Annexure: Statutory Approvals
emphasises the purpose of project risk governance for this proponent – obtain development consent
within “a reasonable timeframe and within budget”.31 How the Koala team used project risk
31 Although called an annexure, this is an important document as it specifies the procedures Marsupial Coal’s project teams must follow during
project evaluation.
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governance mechanisms as part of project management is the focus of this section. Four
mechanisms are explored.
7.6.1 The role of the project governance committee
Marsupial Coal’s project governance committee (PGC) has many of the same attributes, and it
functions in much the same way, as the committees of other mining companies (see the discussion
in Chapter 5). Committee members are drawn from Marsupial Coal’s senior business development
managers and the committee is led by Vaughan, head of development and projects. The PGC is the
“central decision-making portal” for projects (Oliver, a research participant, 2015) and all teams are
required to report to the committee on a monthly basis. Meetings with the PGC are “quite
structured” (Liam, a research participant, 2015) and provide a mechanism for the teams to outline
their project’s progress and to discuss any issues that may have arisen since the previous meeting.
Oliver says that the teams were expected to recommend solutions to the issues they were facing and
to provide a rationale for their recommendations. If, for example, the Koala project team
recommended a change to the mine plan, it would need to explain how the change eliminated risk,
to provide a cost/benefit justification and to identify any flow-on effects to other parts of the plan.
Based on the information provided by the project team, the PGC assesses whether the project is on
track, provides direction to the project team as well as approving project budgets and changes in
expenditure. The PGC also provides the project investment approval, although the final investment
decision is made by the board. Mackenzie describes the approvals process as a type of change
management:
So if there was any change or something new, we would have to get approval
through a change management process. If we said, “This is our plan” and then
all of a sudden we decided that we need to spend a bit of money to do this, we
would have to go and put in a change management to the [PGC] and get
approval for that. (Mackenzie, a research participant, 2015)
In this way the PGC could control project expenditure.
According to research participants, the relationship between the PGC and project teams is a
supportive one. Harrison, for example, says he has not experienced “undue pressure” from the
committee:
The executive team here with Umberto, Liam and Vaughan are always happy
to hear about what the roadblocks are and offer suggestions: “We’ll always
check in to see how you’re going”, but [they] don’t apply undue pressure when
they can see things are beyond the project team’s control. (Harrison, a research
participant, 2015)
Sandy Worden Chapter 7 126 | P a g e
Harrison’s perspective is aligned with the comment made by Karl (cited on page 120). These two
comments, in addition to the discussion in the section on the project team, suggest that Marsupial
Coal provides an environment conducive to constructive employee relationships, both across the
organisation and vertically through its reporting hierarchy.
For Noah, the PGC’s leadership has contributed to an effective project risk governance process and
he contrasts Marsupial Coal’s governance processes with those of other mining proponents. Noah
contends that his company incorporates environmental and social factors, which he calls
“sustainability aspects,” and the “right issues and risks” in addition to the common requirement for
PGC sign-off on the financials: “I think the runs are on the board to demonstrate that [this
approach] gives you the outcomes that you need as a business in the timeframes that you’re looking
for” (Noah, a research participant, 2015). Noah asserts that by adopting a broader approach to
project risk governance, not just focusing on financial indicators, Marsupial Coal is able to develop
mining projects within a timeframe that is acceptable to the company.
This section described the role of Marsupial Coal’s project governance committee and highlighted
that participants consider there to be a constructive relationship between the PGC and the Koala
Extension Project team. The next section explores the company’s systems, policies, standards and
guidelines that are used by teams to navigate the project evaluation process.
7.6.2 Marsupial Coal’s systems, policies, standards and guidelines
At Marsupial Mining, project development sits within the context of sustainable development.
There are seven sustainable development standards and they address planning and resources;
communication and engagement; risk and change management; legal compliance and document
control; environment, biodiversity and landscape functions; social and community engagement; and
lifecycle management. At the business unit or Marsupial Coal level, there are a range of policies,
frameworks, guidelines, annexures and user guides that relate to project evaluation. All these
documents are hosted on the company’s intranet. I consider the documents of most relevance to
Chapter 7 to be the sustainable development policy; Sustainable Development Annexure: Statutory
Approvals; the approval stage-gate guideline; the associated project management system; and the
environmental and social impact assessments (ESIA) management control framework.
The sustainable development policy provides the company’s overall approach to sustainable
development. The statutory approvals document provides advice to project teams tasked with
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obtaining statutory approvals for their project and specifies the corporate requirements for that
process. The document describes its purpose as minimising
the business risk of delays to Marsupial Coal projects and operations resulting
from overdue approvals. This will be achieved by assisting Marsupial Coal’s
major projects and operations to achieve consistency in approach across the
[…] group, and assist in obtaining the necessary environmental and mining
approvals in an efficient and timely manner. (Marsupial Coal, n.d., p. 3)
The Marsupial Coal project management system describes the project planning phases required to
develop a project – concept, prefeasibility and feasibility – and provides a summary of the
minimum activities required for a project to progress into the subsequent phase. It also includes
links to the relevant Marsupial Mining sustainable development standards (Marsupial Coal, n.d.).
The ESIA management control framework contains specific requirements for undertaking
“consistent and robust ESIA processes”, such as the development of an execution plan,
communications plan and peer review requirements. Project teams are required to engage with the
corporate team and to initiate early peer reviews of the ESIA studies (Marsupial Coal, n.d., p. 11).
These systems, policies, standards and guidelines are not a popular topic of conversation among
research participants, although in their interviews the general manager environment and
community, the project manager and the approvals manager do engage with the topic from time to
time. Mackenzie and Noah both note that following the completion of Koala’s feasibility study,
amendments were made to these documents as a means of continuous improvement. Mackenzie
says that Marsupial Coal now has a much more “empathetic” approach to project delivery:
The Koala Extension Project process brought in a lot of structure, and a lot of
empathy, and a lot of understanding. That then eventually transposed to the
PGC getting it, everybody getting it. And that’s been taken forward into other
projects, if you know what I mean. So now it’s been written up in standards
and stuff like that. (Mackenzie, a research participant, 2015)
Noah left his role as project approvals manager for Koala Extension Project to take up a group
project approvals role. He describes one of the changes he initiated in his new role:
We had quite a well-developed project control system, from concept through to
prefeasibility, feasibility and then execution of the project. That was pretty well
developed, but what I’ve done is integrate the environmental and social into
that process. (Noah, a research participant, 2015)
These comments from Mackenzie and Noah indicate that although Marsupial Coal’s culture
influenced the way the project team carried out its work, the lessons learned from Koala’s approach
to project management were of sufficient value to be integrated into the company’s existing project
risk governance system, standards and guidelines. They also indicate that work was needed to
integrate the corporate culture into the system and associated documentation.
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7.6.3 Reducing uncertainty via Marsupial Coal’s stage gate process
Project stage gates are a formal mechanism used to reduce project risk and uncertainty by investing
increasingly greater resources at each gate to improve data accuracy. If the proponent deems the
risk profile to be acceptable and it meets the specified stage-gate requirements, the project proceeds
to the next gate. Marsupial Coal has three project evaluation stage gates ahead of execution
readiness and execution – concept, prefeasibility and feasibility. Oliver explains that the stage gates
were based on a risk profile that was “strongly related to community acceptance and project
approval” (Oliver, a research participant, 2015). If the project were unlikely to be acceptable to key
actors and unlikely to obtain development consent, it would need to be reconfigured until the PGC
and the peer reviewers found the risks to be acceptable. Peer reviews are conducted at each stage
gate. Discipline experts from within Marsupial Coal, but external to the project, review the study
report and assess whether the scope for the next stage is adequate to address the risks that have been
identified (Noah, a research participant, 2015).
In the concept stage, baseline surveys and constraints studies are undertaken using a desktop
approach. Liam says the project team evaluated the key risks and constraints and, based on the
projected mining impacts, assessed the likelihood that the project would obtain development
consent. The PGC accepts a variance in data accuracy of ±30% at this stage.
The aim of prefeasibility is to confirm the preferred mine design option, and to deliver a conceptual
project development plan. Randall asserts that at prefeasibility, the Koala Extension Project team
had “a reasonable understanding” of what the issues were, based on community feedback in relation
to the existing Koala mine and from general knowledge. Noah explains that in prefeasibility there is
a series of project options. A risk assessment is conducted on the various options. One option may
have extremely high noise risks. A second option may have the rail loop located in proximity to the
product stockpile but present a biodiversity risk as trees need to be removed before the rail loop can
be constructed. If the risks in the options are considered to be high, specialist studies are
commissioned to quantify the risks and identify what mitigation and control measures are needed.
At prefeasibility the PGC accepts a variance in data accuracy of ±20%. Once the conceptual
development plan is completed, the feasibility study is costed.
A common topic of conversation among the research participants is the unacceptability of the
conceptual development plan delivered at the prefeasibility stage gate. In describing this situation,
Noah acknowledges the importance of peer reviews to the stage-gate process:
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Part of the value of this business is that people like Liam are involved in the
review of projects at their prefeasibility stage and, in the case of Koala
Extension Project, they said, “No, it shouldn’t go ahead”. It will have too big
an impact on the community in the configuration that it was in prefeas, so it
was flowed into feasibility but on the understanding that all those limitations
had to be fixed. (Noah, a research participant, 2015)
Noah’s comments support the contention that Marsupial Coal prioritises social and environmental
factors in project evaluation. His comments also indicate that the PGC is prepared to be flexible
around the stage-gate requirements.
The aim of the feasibility study is to reduce the level of risk in the project by undertaking a series of
studies and using modelling to quantify the projected impacts. The variance in data accuracy that
the PGC is prepared to accept at feasibility is ±15%. Reducing the level of risk is an iterative
process. Oliver explains that the project team aims to close all the gaps in the baseline data:
It has to be rigorous and that’s why, sometimes, your project description
changes. You have to go back and revisit all these to make sure that you don't
have to capture additional baseline data. You’re continually going back and
rechecking certain aspects – rechecking, rechecking, rechecking – until, finally,
you're happy with the risk you're going to tolerate to put the EIS in because you
think […] we’ve mitigated […] well enough; we’ve met the [terms of
reference/SEARs]. Some of our stakeholders are unhappy but, overall, the
narrative of our project is quite good, so you put it up. (Oliver, a research
participant, 2015)
The Koala Extension Project feasibility study was not without its challenges. The key issues facing
the project team during this stage, according to the research participants, related to two land
acquisition scenarios and the Aboriginal cultural heritage and archaeological assessments. In the
first land acquisition scenario, the project team wanted to acquire a small parcel of land needed for
site access. The negotiation was long and complex but it was ultimately resolved to the satisfaction
of the parties. In the second scenario, the project team considered acquiring land occupied by a
neighbouring industrial facility in order to manage air quality risks. After a protracted and
unsuccessful negotiation, the project team amended the mine plan to reduce the risks to the
neighbour. Research participants identify two key challenges in relation to the Aboriginal cultural
heritage and archaeological assessments. Harrison notes that there were many registered Aboriginal
parties with connections to land in the Koala area of Eucalyptus Pits but that their interrelationships
were fragmented. This, he says, made it difficult to reach agreement on how to address mining
risks. Some areas of cultural significance and a set of artefacts were identified, so the mine design
was amended to avoid the areas of cultural significance and the artefacts were relocate away from
mining. The second challenge put forward by research participants is that Marsupial Coal did not
have a strong relationship with local indigenous groups due to conflict at a previous project. The
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conflict stemmed from the way the team had responded to concerns about cultural heritage risks.
Significant effort was needed to rebuild those relationships, and that was a time-consuming process.
This section provided an overview of the Koala Extension Project stage-gate process. It showed that
stage gates enable mining proponents to limit the financial risk of project evaluation by investing
discrete funds to undertake a set program of work and, at the end of that work, to be in a position to
determine whether the project – based on its risk profile – warrants further investment. The focus
for Marsupial Coal is on limiting the risk of its development applications being rejected by the state
government which would put its investment at risk. Managing approvals risk was, therefore, a focus
for the Koala Extension Project team.
7.6.4 The purpose and scope of risk assessments
Research participants identify several methods that the project team used to assess risk. These
include: constraints assessment, broad-brush risk assessment (BBRA), approvals risk assessment,
cost escalation risk assessment, environmental risk assessment and SIA. When asked to discuss the
processes undertaken throughout the project to assess risk, most research participants identify the
BBRA as the key process. The Koala Extension Project’s BBRA was undertaken in a workshop
environment with a diverse group of disciplinary experts, including the project team, Sam and
Phoebe. External actors did not participate in the BBRA which meant that their concerns were
presented by workshop participants and, therefore, had undergone a process of interpretation by
those participants. The validity of those interpretations is uncertain. Using the Marsupial Coal risk
matrix, the group ranked the risks and populated a risk register, including action plans and
mitigation measures, using specialist software. The risk register was continually updated throughout
the project life. Noah describes the BBRA process:
That was done with about 30 people and it involved your high-level people in
business development, operations people, environment and community people
and specialists in different fields. So broad-brush risk assessment is, as it’s
called, supposed to identify risks right across the range of issues that might be
there and […] put in place the processes to address those risks. There was a
requirement to revisit the broad-brush risk assessment through projects. I’m not
sure that it was done as rigorously as it could have been with Koala Extension
Project. (Noah, a research participant, 2015)
Harrison says that the advantage of including a range of specialists in the BBRA workshop was that
it enabled different risk perspectives among the proponent’s representatives to be put on the table
and to be evaluated. This approach aligns with the risk governance principle of multidisciplinarity
but not with the principle of inclusiveness. For Noah, however, there were limitations to the
effectiveness of the BBRA. He explains that BBRAs do not enable in-depth analysis of risks on a
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discipline-by-discipline basis and that Marsupial Coal has since relegated these types of
assessments to the early stages of project evaluation:
We tend to now limit the broad-brush approach to earlier phases of projects.
[…] In a project like this, now we would do environment and community risk
assessments focused on that with a smaller group of people – not so many truck
drivers and people like that – but guys that are involved in community
management and the specialists. (Noah, a research participant, 2015)
In his discussion of the BBRA, Oliver draws on the hierarchy of risk controls model to explain
some of the project team’s decision-making. This model ranks the ways of controlling workplace
risks from the highest level of protection and reliability (level 1) to the lowest (level 3). The highest
level control is to eliminate the hazard. At the next level, risk controls include substituting the
hazard with something safer, isolating the hazard from people, and reducing the risks through
engineering controls. Reducing exposure to the hazard using administrative actions and using
personal protective equipment are the least effective forms of risk controls (Safe Work Australia,
2017). Oliver explains that eliminating risks is the most effective control:
I’d go back to [name] hill.32 The best thing you can do is eliminate risk. So if
we can avoid that hill, that risk is eliminated, and that’s the best result you can
get. So for the [artefacts], it's really more of an administrative […] control to
move them. [….] If we could avoid them [….] the issue would’ve been
completely off the table. But sometimes you can’t, so you’ve got to tolerate the
risk and mitigate it the way you can. But where you can’t eliminate, for
instance that noise one, it's more of an engineering control. You can’t eliminate
the fact that we’ve got a mountain where the coal is, but we’re able to […]
engineer a better solution. (Oliver, a research participant, 2015)
A range of methods are used to address risks, depending on the specific context and the proponent’s
risk appetite. The Koala Extension Project team sought to avoid risks to obtaining development
consent.
This section identified a range of risk assessments used by the Koala Extension Project team, with
BBRA being the most widely recalled and discussed risk assessment. The section highlighted
research participants’ perspectives on the advantages and disadvantages of BBRA, and touched on
the project team’s selection of risk controls.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the Koala Extension Project case study. It described the composition of the
project team and the roles of team members. It showed that although some frustrations existed
32 This is the hill mentioned on page 121 that holds cultural significance to local Aboriginal people.
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between team members, overall, there was a cohesive team dynamic. Research participants
considered that there were constructive relationships between the project team, representatives from
the operations team and Environmental Consulting, and that the strength of those relationships
facilitated an integrated approach to project evaluation. The chapter provided an overview of
Marsupial Coal’s culture. It identified the importance the company places on relationships with
local communities, and the priority it gives to social and environmental considerations. The chapter
also identified that the organisational culture is underpinned by business imperatives: Marsupial
Coal wants to continue developing mining operations in Eucalyptus Pits and it needs to have
constructive relationships with local communities, regulators and other actors in order to do so. The
influence of the organisational culture was evident in the development of Koala Extension Project’s
strategy and Marsupial Coal’s project risk governance mechanisms. Although it has a mature risk
governance process, Marsupial Coal is open to enhancing the process based on what has worked
well in its new projects. Chapter 7 showed that although social risk was an important consideration
for the project team, Marsupial Coal’s priority in undertaking project evaluation is “to obtain the
approvals required by legislation of mining projects [….] in a reasonable timeframe and within
budget” (Marsupial Coal, n.d., p. 9). In other words, addressing social risk was a strategy to reduce
approvals risk.
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CHAPTER 8: KOALA EXTENSION PROJECT & THE PROCESS OF
ASSESSING SOCIAL RISK
Introduction
Chapter 8 examines how social risk was constructed and assessed by the Koala Extension Project
team and distinguishes the team’s approach from common conceptualisations of SRA. To clarify
the distinction, the Koala approach is called the integrated model of SRA, and other approaches,
including those articulated by research participants in Chapter 6, the mechanistic model. The
integrated model supports SRA competence, a term I use to describe the ability of project team
members to assess risk to a standard that avoids or mitigates risk to people. SRA competence is
analogous to Chomsky’s (1965) concept of linguistic competence, which he distinguishes from
linguistic performance. Linguistic competence is the system of knowledge retained by native
language speakers whereas linguistic performance is the way people use language to communicate
in practice. Although SRA competence could be considered a system of knowledge, it is more
active than the term ‘system’ implies. Rather, it is an integrated process enacted by a team of
project evaluation specialists to govern the social risks generated by the project.
The chapter has seven sections. Section 8.2 examines the research participants’ conceptualisations
of social risk. Section 8.3 explores the social engagement processes used by the Koala Extension
Project team. It also explores how the team differentiated its ongoing engagement with a range of
social entities from the community engagement work led by Phoebe. The importance that the
established relationships and existing engagement mechanisms had on project success are discussed
in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 examines the SIA process, including community engagement, risk
mitigation workshops, SRA, and a community visioning study. A comparison between the
mechanistic model of SRA and the integrated model is made in Section 8.6. Section 8.7 concludes
the chapter.
Three dominant approaches to conceptualising social risk
Social risk is not a term commonly used by the Koala case study research participants; in fact, some
participants – Harrison, Isaiah, Jack and Karl – are uncertain of its meaning. In addition, some
participants – Jack, Karl and Liam – link social risk to social licence to operate, a term with which
they are more familiar. Nevertheless, when asked, all research participants provided a definition of
social risk. Five participants – Harrison, Oliver, Phoebe, Randall and Sam – orient their definitions
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of social risk towards risk to people. Harrison defines social risk as “the risk that the project would
adversely impact the broader community” (Harrison, a research participant, 2015). In providing his
definition of social risk, Randall distinguishes between project, social and environmental risks:
Some of those risks are community driven and some of them are
environmentally driven, but you’re talking about the impact that they have on
the project. Whereas, when I talk [about] environmental risk and social risk,
I'm talking about the risks to the environment, the risks to the community.
(Randall, a research participant, 2015)
Four participants – Isaiah, Jack, Karl and Noah – use a dual orientation of social risk, and Karl links
social risk to social licence to operate:
Social risk to my understanding is basically your licence to operate. So if you
are perceived not to be doing the right thing, your position gets untenable. [.…]
The risk, there’s two parts of it – there’s risk that you do damage to the people
in a community, and there’s risk that the community will interface and do
damage to you by shutting you down. There’s risk on both sides. (Karl, a
research participant, 2015)
Two participants (Liam and Mackenzie) orient their social risk definitions towards risk to the
project and, like Karl, Liam links social risk to social licence to operate:
My interpretation of that would be that if you lose that community support, you
can lose your social licence to operate. If you lose that, if the community don’t
want you there, it’s just going to make your job so much harder. You’re going
to get complaints. You’re going to get grief from government. Every time you
want to do something, it’s going to make it all that harder to do it […] so I
guess […] social risk is one of the key things that we do need to manage.
(Liam, a research participant, 2015)
While the research participants may not be overly familiar with the term ‘social risk’, risk to people
and risk to project were both key considerations for the Koala Extension Project team, as outlined in
Chapter 7. The project team has identified the link between social risk and project risk; that is, if
social risks are not addressed, they can rebound as project risk through opposition to the project
from potentially affected people and other actors. Most of the participants’ constructions of social
risk are oriented towards downside risk. This section has shown that social risk is not constructed
consistently by the case study research participants. Three different classifications of social risk are
used: risk to people, risk to project, and risk to both people and project.
A practical approach to differentiating stakeholders in social
engagement
The Koala Extension Project team identified ongoing, effective social engagement as a critical
factor for project success: “You can’t expect people to listen, if you don’t talk to them” (Noah, a
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research participant, 2015). A stakeholder mapping exercise was undertaken early in the project to
identify and prioritise stakeholders according to their ability to increase approvals risk or affect
design of the mine plan, and to trace the relationships between them. In addition, Phoebe developed
a tailored community engagement strategy as part of the SIA. Both these activities informed the
ongoing social engagement process and indicate a commitment from the project team to the risk
governance principle of inclusiveness. Harrison explains the importance the team attributed to
making the engagement “personal”:
Don’t just send [project information] off and think someone’s going to read it.
Take the time before you even send it off just to go down and have a meeting –
put a name to the face – because a lot of stuff we do here in the approval
process is over the phone or via email. It helps if you’ve been down and had a
couple of meetings, even if it’s down to have a five-minute cup of coffee with a
person. (Harrison, a research participant, 2015)
The way social engagement was carried out during the Koala Extension Project can be categorised
into two approaches: community engagement undertaken as part of the SIA and largely driven by
Phoebe, although project team members were part of the engagement team, and broader, ongoing
social engagement carried out by the project team over the life of the project. The community
engagement activities are discussed separately in Section 8.5.2.
The focus of the project team’s ongoing social engagement was with federal, state and local
government representatives; and infrastructure agencies and utilities. Mackenzie asserts that the
approach the team used was all about consistency, regularity, transparency, openness and honesty.
He also suggests that the project team was “flexible and sensible and practical”. Liam explains that
it is standard practice for Marsupial Coal operations to give government representatives a “heads
up” about a project before starting the community engagement process:
We would say the Department of [name], the local council, we’d go to them
first and say: “Hey here’s our project. We’re about to go out and start talking to
the community about it. We just want to let you know. If you get any
questions, at least you’re aware of the project.” So, that [is the] priority in
which you do it, so they don’t get blindsided at a council meeting. (Liam, a
research participant, 2015)
The project team identified the local council as a key external actor requiring engagement. Research
participants note that other project proponents in Eucalyptus Pits did not have a constructive
relationship with the council and that it was a key objective for the team to differentiate Koala
Extension Project from other projects in the region. Jack says the team established a “quite strong
working relationship with the council” and that it valued the relationship. Mackenzie, Isaiah, Jack
and Karl met with council administration representatives on an almost monthly basis during “the
critical time” to provide project progress updates, results from the various studies and to answer any
Sandy Worden Chapter 8 136 | P a g e
questions the council may have had (Isaiah, a research participant, 2015). At times, the project team
also met with the mayor and other councillors.
The project team considered the regulating authority to be an important actor and the team met with
representatives on a monthly basis. Isaiah reiterates Mackenzie’s emphasis on the importance of the
team’s approach to social engagement:
We’re actively engaged with the regulators – an open, and honest, transparent
relationship. It […] ultimately is an asset. They trust us [….] Everything falls
back to being open and honest and transparent. If you don’t do those three
things […] you’ll never get anybody’s trust. It will always be a struggle.
(Isaiah, a research participant, 2015)
The team met with representatives from other state and federal government departments on an ‘as-
needed’ basis. Noah says that as a result of the focus that the Koala Extension Project team put on
engaging with government representatives, Marsupial Coal now has constructive, ongoing
relationships with key senior bureaucrats.
A third group of actors given priority in the social engagement process was infrastructure agencies
and utilities. Because Koala Extension Project’s mine plan intersects roads, powerlines, water
pipelines and other state-owned infrastructure, Mackenzie and Karl regularly met with
representatives from these agencies. Mackenzie says the focus of the engagement was on
minimising the impact of the project on existing infrastructure and on landholders although, at
times, that was difficult, particularly in terms of prioritising who or what was at risk. Nevertheless,
he says his priorities were clear: “I’d prefer to work with [name of the utility] moving a 330 kV
[powerline] than having 80 people in acquisition” (Mackenzie, a research participant, 2015).
Although logistically challenging to move a large, high-voltage powerline, Mackenzie considers it
preferable to generating social risks by instigating a multi-property acquisition program. Mackenzie
also notes that he briefed local media agencies on project progress “probably twice a year”
(Mackenzie, a research participant, 2015). Other social engagement activities related to land
acquisition negotiations.
This section outlined which external actors the Koala Extension Project team prioritised in its
ongoing social engagement program and the rationale for that prioritisation.
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The importance of existing relationships and engagement
mechanisms
Because the existing Koala mine has been operating in Eucalyptus Pits for more than 30 years, the
operations team has established ongoing relationships with the local communities. Every research
participant spoke about the importance of these relationships to the success of the Koala Extension
Project. Four key advantages emerged from these discussions. First, Marsupial Coal already had a
good understanding of the key risks from the perspective of potentially affected people; that is, it
had local knowledge. The project team was able to use this knowledge in the mine planning process
so that amendments were made to the mine plan well before the project’s community engagement
activities were undertaken:
We knew what would work because of that pre-existing community
engagement. We knew what project would fly before we even put it out to
them – what they could tolerate and what they wouldn’t. (Sam, a research
participant, 2015)
Second, a level of trust had been built up over time between Marsupial Coal and local residents, as
Jack explains:
I think, as well, a big part of that for Koala is the existing relationship they
have with the site. So if someone comes and says, “Is it going to be the same as
what I’ve got now?” Do they trust the person who says, “Yeah it’s going to be
pretty much the same as what it is now”? (Jack, a research participant, 2015)
This level of trust not only meant that the community members would listen to what the project
team had to say, they were comfortable sharing their concerns about the project. Trust enabled the
team to identify “the real issues” and, therefore, to be able to select appropriate mitigation measures
(Noah, a research participant, 2015). Oliver suggests that the reverse is also true: poor relationships
between a proponent and the community, and a lack of trust, are barriers to the assessment of social
risk. Research participants note the downside of greenfields projects is that project timelines are not
conducive to the development of new relationships and the trust that is required for effective social
engagement. As Oliver expresses it: “you generally can’t build [trust] in the timeline of a project; a
project’s only two or three years long”.
Third, having established relationships enabled the project team to optimise existing communication
mechanisms to share project information and receive feedback, such as through the biannual social
gatherings the Koala operation hosts for local residents. Randall explains further:
Some projects you spend the first six months or so just trying to work out
who's who and who you need to talk to. The communication lines were already
open, so it made it much easier to have a conversation about what they were
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doing, and the outcomes, and what the issues were, because people were
willing to tell them. (Randall, a research participant, 2015)
The points Randall raises are also linked to the points already made about trust; being able to utilise
existing communication mechanisms not only gave the project team access to potentially affected
people and other actors but, because the communication mechanisms were well established, the
mechanisms were generally considered to be trustworthy.
The final advantage of established relationships presented here is that they make it possible for
mining proponents to strive for coexistence, as Noah explains:
It’s almost a bit past coexistence […] There’s more of a collaborative
relationship where you know there are some benefits for them of us being here
and there’s benefits to us because we are [laughs]. So that sort of coexistence
and collaborative relationship, I think, is an achievement in itself. (Noah, a
research participant, 2015)
Koala Extension Project’s SIA story
8.5.1 Introduction
Section 8.5 examines the key components of the Koala Extension Project SIA. An overview of the
SIA is provided in this subsection, while the following subsections explore community engagement,
risk mitigation workshops and other communication mechanisms, SRA, and a community visioning
study.
The Koala Extension Project team adopted a collaborative and integrated approach to the
assessment of social risk. Phoebe participated in the BBRA workshop, which included an
assessment of social risk; provided guidance on social risk, community engagement, and social
engagement more generally; and she also carried out the SIA. A common theme to emerge from
interviews with the research participants is the high standard the project team attributes to Koala’s
SIA. Isaiah, environment and community manager with the existing Koala operation, contends that:
“The Koala Extension Project has probably got one of the best social impact assessments that have
been conducted in Eucalyptus Pits [….] I think we’ve had an enlightened view and approach to
what social risk is” (Isaiah, a research participant, 2015). Randall, the external environmental
consultancy lead, explains that it is unusual for coal projects in Eucalyptus Pits to have SIAs as
extensive as Koala’s assessment:
Some companies, like Marsupial Coal, can see the value in spending the money
and doing that, but you'll get similar sized mining projects that have got three
or four pages written at the back end of social stuff. They'll have an economic
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assessment but, in terms of social, there will certainly be no standalone
specialist study; it will be a few pages [long]. (Randall, a research participant,
2015)
The Koala Extension Project SIA document is more than 250 pages long. Understanding and
mitigating the social risks generated by the Koala project was a priority for the project team.
Furthermore, Noah says that learnings from the Koala SIA are considered to be worthy of
application in other Marsupial Coal projects. In other words, what worked well in the Koala SIA
has now become standard practice for Marsupial Coal’s projects. The high standard of the SIA is
indicative of SRA competence.
According to the Koala Extension Project SIA report, the purpose of the SIA is to develop a profile
of the social and economic context in which the Koala project is situated; identify its impacts and
opportunities; assess and predict the significance of those impacts and opportunities; develop
mitigation strategies; and identify monitoring activities to be undertaken should the project obtain
development consent (Environmental Consulting (a), [year]).33 The SIA was undertaken in five
stages. In stage one, “a tailored stakeholder engagement strategy” was developed. This strategy was
used by both the Koala Extension Project team for its ongoing social engagement and for the
community engagement undertaken as part of the SIA. In stage two, the community and Aboriginal
profile was established through a series of analyses, including the operational situation, socio-
demographics, township resources, regional and cumulative data, and historic and contemporary
issues and opportunities. The issues and opportunities identified in stage two were scoped in stage
three. In stage four, the impacts and opportunities were assessed using a process Phoebe calls
‘social risking’, which is a type of SRA. Rather than using Phoebe’s term, I will use the terms
‘social risk’ and ‘SRA’. In stage five, the impacts were predicted or, to use risk terminology, the
risks were assessed and the residual risks were ranked. Mitigation strategies were also developed
(Environmental Consulting (a), [year], p. 15).
In line with the risk governance principle of inclusiveness, more than 400 people participated in the
community engagement activities. These participants included neighbouring landholders, local
residents, council administration representatives and local councillors, community groups, business
chamber and local business owners, cultural and heritage groups, education providers, emergency
services, health service providers, sports and recreation groups, Aboriginal stakeholders, existing
Koala mine employees and contractors, and Koala mine suppliers (Environmental Consulting (a),
[year]).
33 The publication date has been removed to protect the anonymity of the project.
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According to the SIA report, the social impacts of the Koala Extension Project were largely
minimised through the mine design and by limiting the extension of the existing mine footprint.
These approaches are indicative of SRA competence. The primary impacts identified in the report
relate to housing and accommodation in Eucalyptus Pits, due to demand from the construction
workforce, road capacity and road safety in relation to proposed road relocations, social amenity,
and health and wellbeing, associated with the presence of a construction workforce (Environmental
Consulting (b), [year]). The SIA report states that residents were particularly concerned about social
amenity issues and the sustainability of local communities due to the expansion of mining in
Eucalyptus Pits. At the time of engagement, residents – particularly those strongly opposed to
further mining and industrial development in the region – considered land-use conflict to be high
(Environmental Consulting (a), [year]).
One of the complications Phoebe faced during the SIA process was associated with keeping the
social data up-to-date; just as she was finalising the SIA, the coal industry was transitioning out of a
“highly heated” boom environment into a downturn:
That all changed very dramatically and changed very quickly; […] to the point
that we had to go back and relook at our data [….] At that time, there was
nowhere for anyone to live [...] Now there’s a completely different context.
(Phoebe, a research participant, 2015)
The length of time it takes mining proponents to evaluate their projects (at least two years) means
that it is possible that the prevailing conditions at the start of the project could change significantly
by the time the development application and EIS are submitted, requiring data to be reviewed and
updated.
8.5.2 A collaborative approach to community engagement
Phoebe and the community engagement team undertook their work in accordance with the
engagement strategy established at the beginning of the SIA. Phoebe says the team began by
conducting personal interviews with actors in close proximity to the existing Koala operation – such
as local landholders – “because they’re the ones more directly impacted” (Phoebe, a research
participant, 2015). They then progressively moved out from the mine site, interviewing local
residents, indigenous groups, social entities and the other actors listed in the previous subsection.
The information they gathered from this engagement was used to inform project planning and the
mine design “in a proactive way” and to ensure that the issues of importance to the community were
considered by the project team (Environmental Consulting, [year]). Noah has a similar recollection:
We did a lot of one-on-one interviews. When we did the stakeholder
engagement strategy, we determined that people [….] in close proximity to the
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mine [are] likely to be more affected [and, therefore], needed to be told all
about it individually. We cast a pretty wide net of about 65 different properties
that we visited individually, starting in close proximity and working out.
Because the grapevine works well in rural communities, you’ve got to get onto
it pretty quick. Otherwise they hear interpretations of things from other people
that aren’t quite what you’ve said, probably, and the rumours and the fear
spreads pretty quickly. (Noah, a research participant, 2015)
Noah says once the individual interviews were completed, the community engagement team
identified the region’s social networks, talked to community groups and conducted some
information sessions to enable people to ask questions and raise concerns.
For Liam it is important to adopt a tailored approach to community engagement; in fact, he
recommends asking actors how they want to be engaged with. In his experience, most people want
to be engaged with on a one-on-one, face-to-face basis. He uses fictitious characters to explain his
point about tailoring engagement:
Sandy […] is really interested. Her husband’s a […] mining engineer. He
wants to know all the details about what shovel we’re using, so I’m going to
take [an expert] along. Or [Joe …] there, he doesn’t care: “You know, mate
just ring me when it’s lodged, so I can have a look.” And sometimes people
want to see the boss. So [influential landholder], he’s used to running a
business [….] “I’m happy to have Liam there, but I want the boss there,
because I want him to know I’m important.” (Liam, a research participant,
2015)
Marsupial Coal tracks the type of information that Liam discusses through its social engagement
database. Liam also recommends showing actors examples of what is being discussed to put the
situation in context, for example, organising field trips to see a dragline in operation or to examine
examples of the local topography as the project team did during the risk mitigation workshops
discussed in the next subsection.
A comment repeatedly made by the research participants is that there is no point undertaking
community engagement if nothing is done with the data collected. Mackenzie considers
engagement to be a “two-way street” in which project team members demonstrate a willingness to
take alternative views on board and to address the issues that are raised. This attitude is indicative of
SRA competence. It is also important, he says, to consider how information is presented. In his
view, asking for feedback is preferable to “telling” people what you are going to do. Harrison
recalls Mackenzie’s passion for community engagement:
As I said, he was a big proponent for saying, “Hey, let’s not just jam a mine
plan out there. Let’s go and walk these people through and understand what’s
hurting them, and how we can help on that process.” (Harrison, a research
participant, 2015)
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According to Oliver, the Koala Extension Project team made a genuine effort to address the issues
raised by actors:
People could actually see where we changed our project over time. And I think
we made a genuine change. I think we communicated change very well. They
could see we just didn't run off and do it in isolation. I think the feedback loop
was there. And I think it gave government confidence. Government could see
the changes we’d made and why we made them. I think that story was told
well. (Oliver, a research participant, 2015)
The comments made by Mackenzie, Harrison and Oliver indicate an alignment with what Grunig
and Hunt (1984) call two-way symmetrical communication. This type of communication is
primarily about ensuring that decisions made by an organisation benefit the target audiences as well
as the organisation. It stands in contrast to asymmetrical communication, in which the organisation
seeks to persuade the target audience to its own point of view. Two-way symmetrical
communication is indicative of SRA competence.
Liam notes an unexpected finding to emerge from the community engagement work: the
importance the community attributes to mine closure and final voids. This issue was not discerned
from the existing social engagement activities. Mine closure refers to the point at which operations
cease and the infrastructure is removed. This occurs prior to decommissioning, site rehabilitation
and relinquishment of the mining lease (ICMM, 2008). Final voids are the deep pits that remain
after the end of open-cut mining, and they create safety and environmental risks. One method of
managing final voids is to transform them into mine lakes; however, mine lake water can be highly
acidic and saline, and expensive to ameliorate (Blanchette and Lund, 2016). Liam explains that
being made aware of these concerns enabled the project team to reprioritise the management of
final voids.
In concluding this subsection, I note the value some research participants attribute to
multidisciplinarity and having an experienced external social practitioner like Phoebe working with
the project team. For Noah, engagement is more than just intuitively listening to people. He
explains that Phoebe was able to help the team understand the underlying drivers for people’s
behaviour – why they respond the way they do. She was also able to gather social data in order to
“do some proper analysis of issues” and to “identify potential solutions to those issues” (Noah, a
research participant, 2015). While the project team members may have wanted to undertake
meaningful community and broader social engagement, Noah says their efforts were improved by
Phoebe’s guidance. Phoebe warns that it is important, however, to recognise that the engagement
process can be challenging at times. She says people can get “heated” when sharing their
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perspectives, particularly in relation to “the hard issues” but she says that is just a normal part of the
process.
This subsection provided an overview of the community engagement activities undertaken as part
of the Koala Extension Project. It also discussed the underlying approach to that engagement, which
aligns with the risk governance principle of inclusiveness. Many of the attitudes exhibited by the
project team members and their willingness to amend the mine plan to address the concerns of
external actors are indicative of SRA competence.
8.5.3 Collaborative approaches to risk mitigation – workshops and other
communication mechanisms
Having gained insight into the social risks of concern to community members and other external
actors through existing relationships, community engagement and ongoing social engagement, the
Koala Extension Project team wanted to do something with that data. The team had some ideas
about how to mitigate the risks generated by the project. Risk mitigation workshops were proposed
as a mechanism through which the team could acknowledge community concern about those risks,
share the team’s proposed mitigation measures, seek feedback and give community members the
opportunity to clarify points and question the experts. In addition, taking an open and interactive
approach to risk mitigation differentiated Koala from other projects in Eucalyptus Pits. The project
team conducted two workshops in conjunction with Marsupial Coal, Environmental Consulting and
a landscape architect. A report capturing the feedback from the workshops was published in Koala’s
EIS by the landscape architect. The report states that while participants appreciated and generally
agreed with the project team’s synopsis of the issues and its mitigation measures, their focus was on
ensuring that the project team actually delivered on its promises of reduced noise and dust levels
(Environmental Consulting (b), [year]).
The primary mitigation measure presented at the first workshop was the construction of a large
visual bund along a length of the mine lease area to protect landholders, adjacent businesses and
other residents from future mining impacts. The bund was to be created by recontouring the out-of-
pit emplacement material. A key objective of the workshop was to illustrate what could be done to
achieve “a successful landscape and visual outcome” (Environmental Consulting (b), [year], p. 7).
Examples of existing rehabilitation treatments were presented to participants; however, the designs
looked artificial and participants argued that the bund needed to look more natural by following the
topography of the existing landscape. There was further discussion regarding the preferred visual
landscape characteristics; implementation issues; constraints, such as water management and bund
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height; and road screening opportunities. A bus trip was organised to identify and discuss local
landscape features, and to provide examples of what more natural topography might look like
(Environmental Consulting (b), [year]). At the second workshop, the revised plans were presented
and issues relating to timing and construction schedules, drainage alignment and revegetation
patterns were discussed. Participants accepted the project team’s approach and it was carried
forward to detailed design (Environmental Consulting (b), [year]) and implementation. The project
team’s approach to these workshops is indicative of SRA competence.
Jack discusses the value of hosting forums like the impact mitigation workshops:
The people there are not people who are unfamiliar with mine applications so
they are wanting some education. They are wanting to talk to and grill some of
the experts. They are wanting to talk about those things because they’ve been
running and looking at EISs for the last five or six years. So there are people
there who are genuinely interested and wanting to know more and wanting to
challenge, not just us, but the people who are writing the reports [….] So
people can say, “How does this work, how does it perform?” Some people just
want to know, “Is it going to be the same as what I’ve got now?” Just having a
few of those different avenues for people to get the amount of information they
want. (Jack, a research participant, 2015)
The workshops provided potentially affected people with an opportunity to engage with the
proponents, and to hear one another’s perspectives, aspirations, and concerns about the project. The
workshops also provided a chance for issues to be addressed upfront, before the development
application and EIS were submitted to the regulating authority.
For Phoebe, it is important to keep in mind that just because potentially affected people can
appreciate the significant investment proponents may put into risk mitigation measures, it does not
mean that they support mining so close to their front doors:
We […] developed a process in the latter stages of the SIA […] of involving
the community in the design of the bund, the shaping of it [….] The point is, at
the end of the day, the community doesn’t want the bund if it can help it. In
fact, they would rather not have the extension. But they at least could see how
this company was planning their project the best possible way to reduce
impacts, to take those views on board (emphasis added). (Phoebe, a research
participant, 2015)
The preferred option for many landholders, business owners and residents adjacent to the project
was for mining to stop at the end of the existing development consent. However, if the extension
project were to go ahead, the bund would be an appropriate means of mitigating the project’s social
amenity risks.
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In addition to the impact mitigation workshops, research participants discuss a number of
communication mechanisms adopted by the project team. The first of these is the 3D digital model
of the mine, which was developed to help actors visualise the progress of mine development – that
is, the sequence of activities from the establishment of infrastructure, the development of the pits,
the creation of the out-of-pit emplacement dumps, the construction of the bund, the start of
rehabilitation works and so on. The second mechanism was a 25-page “magazine version of the
EIS”. Jack says the document was produced so that potentially affected people and other external
actors could understand the key elements of the project without having to read the full EIS: “Our
EIS is literally this thick [gesticulates]. To sit down and read that front to back would be a fairly
difficult exercise for anyone to do. We identified that early on and tried to put a simpler document
forward” (Jack, a research participant, 2015). The team also produced factsheets on specific
elements of the project and newsletters to keep people informed of project progress. In addition,
Isaiah says that the project team made an effort to avoid complicated explanations and the use of
jargon when presenting information to local residents and other actors.
8.5.4 Comparing different perspectives of risk – the ‘social risking’ process
Phoebe has extensive SIA experience. From her experience, she identifies differences in the risk
perspectives of project teams compared with those held by community members. She suggests that
unless those differences are understood by the project team and “addressed appropriately”, there is
“the potential to result in elevated levels of community concerns, complaints and grievances”
(Environmental Consulting (a), [year], p. 39). As a means of understanding the different risk
perspectives in relation to the Koala Extension Project, Phoebe undertook a desktop SRA, which
she describes as ‘social risking’. The assessment had four steps: determine the likelihood and
consequences of social risks, assess ‘technical risk’, rank ‘stakeholder perceived risk’, and compare
technical risk and perceived risk. ‘Perceived risk’ is the term Phoebe applies to the risk perspectives
of actors interviewed during the scoping stage of the SIA. These risks were ranked according to the
frequency with which they were raised by a particular social entity, such as landholders or
indigenous groups. A social risk matrix that has six consequence categories (catastrophic, massive,
major, moderate, minor and negligible) and five likelihood categories (almost certain, likely,
possible, unlikely and rare) was used to guide the ranking process (Environmental Consulting (a),
[year]). Table 8.A shows an example of the social amenity definition from the social consequences
matrix.
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Table 8.A: Social amenity definitions
Social consequence definitions
Catastrophic Permanent and significant reduction in social amenity in a region as a result
of dust/air quality, noise, visual impacts, traffic congestion
Massive Temporary but significant reduction in social amenity in a region as a result
of dust/air quality, noise, visual impacts, traffic congestion
Major Permanent and significant reduction in social amenity in a local area as a
result of dust/air quality, noise, visual impacts, traffic congestion
Moderate Permanent but insignificant or temporary but significant reduction in social
amenity in a local area as a result of dust/air quality, noise, visual impacts,
traffic congestion
Minor Temporary but insignificant reduction in social amenity in a local area as a
result of dust/air quality, noise, visual impacts, traffic congestion
Negligible No measurable impacts on social amenity in local area as a result of dust/air
quality, noise, visual impacts, traffic congestion
The methodology for assessing ‘technical risk’ is outlined in the SIA report:
For some impacts, this risking assessment involved referencing the respective
technical reports of the EIS (eg heritage, economic), however, most impacts
have been assessed through the social risking process. It is important to note
here, that the technical risk ratings represent ‘residual risk’, that is, the risk
remaining after management measures are applied. As a result, mitigation,
management and enhancement strategies are outlined and discussed where
relevant throughout the risk assessment. (Environmental Consulting (a), [year],
p. 172)
The SRA was structured around the assessment of 10 social factors. These factors were population
change, changes in demand or capacity for community infrastructure and services, recreation, social
amenity, health and wellbeing, sense of community, the economy, community sustainability,
intergenerational equity, and cumulative impacts.
Two lists of social risk perspectives were produced from the SRA: perceived risk (perspectives of
external actors) and technical risk (perspectives of the project team). Differences between those risk
perspectives are shown in Table 8.B. The greatest discrepancy between perspectives was that the
perceived risk of community sustainability was ranked high, whereas it was ranked low from the
technical risk perspective. This indicates that the project team may have underestimated community
concern about the sustainability of their towns in the face of mining. The other key differences, in
which the risk was ranked high by one group but not by the other, were road safety due to
construction traffic (high technical risk, medium perceived risk), impacts on social amenity (high
perceived risk, medium technical risk) and heightened land-use conflict (high perceived risk and
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medium technical risk). It is worth noting here that one reason for perceived risks to be ranked
higher than technical risks could be due to differences in methodology – technical risk is based on
residual risk but perceived risk is not.
Table 8.B: Variations in risk ranking between perceived risk and technical risk
Social risk Perceived risk Technical risk
Community sustainability High Low
Impacts on social amenity
(visual, dust, noise)
High Medium
Heightened land-use conflict High Medium
Population change (impacts of
acquisition)
Medium Low
Construction and operational
workforce use of health
services
Medium Low
Dust emissions impact on
health
Medium Low
Impacts on water Medium Low
Construction traffic (road
safety)
Medium High
Construction and operational
workforce use of education
services
Low Medium
Road relocation impact on
emergency response
Low Medium
OHS of employees/contractors Low Medium
Workforce drug and alcohol
abuse
Low Medium
Ecological impacts Low Medium
While the acknowledgement and consideration of different risk perspectives is critical in assessing
social risk, I note that there are some weaknesses with Phoebe’s approach. First, the technical risk is
based on residual risk, whereas the data collected from the scoping study was not. This data was
collected early in the SIA process, before mitigation measures would have been determined. A more
appropriate methodology would have been to compare ‘like’ with ‘like’; that is, both based on
residual risk or both of them not based on residual risk. Second, the use of the term ‘technical risk’
in this context is a misnomer as technical risks, such as highwall stability or the structural integrity
of tailings dams, were not discussed. What is presented is two potentially different risk perspectives
– those of the people who were interviewed during the scoping stage of the SIA (community
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perspectives) and the project team and Phoebe’s perspective of social risk, which are based on
residual risk. It is unusual to find desktop SRAs of this type integrated into SIAs for coal mining
projects. The assessment acknowledges that how people think about and respond to risk can differ,
and that these differences need to be understood in order to assess and avoid or mitigate social risks.
This is the position taken in the sociology of risk literature and stands in contrast to positivist
perspectives of risk (there is one objective truth).
8.5.5 Community visioning study
In keeping with the Koala Extension Project team’s strategy to understand and mitigate social risk,
Phoebe undertook a community visioning study as part of the SIA. This study used values mapping
to identify “existing values of importance to community members and to document aspirations for
the future” (Environmental Consulting (b), [year], p. 16). Noah explains that the study was
undertaken as a kind of community “resource” to capture community members’ values and how
they wanted to maintain or enhance those values in the future. Even more importantly, the study
gave the project team an understanding of those aspirations. This knowledge could be used to
identify opportunities for community development initiatives. It could also be used to benchmark
Marsupial Coal’s future business development plans against community aspirations in order to
identify synergies or potential for community conflict. A community investment fund was
established in response to the study results (Jack, a research participant, 2015).
The community visioning study identified some differences in aspirations at the local and regional
levels. At the local level, the focus is on protecting the local heritage, and the rural and social
amenity. At the regional level, there is a greater focus on addressing the demand on existing
infrastructure and services, particularly in relation to safety and capacity of the road networks.
Overall, participants in the study envisioned a future in which the downside risks and economic
benefits of mining were balanced, mining-related health concerns and risks to the sense of
community were addressed, community values were protected, there was a greater awareness of
Aboriginal cultural heritage, and that Aboriginal cultural events and support programs were up and
running.
The study also included historical and youth projects. Some of the district’s most senior residents
were interviewed to produce an historical record and young people were invited to participate in a
‘vox pop’. Phoebe describes this project:
[Young people] told us about why they valued their environment and water,
what was important to them and so forth. That was then fed into that process
Sandy Worden Chapter 8 149 | P a g e
and also fed back to the company, so they could also see what the youngsters in
the community thought. We also did a bit of a vox pop process with a
Facebook page where we posed questions on Facebook around that project.
The youth came back with comments […] about issues for them, [such as]
relocating out of the area to university and schools, employment and those
sorts of things. (Phoebe, a research participant, 2015)
Phoebe adds that she found it useful to include the perspectives of young people in the SIA because
their views are not always considered in impact assessments.
Section 8.5 provided an overview of the Koala Extension Project’s SIA, including the community
engagement, impact mitigation workshops and other communication mechanisms, SRA, and the
community visioning study. The section showed that the Koala project team incorporated the risk
governance principles of multidisciplinarity, inclusiveness and multidimensionality into its social
risk assessment practice and exhibited SRA competence.
The integrated model of SRA
The research findings discussed in this chapter show that the Koala Extension Project team’s
approach to assessing social risk stands in contrast to what I call the mechanistic model, which has
two key components: an SRA and an SIA. The descriptions of SRA provided by the research
participants in Chapter 6 are aligned with the mechanistic model (see Table 8.C, p. 149 for a
comparison of the features of the mechanistic and integrated models). The SRA is conducted in a
workshop environment, either in a full workshop or in a break out group of social performance
specialists. It can be conducted at each stage of the project lifecycle, but is considered in most detail
in the feasibility stage. Although it may be scoped by the project team (usually after the SRA), the
SIA is outsourced to a specialist consultancy. Often there is little relationship between the two
processes or the two groups of people who undertake them; research participants note that the social
assessor may not even participate in the SRA. Furthermore, project team members may not be
cognisant of SIA methodologies or how to judge the standard of the report that is delivered. Jacob, a
project manager cited in Chapter 6, confirms this observation when he describes SIA as “a black
art” and says “it’s an area of expertise that I don’t understand” (Jacob, a research participant, 2015).
As a project manager, Jacob is responsible for delivering projects, including their risk profile, to the
proponent’s PGC. The lack of understanding that he acknowledges can result in the consideration of
the SIA as standalone process and not integrating SIA data into project planning. This can affect the
accuracy of the risk profile. It can also mean that the ownership of social data is fragmented and
that oversight of the SRA process is not considered nor specified.
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Table 8.C: Features of the mechanistic and integrated models
Mechanistic model Integrated model
Responsibility for social data and assessment
of social risk is not assigned
Responsibility for social data and assessment
of social risk is assigned to a project team
member or members
Social risk assessors and social impact
assessors work in isolation from each other
The project team and the social impact
assessors work in collaboration to collect and
analyse social data, and assess social risk
SRA and SIA are considered to be standalone
mechanisms; information is not shared
There are project team members appointed who
have the experience needed to assess social
risk, and to scope and evaluate SIAs
Project team members do not understand the
SIA process or how to judge the standard of the
SIA report delivered
Social data collected via different processes
(including SRA and SIA) are fed into the
assessment process and used to inform risk
decision-making
Social data are not optimised in risk decision-
making or in the design of the mine plan
The project team, in conjunction with social
practitioners (internal and external) conducts
multi-actor social engagement
The project team is cognisant of the need for
relationship building with key external actors
(communities, regulators etc)
Priority is given to social and environmental
factors, along with financial, production and
workplace health and safety factors
The priority social risks of external actors are
addressed before the development application
is submitted
The proponent accepts responsibility for the
social risks generated by its project
Mitigation measures are budgeted for
The process used in the Koala Extension Project (shown in Figure 8.A, p. 150) is far more complex,
integrated and collaborative than the mechanistic model. The ‘x’ axis shows four entities that
directly contributed to the project’s assessment of social risk: Marsupial Coal, including
representatives from the existing Koala operation and the corporate team, the Koala Extension
Project team, Phoebe’s team, and activities that were undertaken collaboratively by the Koala team
and Phoebe’s team. The vertical arrows indicate that data was shared between the entities and
utilised in their assessment activities. The ‘y’ axis shows the process timeline. Most of the
assessment activities were undertaken during the feasibility stage, once the preferred mine plan was
confirmed. Data from all the mechanisms to the left of the white ‘explosion’ icon (on the far right of
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Figure 8.A: The Koala Extension Project’s SRA process, an example of the integrated model.
KEY: Both K&P
= Both Koala
project team and
Phoebe’s team
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the figure) were fed into the assessment process, providing a comprehensive understanding of social
risk by the end of the feasibility stage. Marsupial Coal’s culture and the prevailing social
environment in Eucalyptus Pits – that is, broad opposition to the development of new coal mines –
focused the Koala Extension Project team’s attention on setting the project apart from its
competition. The project strategy developed by the team guided the overall evaluation process.34
The strategy stipulated that relationships with potentially affected people and other actors such as
local government are important and need to be nurtured; priority is to be given to social and
environmental factors; issues are to be addressed upfront before the development application and
EIS are submitted to the regulating authority; the mine plan is to be amended in response to
feedback from actors; and a significant investment is required to fund the necessary mitigation
measures. Ownership of social data and the overall assessment of social risk rested with the project
team.
Conclusion
Chapter 8 examined the processes the Koala Extension Project team used to assess social risk; that
is, the integrated model. The importance of this chapter lies in its discovery that the way the
assessment of social risk is commonly conceptualised can differ markedly from the integrated
model. The Koala case study provides lessons about the benefits of front-end loading projects,
being realistic about the cost of risk mitigation and being willing to fund it, engaging with
potentially affected people, and taking a long-term perspective of project management. By
implementing its project strategy, the Koala Extension Project team was able to achieve its
objective of obtaining development consent within a timeframe acceptable to the proponent.
34 ‘Project strategy’ is a term I am using to describe a collection of factors raised by the research participants as important to the project team but that
may not have been articulated by the team as the project strategy.
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CHAPTER 9: BEYOND NARROW SELF-INTEREST –
CONCEPTUALISING SRA COMPETENCE
Introduction
This thesis set out to examine how social risk is constructed and assessed by members of Australian
coal mining project teams. Two different data generation methods were employed to underpin this
examination: an exploratory review and case research. The exploratory review comprised a series of
face-to-face, semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 31 industry participants. The participants
work in diverse roles, as engineers, environmental scientists, risk specialists, project managers,
community relations practitioners, and communication management specialists. They are employed
by different types of organisations, including small, mid-sized and major mining companies; EPCM
companies; and specialist consultancies.
The case research was designed around a single case – the Koala Extension Project – an open-cut
coal mining project that had obtained development consent. Face-to-face, semi-structured, in-depth
interviews were conducted with 11 members of the project team, including environmental and
social consultants. Koala represents the revelatory case, which Yin (2003) describes as a case in
which the researcher is given access to observe and analyse a phenomenon not previously
accessible to other researchers. I was given access to team members of a contemporary coal mining
project and the associated documentation in order to examine how social risk is constructed and
assessed. Mining proponents do not often provide this type of access to external researchers. Using
the two data generation methods was important because it delivered different but complementary
levels of data. The exploratory review provided a broad overview of the construction and
assessment of social risk across the Australian coal industry while the case research enabled me to
conduct a deeper evaluation of a specific project and to triangulate research participants’
experiences and perspectives of the same project. In addition, I was able to test and compare the
findings from the case research against those from the exploratory review.
Chapter 9 draws together the research findings under three categories – conceptual considerations,
organisational considerations, and considerations of SRA practice – and reflects on the findings in
the context of the established literature. I draw on additional literature to help make sense of some
of the findings. This literature includes Steiner (1972, in Carroll, 1999), Hay and Gray (1974),
Stryker and Serpe (1982), Griffiths and Lucas (1995), Ikerd (1999), Marens and Wicks (1999),
Moir (2001), Smith (2003), Kemp (2005, 2010), Porter and Kramer (2006), Campbell (2007),
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Krishnan (2008), Trebeck (2008), Budihardjo (2011), Frimer et al. (2011), Cragg (2012); Crăciun 
(2014), and Aras and Ingley (2016).
The chapter has five sections. Conceptual considerations are addressed in Section 9.2. This section
examines the different meanings attributed to social risk and the significance of those meanings to
the assessment of social risk. It also differentiates the concepts of social risk and social impact.
Organisational considerations are addressed in Section 9.3. The section explores the conflicting
objectives of project evaluation and considers how project evaluations are resourced and the extent
to which social practitioners are integrated into project teams. Section 9.4 addresses executional
considerations of SRA practice. It presents the case for SRA competence and engages with the
concept of enlightened self-interest. Section 9.5 concludes the chapter.
Conceptual considerations
9.2.1 The different meanings attributed to social risk
The thesis confirmed that the diversity of social risk meanings in the literature is replicated among
project team members. These meanings can be categorised according to who or what is at risk; that
is, risk to people, risk to project, or risk to both people and project. I use the term ‘dual orientation’
of social risk to describe risk to both people and project. Development and welfare scholars
construct social risk as risk to people, whereas business and mining scholars use a dual orientation
or consider social risk to be risk to project. The dual orientation and risk to project are common
constructions of social risk in international policies and standards. The World Bank, for example,
defines social risk as
the possibility that [an] intervention would create, reinforce or deepen inequity
and/or social conflict, or that the attitudes and actions of key stakeholders may
subvert the achievement of the development objective, or that the development
objective, or means to achieve it, lack ownership among key stakeholders. (The
World Bank, 2016)
Many mining companies also use a dual orientation of social risk. Anglo American (2014a, p. 9),
for example, considers social risk to be the “probability and severity of risks to the business as well
as to employees, contractors and external stakeholders”. This is what I am referring to as ‘a dual
orientation of social risk’.
Turning to the primary research, based on my industry experience, I had expected more research
participants to construct social risk as risk to project, and I did not expect the dual orientation of
social risk to be so pervasive. Social risk as a dual orientation is an attractive proposition for project
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team members because it enables them to use the language of social performance while having the
flexibility to orient their position one way or the other. Questions, however, remain about the extent
to which research participants with a dual orientation of social risk engage with each of the
elements. In the exploratory review, participants acknowledged that when assessing social risk
during project evaluation, the focus is more often on risk to the project. Furthermore, when they
were not responding to a direct question about the meaning of social risk, research participants
primarily framed their discussions in terms of risk to the project. For example, they had a propensity
to link social risks with economic costs and benefits; that is, they prioritised social risks according
to the financial repercussions to the project. Framing social risk in this way positions the project
rather than people as the subject of risk.
The discrepancy or ‘slippage’ between what research participants may say (their espoused position)
and the meaning of social risk that is sustained in their discourse (their revealed position) raises
questions about what the dual orientation of social risk means conceptually. For instance, are both
orientations used concurrently or are they used one at a time? If one at a time, does one orientation
dominate in all circumstances, in specific circumstances or on some other basis? I argue that risk to
project dominates when the concerns of potentially affected people and other external actors
conflict with the proponent’s business imperatives. Regulatory requirements and international
policies and standards call for project teams to consider the risks generated by their project to
external actors. In contrast, the proponent (their employer) expects its own interests, particularly
around financial performance, to be protected. When these two conditions are not in alignment, the
dual orientation of social risk is put under tension. Kemp (2010) notes a similar set of tensions
between external community requirements and internal company needs in her work on the practice
of community relations in the mining industry. She explains that community relations practitioners
can “oscillate” between empathising with local people and protecting the organisation’s interests
(Kemp, 2010, p. 8). While practitioners can emphasise one side of a tension over the other,
depending on the circumstances, Kemp (2005) contends that the internal focus on business interests
tends to prevail.
The propensity to prioritise the proponent’s interests over the concerns of external actors stems
from what is referred to in the organisational and management literature as ‘cultural inculcation’.
Budihardjo (2011) explains that organisational culture is the foundation that guides employee
behaviour and decision-making, and it unites employees so that in times of conflict, the
organisational goals are prioritised. To maintain the organisational culture, he says, a management
system is established through training, socialising, and applying a reward and discipline system.
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What this means in the context of mining is that the business perspective becomes so ingrained in
the way employees carry out their work, that it is difficult for them to step out of that worldview
and see situations from other actors’ points of view. The roles that employees hold, their KPIs and
even their promotions are all linked to business criteria, such as identifying business opportunities,
enhancing profitability, protecting reputation and governing risk. Project team members who hold a
dual orientation of social risk may intend to engage with each element equally but, as Budihardjo
explains, in times of conflict, organisational goals are prioritised.
Although there is a propensity to focus on the proponent’s interests, there are examples of
circumstances in which the concerns of external actors are prioritised. Examples include when
company directors recognise that their fiduciary duty to pursue shareholder value requires a broader
and longer-term perspective (see, for example, Marens and Wicks, 1999); when project team
members are predisposed to addressing social risk for “moral reasons” (Trebeck, 2008, p. 351) and
have the communication skills to argue their case (Stryker and Serpe, 1982); and when community
relations practitioners and leaders have the authority or power to make decisions about the
mitigation of social risks. It is more likely, however, for the concerns of external actors to be
addressed when there is a business case to do so (i.e. under conditions of enlightened self-interest).
Trebeck (2008), for example, argues that Rio Tinto’s engagement with corporate social
responsibility from the late 1990s was founded on a business case. She says the company’s
reputation was under threat from protests at its headquarters and shareholder meetings, from local
upheaval at mine sites (Panguna Bougainville Copper mine in particular), and from other pressures
exerted by external actors. It was, therefore, in Rio Tinto’s business interest to change the way it
developed and operated its mines.
A second finding from this thesis is that people’s professional background is not a reliable indicator
of the way they orient their espoused constructions of social risk. Krishnan (2009) defines a
profession as an activity through which people make a living. In the context of this research,
environmental science, project management, risk management, community relations and so on are
considered to be professions. Community relations manager, environmental scientist, and
enterprise-wide risk adviser are considered to be roles; that is, the jobs or formal positions that the
research participants are employed to carry out. The term ‘discipline’, which is derived from the
Latin discipulus, meaning pupil, and disciplina, meaning teaching, has come to represent the
organisation of learning and the systematic production of new knowledge. Key characteristics of a
discipline include having a particular object of research; having a body of accumulated, specialist
knowledge connected to the research objectives; having theories and concepts that organise the
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knowledge; specific terminology; specific research methods; and being taught at tertiary institutions
(Krishnan, 2009). Disciplines of relevance to this thesis include mining engineering, environmental
science, and sociology.
When I undertook this research, I had expected research participants working in social performance
roles, for example, as community relations practitioners, to construct social risk as risk to people,
and participants in techno-scientific roles, including as mine planning engineers, environmental
scientists, and geologists, to consider social risk as risk to the project. This was not the case. There
were just as many community relations participants who espoused a dual orientation of social risk
as those who considered people to be at risk, although none of them considered social risk to only
be directed towards the project. Techno-scientific participants did not attribute the same meaning to
social risk; they used three different orientations; that is, risk to people, risk to project, and risk to
both people and project. The diversity of usage in the meaning participants with techno-scientific
backgrounds attribute to social risk may relate to the different levels of engagement these
participants have with external actors, their specific roles and the skills needed to fulfil those roles,
variations in cultural inculcation, or slippage between their espoused and revealed positions.
Regardless of the reason, this finding confirms that a participant’s profession is not a reliable
indicator of the meaning he or she attributes to social risk.
Linked to the second finding is the finding that although the term ‘social risk’ is part of the
professional vocabulary of community relations and risk management practitioners, research
participants working within these professions attribute different meanings to the term. This finding
indicates that the term ‘social risk’ is not used consistently within the professions that were the
subject of this research. While further work is required to determine the reason for this
inconsistency, I put forward four propositions:
1. Research participants may acknowledge both effects pathways but simply label them
differently; that is, some participants use the terms ‘social risk’ and ‘business risk’ (or a similar
term) separately, while others conflate the terms.
2. Some practitioners are so used to navigating between the two effects pathways – ‘translating’
the perspectives of one party to the other using the vocabulary of that party – that they consider
both effects pathways to be part of an integrated process.
3. Research participants may experience different levels of cultural inculcation. Some participants
are able to step out of the organisation’s worldview and see situations from other points of view.
For them, social risk means risk to people. Participants with higher levels of cultural inculcation
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prioritise risk to project but their professional experience prevents them from dismissing risk to
people altogether, so they adopt a dual orientation of social risk.
4. Some practitioners may have a predisposition to favour moral principles, including not harming
others and protecting human rights, over business imperatives.
Other questions relating to the attribution of meaning to social risk are explored here. First, the
thesis found that when research participants talk about who is at risk from FIFO/DIDO employment
practices, their focus is on mine workers and permanent residents of the host communities. Family
members of FIFO/DIDO workers are not considered. This means that social risk is conceptualised
as place-based rather than as a distributed phenomenon in which potentially affected actors living
outside the geographic location of the project are also considered to be at risk. Taking such a narrow
risk perspective by excluding these actors may result in potential harms to people from the project
and later the operation, not being addressed by the proponent. Second, it is more common for
research participants to discuss physical rather than non-physical social risks, suggesting that
because non-physical risks are not ‘top of mind’, they may not be given priority in the assessment
process, or may not be considered at all. By focusing on physical risks, assessors may miss risks
that are a high priority for external actors, potentially leading to conflict if those risks are not
avoided or mitigated.
With no common construction of social risk, identification, assessment and mitigation is
problematic. How can social risk be assessed if there is no agreement on who or what is at risk?
This observation highlights the importance of undertaking a comprehensive scoping process before
risks are assessed, as recommended by the International Organization for Standardization (2009) in
its Risk Management Principles and Guidelines and the IRGC’s (2005) risk governance framework.
During the scoping process, project team members and any other risk assessors need to articulate
their understanding of social risk and to negotiate an agreement on the meaning of the term, in
addition to the other scoping requirements, before they proceed with the risk assessment. The
concept of negotiated meaning is well-explored by scholars in the academic literature (see, for
example, Cormick et al., 1996; Checkland and Poulter, 2010; and Wong, 2017).
My understanding of social risk – the definition I put forward in this thesis – is uncertainty and
ambiguity about the physical or non-physical consequences of a future event or activity, such as
coal mining, on individuals or civic entities. Social risk can also be produced by events or activities
not occurring, such as proponents not conducting a cultural heritage survey prior to mining. This is
not to say that I am advocating for proponents to ignore risk to the project from external actors; that
would be foolhardy. What I am suggesting is that risk to the project from external actors is not
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social risk. It is a type of business risk linked to uncertainty about the acceptability of the project to
external actors, and the consequences of the acceptability outcome to the project. I argue that using
‘social risk’ as an umbrella term to capture different types of risk can lead to conceptual confusion
and, thereby, affect the quality and results of the risk assessment. Keeping the terms ‘social risk’
and ‘business risk’ separate makes the effects pathway clear; that is, who or what is at risk. For
proponents who want to avoid or mitigate risk from their project, differentiating the terms can help
project teams to identify and, therefore address, risks along both effects pathways. Of course, for
proponents who are more concerned with, or only interested in, risk to the project, differentiating
the terms may not change the way they assess risk.
Articulating meanings for, and differentiating between, social risk and business risk is not simply an
academic exercise. My aim is to bring attention to the consequences of not governing risk from the
project, including the increased likelihood that the burden of risk is carried by those people with the
least resources to deal with it. As Kemp et al. (2016) contend, mining companies can be
unresponsive to concerns about risks to external actors when they do not face social opposition.
However, opposition is not always the best indicator of whether harm is present or imminent.
Mining companies cannot rely on potentially affected people and other external actors to voice
dissatisfaction or non-acceptance before attending to social risk. If they do, they will fail to meet
their policy commitments to sustainable development and fail to demonstrate human rights due
diligence under the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. While the
magnitude of human rights risks generated by coal projects in Australia may not often be
catastrophic, there are many examples of catastrophic consequences across the global mining
industry, such as entrenched conflict between resettled communities and Anglo Platinum at its
Mogalakwena mine near Mokopane in Limpopo, South Africa; violent repression of protesters
against the Conga mining project in Cajamarca, Peru; and the multiple gang rapes of women by
Porgera mine’s security personnel in Papua New Guinea. Many companies with coal assets in
Australia also operate across different commodities internationally, so these examples of human
rights violations are pertinent. Not addressing these risks can rebound (Kemp et al., 2016) as a
business risk through opposition to project development and, thereby, put development consent at
risk.
9.2.2 Differentiating the concepts of social risk and social impact
The development of two distinct bodies of literature – the sociology of risk and SIA – each with its
own set of scholars, has resulted in the evolution of different terminology to describe similar
concepts. Social risk and social impact are a case in point. Both concepts relate to people being the
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subject of some external phenomenon, but what are the differentiating factors? There is very little
comparative literature to draw from and research participants do not delineate between the concepts
in the same way – some participants are confused by the concepts, some conflate them, some
consider that impacts drive risk, while others consider that risks drive impacts. To examine the
relationship between social risk and social impact, I first present definitions of the terms, then
analyse elements of the definitions before identifying the distinguishing characteristics or
indicators.
Aven and Renn (2009, p. 6) define risk as “uncertainty about and severity of the events and
consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value”. My own
definition of social risk is based on Aven and Renn’s (2009) risk definition. Social impact, on the
other hand, is defined by Ziller (2012, p. xvi) as “the consequences to groups of people, or society
as a whole, arising from a decision or an action” and by Vanclay et al. (2015, p. 95) as “something
that is experienced or felt, in a perceptual or corporeal sense at the level of an individual, social unit
(family/household/ collectivity) or community/society”. From these definitions, one can identify
two key indicators for differentiating risks and impacts: temporality and certainty. In brief, the term
‘social risk’ refers to consequences that may, or may not, materialise in the future. By contrast, a
social impact is something that has already happened or is happening now.
A third point of differentiation between the concepts relates to materiality. I am not using the term
‘materiality’ to denote relevance or significance, but in its more literal sense, as meaning capable of
being observed or identified. Subject to methodological constraints (such as inadequate baseline
data), a social impact can be discovered, described and, in certain cases, quantified (for example,
the number of people experiencing respiratory diseases as a result of increases in dust levels, the
percentage of people experiencing anxiety about the project). By contrast, because risk refers to
potential future outcomes, the likely scale and nature of these consequences can only be inferred
from other data sources (such as historical trends and patterns, experiences of similar communities
and indicators of vulnerability) and are, therefore, uncertain.
Mahmoudi et al. (2013) put forward a further distinction between the concepts in the presentation of
their combined risk and social impact assessment framework: that SIAs focus on the consequences
of planned interventions [such as mining or infrastructure developments]; whereas SRAs assess
natural hazards and disasters as well as planned interventions. While this observation may be the
case in practice, it does not preclude the consequences of natural hazards and disasters to people
from being considered social impacts, or the consequences of planned interventions including
unplanned outcomes (elevated social risks), so I have not adopted this delineation.
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Moving now to the concepts of SRA and SIA, I note that SIAs are typically carried out ex-ante; that
is, in advance of a project or other activity being initiated, although Western and Lynch (2000),
Ahmadvand et al. (2009) and Mahmoudi et al. (2013) observe that SIAs can also be undertaken as
ex-post assessments. As noted above, when conducted ex-post, SIAs measure the social impacts of
projects; that is, “the consequences [….] arising from a decision or action” (Ziller, 2012, p. xvi).
When used to predict the potential impacts of a project, particularly those which could have adverse
consequences for individuals or social entities, SIAs are effectively engaging in a form of SRA
(notwithstanding that such studies do not often use the language and tools of risk analysis). The
main points of difference are that SIAs typically have a broader focus and remit including, for
example, the documentation of baselines and provision of descriptive data about the characteristics
and history of communities in the area of influence.
Organisational considerations
This section considers the organisational factors that influence the way project team members
construct and assess social risk. The key factors explored in this section are the conflicting
objectives of project evaluation, the process of resourcing project evaluation, and the extent to
which social practitioners are integrated into project teams.
9.3.1 Conflicting objectives of project evaluation
From the proponent’s perspective, project evaluation is undertaken for two primary reasons: to
deliver the EIS (incorporating an SIA) to the regulating authority as a precondition to obtaining
development consent and to determine whether the project’s risk profile warrants the investment
needed to develop a mining operation. While the first of these objectives is an external requirement
– the EIS is one instrument used by the regulator to determine whether the project’s benefits
outweigh its costs – the objective tends to be internalised by the proponent and positioned primarily
around obtaining development consent. Internalising this objective removes the EIS, and project
evaluation more generally, from the context of mining project risk governance (see discussion
below). Research participants confirm the strong focus project teams place on obtaining
development consent. This is reflected in the titles given to key project team members, such as
approvals manager, approvals coordinator, and widespread use of the term ‘approvals risk’,
considered by research participants to be the project’s “main risk” (Tyla, a research participant,
2015) and in which project teams examine “anything that could affect the approval of the project”
(Jacob, a research participant, 2015) in order to mitigate that risk. The main thing “that could affect
approval of the project” is an assessment by the regulator that the project’s upside risks do not
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outweigh its downside risks. Ironically, addressing the priority social risks of external actors could
improve the likelihood that a project obtains development consent.
In Chapter 3, project evaluation was positioned as one of seven components of mining project risk
governance in Australia. Many proponents do not consider project evaluation to be part of a broader
risk governance framework. Their focus is self-interest; that is, on maximising project value and
obtaining development consent. In contrast, regulators, potentially affected people and other actors
want to maximise the benefits of coal projects and to minimise the costs to them and to the
environment. The way proponents conceptualise project evaluation can influence how they consider
other components of the risk governance framework, such as formal submissions and project-
related social engagement. Actors, such as local governments, landholders, residents of nearby
towns, indigenous groups, activists, have an opportunity to make formal submissions in support of,
or in opposition to, the development application. Do proponents consider these submissions to be a
democratic mechanism to highlight different perspectives of project risk, or do they consider them
to be a hurdle that must be overcome en route to development consent, or something else
altogether?
I argue that for most proponents, responding to submissions and undertaking project-related social
engagement are hurdles that must be overcome. In the exploratory review, for example, rather than
reflecting on the need for proponents to amend their projects’ designs to address the concerns of
external actors, research participants consider that those actors need to be educated about the merits
of coal projects. For Jacob, controlling the discussion is an important objective for proponents:
Despite all of the science that you put out, you’re on the back foot then to try
and get your approvals through. So it’s important in terms of assessing that
risk, to understand those things up front and get onto the front foot; to get the
messages out before the people argue; to try and control a balanced set of
views that need to be considered in any development. (Jacob, a research
participant, 2015)
This perspective is supported by other participants who contend that proponents, in general, are not
successful at delivering their key messages to external actors. These concerns indicate an alignment
with what Wynne (1995) calls the deficit model, in which information is seen to be deficient. The
deficit model represents a belief that if the public were better informed then it would adopt a more
‘rational’ approach; in this context, one that is aligned with the risk perspectives of the proponent.
According to Botterill and Mazur (2004), the way people construct risk does not always correlate
with measurable probabilities of risk. Furthermore, the way information is framed may not be
congruent with external actors’ worldviews. In these circumstances, their perspectives will remain
unchanged regardless of how much ‘information’ is directed towards them (Ben-Porath, 2009).
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In the case research, the Koala Extension Project team showed what is possible when project teams
consider the risk perspectives of others; that is, taking an external point of view. Research
participants explain that Koala team members listened to the concerns of external actors, worked
with them to identify mitigation measures, and were willing to change the mine plan to deliver on
those measures. The strategy was considered to be successful by participants in that development
consent was obtained without lengthy delays and without widespread opposition to the project.
Participants note that the Koala Extension Project team chose to address all the major issues
identified in the feasibility studies and raised by external actors before submitting the development
application; that is, they addressed the issues prior to receiving the formal submissions. According
to participants, this is not a strategy commonly used by mining proponents who operate in
Eucalyptus Pits. It is more common to design a mine that maximises the value of the project and for
issues raised by external actors to be addressed once the public submissions are reviewed; that is,
when they are forced to do so by the regulator. The Koala team recognised that engaging with local
communities and regulators and addressing their priority social risks were critical to Marsupial
Coal’s business objective of continuing to operate in Eucalyptus Pits. The company recognises that
its ability to develop new projects depends on keeping its reputation with the regulators and local
communities intact. This recognition is a type of ‘enlightened self-interest’, a concept that I explore
in Section 9.4.
Proponents’ second objective of project evaluation is to determine whether the project’s risk profile
warrants the investment needed to develop a mining operation. In order to raise capital for
development of the mining operation, proponents need to have done sufficient work at the right
level of detail to convince investors, regardless of whether they are internal or external, that the
project has an acceptable risk profile. Key indicators used to determine the risk profile are NPV and
IRR. Research participants explain that proponents do not invest in projects that fail to meet their
NPV and IRR thresholds. The economic climate, taxation regimes, coal price and the cost of risk
mitigation are important considerations. In discussing coal price, participants note that there is a
‘tipping point’ at which the price will represent an NPV that is so low that project development is
not economically viable or it passes the tipping point, making the project suitable for investment.
Proponents run comprehensive economic models to determine the value and viability of projects.
Jacob, a project manager, explains the cost of delays to a project he worked on. His team ran a
scenario to delay production by 12 months and calculated that it would cost the project around $70
million:
So if you use that in the broader context of a delay in the approval process; a
12 month delay [….] has an effective net present value of around $70 million.
So any of those delays has a significant project impact and, potentially, the
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delays then put you into a different economic regime, which we currently are.
The global economic climate is not particularly supportive of capital
investment in the resources industry [….] If it does push you into a different
economic climate […], it can have major consequences as to whether the
project proceeds or doesn’t proceed (emphasis added). (Jacob, a research
participant, 2015)
Project delays are, therefore, a significant cost to the project, so teams are focused on maintaining
the project schedule. Activities that delay the project timeline and/or cut project value, such as
redesigning the mine plan to address the concerns of external actors, are to be avoided if at all
possible.
Project evaluation has two competing objectives – the regulatory requirement to deliver the EIS as a
precondition to obtaining development consent and the organisational requirement to deliver an
economically viable project. The time and cost required to complete a rigorous EIS, including the
mitigation measures it outlines, can affect the value and, therefore, the viability of the project. This
situation is exacerbated during periods of economic downturn. Campbell (2007) proposes that
organisations are less likely to act in socially responsible ways when they are facing poor financial
performance and the prospect of profitability over the short-term is limited. Project team members
are under pressure to manage costs, maintain the project schedule and obtain development consent.
This environment fosters a propensity for team members to frame project evaluation from the
proponent’s perspective, raising questions about whether this environment is conducive to the
assessment of social risk, given that social risk concerns risk to people and requires project team
members to look externally. The factors that enable the assessment of social risk – ongoing social
engagement, a willingness to acknowledge risk perspectives that differ from those of the project
team, and working with potentially affected people to prioritise social (and other) risks and select
mitigation measures – cost time and money. What the Koala Extension Project case study has
shown, however, is that this cost can be offset by the avoidance of lengthy delays, which Jacob’s
team calculates to be around $70 million per annum or $5.8 million per month. Addressing the
priority social risks of external actors through amendments to the mine plan can help to mitigate
approvals risk.
9.3.2 Resourcing project evaluation
The financial and human resources that proponents allocate to projects are aligned with a formal
mechanism called project stage gating – a progressive, standardised and planned evaluation process
that incorporates a series of control points, known as stage gates. Botin and Anderson (2009, p. 208)
describe stage gating as a “stepwise risk reduction process” through which “increasingly larger
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amounts of capital are invested over time to reduce uncertainty and financial risk”. Each stage
covers the same general areas at differing levels of detail, and each stage has clearly defined
objectives and deliverables. This view is supported by the research findings. Participants state that
funding for the next stage is contingent upon the project having met a standard of performance that
is stipulated in the company’s project management standard (or equivalent) and to the satisfaction
of the PGC. The purpose of the stage-gate process is to reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding
the project and to protect the proponent’s investment. If the proponent deems the risk profile to be
acceptable and it meets the specified stage-gate requirements, the project proceeds to the next stage
gate. This means that the size of project teams and the extent of work undertaken varies
considerably from concept to feasibility. At the concept stage, there may only be one or two project
team members doing basic desktop studies. These team members tend to be techno-scientific
specialists. The capacity for teams to assess social risk at this stage is very limited. Unless the
proponent has in-house social practitioners, it is unlikely that this expertise is engaged with until the
mine plan is confirmed in late prefeasibility/early feasibility and the SIA consultant is appointed. At
this stage, the mine plan has already been set and there is a general unwillingness to amend it due to
time and financial constraints. How, then, do proponents resolve this dilemma? The Koala
Extension Project case study offers some insights.
The Koala Extension Project research participants contend that environment and community issues
are considered by Marsupial Coal to be just as important as production and health and safety, and
that the perspectives of environment and community personnel are taken on board by the executive
team. Project systems and processes support this culture. Marsupial Coal has a rigorous project risk
governance process that incorporates social and environmental considerations, along with financial,
production, workplace health and safety, and other important criteria – all requiring sign-off from
the PGC. In addition, there is an ESIA management control framework that contains specific
requirements for undertaking “consistent and robust ESIA processes” (Marsupial Coal, n.d. p. 11)
and project teams are required to engage with the corporate team to initiate early peer reviews of the
ESIA studies. The Koala case study illustrates that project teams can be empowered to amend the
mine plan in response to concerns of external actors, and be given permission to incur the costs of
delays, when social performance is prioritised by the proponent, systems and processes are in place
that incorporate social considerations, and project teams have access to qualified and experienced
social practitioners. In these circumstances, budgets and schedules can be developed that
accommodate changes to the mine plan during the feasibility stage.
Sandy Worden Chapter 9 166 | P a g e
9.3.3 The integration of social practitioners into project teams
A key premise of this thesis is that risk may be understood differently across disciplinary domains
and that diverse tools, methods and frameworks of analysis can be used, depending on the discipline
in which assessors place themselves (Lupton, 2013). It is for this reason that I incorporate the
principle of multidisciplinarity into my conceptual framework of mining project risk governance
(Chapter 3). The principle of multidisciplinarity requires the project team to have the disciplinary
backgrounds and experience needed to assess the diversity of risks the project generates and to
commission and review the associated studies. In addition to the standard engineering and scientific
expertise, are there team members with sufficient experience in the social dimensions of mining to
be able to assess social risk?
This subsection examines the extent to which social practitioners are integrated into project teams.
There are two key findings discussed here. First, research participants indicate that it is rare for
social performance specialists, such as community relations practitioners, to be appointed to full-
time roles within project teams. Of the 11 research participants who work in community relations
on a day-to-day basis, rather than those who oversee this function as part of their reporting
hierarchy, only one participant – Yasmin – had experience working on projects in a full-time
capacity. All other participants working in-house provided community relations advice and
guidance to project teams on an ‘as-needed’ basis, including during risk workshops; and the
consultants undertook discrete tasks, such as SIAs, for project teams. Yasmin’s experience as the
general manager community for a major mining project highlights the advantages of being
integrated into the project team. The proponent’s leadership team recognised early in the project
lifecycle that the way the project engaged with potentially affected people was critical to project
success. Yasmin’s role, therefore, was given equal authority with the project’s general manager
technical. This, she explains, is not a common occurrence and it resulted in the prioritisation of
community relations across the project lifecycle. Having community relations or other social
practitioners embedded into project teams means that they are able to influence decision-making on
an ongoing basis rather than providing guidance out of context or once key decisions have already
been made. In addition, as Wong and Lockie (2018) note, social practitioners can be relegated to
analysing risk ‘perceptions’ and informing risk communication rather than being active participants
in the overall assessment of risk. Although the Koala Extension Project team did not have a full-
time social practitioner, research participants acknowledge the value of having an experienced
practitioner and qualified social scientist like Phoebe working with the team. Participants note that
Phoebe was able to help the team understand the underlying drivers for people’s behaviour – why
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they respond the way they do – and she was also able to gather social data in order to analyse issues
and identify potential solutions.
Second, in the exploratory review, research participants with techno-scientific backgrounds
expressed an unwillingness to engage with the ‘social space’. Ethan, a project executive, says the
‘social space’ is “a difficult thing for us engineers to get our minds around” (Ethan, a research
participant, 2015). Peter, a project approvals manager, attributes this difficulty to the non-physical
characteristics of social dimensions of mining: “It’s not something you can just go out and measure
with a measuring tape” (Peter, a research participant, 2015). While these participants consider social
engagement to be an integral component of the project evaluation process, they would prefer to
leave this work to community relations or social practitioners. The reluctance of research
participants from techno-scientific backgrounds to engage with the social dimensions of mining
creates a dilemma in terms of the assessment of social risk. If techno-scientific specialists do not
want to undertake this work and the project team does not include social practitioners, who is
responsible for assessing social risk?
These two findings suggest that without team members experienced in the social dimensions of
mining, project teams may struggle to assess social risk. Why, then, are social practitioners
generally omitted from full-time roles with project teams or not empowered to contribute equally to
the assessment of risks? Is the workload associated with SRA not considered sufficient to warrant
full-time resources? Is the expertise of social practitioners only valued in circumstances when
development consent is at risk by widespread community opposition or when the region in which
the project is located has a history of community opposition to mining?
Considerations of SRA practice and competence
This thesis has identified two models of SRA, which have been delineated using the nomenclature
‘mechanistic model’ and ‘integrated model’. The mechanistic model comprises two distinct
mechanisms: an SRA and an SIA. The SRA is conducted in a workshop environment, either in a
full workshop or in a break out group of social practitioners. SRA workshops can be undertaken at
any stage of the project lifecycle and can be undertaken multiple times. In contrast, the SIA is only
carried out once during the life of a project and is generally commenced in late prefeasibility or in
early feasibility. Although it may be scoped by the project team, usually after the SRA, the SIA is
outsourced to a specialist consultancy. Often there is little relationship between the two mechanisms
or the two groups of people who undertake them; the social impact assessor may not even
participate in the SRA workshop. Furthermore, project team members may not be cognisant of SIA
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methodologies or have the skills to judge the standard of the report that is delivered. Some research
participants consider SIA to be ‘a black art’. While a black art is generally taken to be a practice
that is mysterious or sinister, in this context, research participants are indicating that SIAs are an
area of expertise that they do not understand. Conceptualising SIA as a ‘black art’ not only indicates
a lack of understanding about what an SIA entails, but it denotes a lack of confidence in what the
mechanism can deliver.
In the mechanistic model of SRA, ownership of social data is fragmented and oversight of the SRA
process is not considered nor specified. In other words, it is not clear who is responsible for social
data and the assessment of social risk. The individual mechanisms used to assess social risk become
disconnected over the life of the project. One mechanism (the SRA workshop) is started by a team
of internal actors (the social risk assessors). Once the workshop has ended, the assessment of social
risk stops. At a later date, an unrelated team of external consultants (the social impact assessors)
picks up the assessment when it undertakes a separate mechanism (the SIA), often with very limited
direction or handover from the social risk assessors. Once the SIA has been completed, the
assessment of social risk stops again. This disjointed approach means that the knowledge generated
by each separate assessment is not shared beyond the team that undertook the assessment, making it
challenging for the project evaluation team to develop a comprehensive understanding of the social
risks generated by its project. The fragmentation of social data can also affect the accuracy of the
project risk profile, which proponents use to make mine investment decisions. Based on the
deficiencies highlighted here, the mechanistic model does not support SRA competence among
project team members.
SRA competence is the ability of project team members to assess social risk to a standard that
avoids or mitigates risk to people. The concept is similar to Chomsky’s (1965) notion of linguistic
competence; that is, the system of knowledge retained by native language speakers. Competence is
set against performance or the way people use language to communicate in practice. For Chomsky,
linguistic competence represents a higher standard of skill than the linguistic performance.
Returning to the context of the thesis, SRA competence could be likened to risk governance in that
it requires all the systems, processes and tools used by the project proponent, the project team and
the consultants engaged during project evaluation to collect, analyse and communicate social risk
information in order to make decisions about social risk.
While I consider the Koala project team’s approach to assessing social risk to be an example of
SRA competence, it was underpinned by business objectives, which raises questions about the
relationship between SRA competence and enlightened self-interest. Business and corporate social
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responsibility scholars began engaging with the concept of enlightened self-interest back in the
1970s (e.g. Steiner, 1972, in Carroll, 1999; Hay and Gray, 1974). The concept is of relevance to this
thesis because it is the primary driver for mining project proponents to govern social risk.
Enlightened self-interest refers to the alignment of one’s own interests with those of others (Frimer
et al., 2011), when cooperation with others is more advantageous than simply choosing narrow self-
interest, and when one “seeks to get and obtain something” (Crăciun, 2014). Some scholars (Hay 
and Gray, 1974; Ikerd, 1999) contend that enlightened self-interest integrates aspects of narrow
self-interest, shared interests and the interests of other actors (altruism), whereas other scholars
(such as Smith, 2003) delineate between a desire to do good (the normative case) and enlightened
self-interest (the business case). Actors operating with enlightened self-interest tend to take a
longer-term perspective than those operating within a narrow self-interest (Steiner, 1972, in Carroll,
1999; Griffiths and Lucas, 1995; Moir, 2001). Companies consider engaging in “good business
practices” to gain a competitive advantage (Aras and Ingley, 2016, p. 2). Examples of enlightened
self-interest abound in the business literature. Porter and Kramer (2006, p. 4), for example, point to
the environmental and business benefits derived from sustainability initiatives, such as DuPont’s
$2 million savings from reductions in energy use since 1990 and McDonald’s 30% reduction in
solid waste from switching the materials it uses to wrap its food. These initiatives benefit the
bottom line as well as the environment. Smith (2003) notes DuPont’s enlightened self-interest in
deciding to remove CFCs from its products. The company was a market leader in CFC alternatives
and so it gained commercial advantage. Smith (2003) also note GSK’s decision to heavily discount
HIV/AIDS treatment drugs for less developed countries. GSK was a leading provider of drugs to
treat tuberculosis and malaria, two of the other top five killer diseases, and by discounting
HIV/AIDS treatment drugs, the company was able to open up new markets for its other products.
These four cases exemplify the mantra of enlightened self-interest – ‘do well by doing good’ – a
phrase widely attributed to Benjamin Franklin.
In my research, I identified that the Koala Extension Project strategy – to engage with potentially
affected people, address their priority social and environmental risks, and to front-end load the
project – was underpinned by a business case. Two factors influenced the Koala Extension Project
team’s objective to set the project apart from its competition: Marsupial Coal’s culture and the
prevailing social environment in Eucalyptus Pits (broad opposition to the development of new coal
mines). The project sought to “get and obtain” development consent and for Marsupial Coal to
remain operating in Eucalyptus Pits, and its strategy was successful. I did not expect that SRA
competence could be delivered by a project team operating with enlightened self-interest, and this
finding raises a number of questions. First, if the integrated model represents SRA competence and
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the mechanistic model does not, what does SRA excellence looks like? Second, can SRA excellence
be achieved via enlightened self-interest? Third, if enlightened self-interest can produce SRA
competence, is competence ‘good enough’ in terms of governing risk to people? Fourth, given that
mining companies have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders, is SRA excellence
achievable in this context?
Conclusion
This chapter examined the research findings across three broad themes – conceptual, organisational
and practice considerations – and it reflected on those findings in the context of the established
literature. Five main points can be drawn from this examination. First, project team members do not
have a common understanding of social risk, although the way social risk is constructed can be
categorised in terms of who or what is at risk. The diversity of meanings attributed to social risk
needs to be considered when social risks are being assessed and a shared meaning negotiated during
the scoping process. Second, risk assessors need to be cognisant of the tensions that emerge when
the risk perspectives of external actors conflict with the proponent’s business imperatives and when
the objective to avoid or mitigate risks to people threatens the economic viability of the project. In
these circumstances, project teams tend to prioritise risk to project, potentially putting people at
risk. Third, mining proponents need to reconsider the way they structure project teams in order to
assess social risks. Team members are needed who have experience in the social dimensions of
mining and are able to assess social risk. Fourth, the concept of SRA competence has been put
forward to differentiate the skill level of project team members in assessing social risk. Fifth, the
chapter identifies that the Koala Extension Project team was able to deliver a project that
represented a high standard of SRA practice despite operating from a position of enlightened self-
interest.
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
This thesis examines the way coal mining project teams assess social risk and it presents the
concept of SRA competence. Assessment practice is differentiated according to two different
models – the mechanistic and integrated models. The Koala Extension Project is an example of the
latter and illustrates that it is possible for coal mining proponents in Australia to deliver projects that
give a high priority to mitigating risks to potentially affected people. The ability of proponents to do
so, however, requires a shift in thinking from short-term, narrow self-interest to longer-term,
enlightened self-interest, and a willingness to accept responsibility for the social risks generated by
their projects. In this context, enlightened self-interest is a strategy to offset the cost (the investment
required to address social risk) with the gain (the prospect of obtaining development consent
without lengthy delays and being able to develop new mines in the future). Working with
potentially affected people to develop a shared meaning of risk, to identify risk mitigation measures
and, subsequently, to amend the mine plan and implement those measures, requires an upfront
financial investment. It also requires time to be allocated in the lead up to submission of the
development application. There are, of course, no guarantees that development consent will be
granted, and future monitoring and/or an SIA will be required to confirm the success of the SRA
and its mitigation measures.
Three key impediments to avoiding or mitigating risk to people have been identified. First, there is
no consensus on the meaning of social risk. How then can social risk be effectively addressed if
there are differing views on who or what is at risk? Second, proponents who adopt the mechanistic
model of SRA do not optimise social data in risk decision-making and mine planning, and this can
result in the priority social risks of external actors not being identified nor mitigated. In this context,
social data are the quantitative and qualitative details collected by project team members and the
social consultants about potentially affected people and their social environment, including their
risk perspectives. Third, there is a propensity for project teams to prioritise proponents’ interests
over the concerns of external actors. These impediments are discussed in Section 10.2.
Chapter 10 has seven sections. The research questions are addressed in Section 10.2, followed by
the contribution of the research in Section 10.3. A discussion of the implications of the research and
recommendations for improving SRA policy and practice are provided in Section 10.4. The
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limitations of the research (Section 10.5) and directions for future research (Section 10.6) are then
presented. Section 10.7 concludes the chapter.
Addressing the research questions
Research for the thesis has been constructed around one primary research question and three
secondary questions. These questions are:
1. How is social risk constructed and assessed by team members of Australian coal mining
projects?
2. What conceptualisations of social risk are predominantly used by team members of Australian
coal mining projects?
3. What paradigmatic assumptions underpin their construction and assessment of social risk?
4. How do these assumptions influence how project team members construct and assess social
risk?
The research confirmed that the diversity of meanings attributed to social risk in the literature is
replicated within project teams; that is, research participants construct social risk differently. These
constructions, however, can be categorised according to who or what is at risk; that is, risk to
people, risk to project, or risk to both people and project. The term ‘dual orientation of social risk’
is coined to describe risk to both people and project, and the concept is examined in Chapter 9. The
dual orientation enables team members to use the language of social risk while having the flexibility
to orient their risk perspectives one way or the other. The extent to which team members engage
with each of the elements is uncertain. However, I argue that when the priority social risks of
external actors conflict with the proponent’s business imperatives, risk to project prevails.
There are four further findings relating to the conceptualisation of social risk. First, professional
background is not a reliable indicator of how project team members orient their constructions of
social risk. The meaning that team members working within professions attribute to social risk
varies. Community relations practitioners, for example, consider social risk to be either risk to
people or risk to both people and the project, whereas all three orientations are used by people
working in techno-scientific roles. Second, and linked to the first finding, is the finding that
although the term ‘social risk’ was found to be part of the professional vocabulary of community
relations and risk management, project team members working in these roles attribute different
meanings to the term. Third, conceptualisations of social risk tend to be place-based rather than
distributed; that is, they are not applied to people beyond the geographic location of the project.
Fourth, discussions around social risk focus on physical rather than non-physical risks, suggesting
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that non-physical risks may not be given priority in the assessment process, or may not be
considered at all. By focusing on physical risks, assessors may miss risks that are a high priority for
external actors, potentially leading to conflict if those risks are not avoided or mitigated.
The way team members of Australian coal mining projects assess social risk can be mapped against
two models presented in the thesis: the mechanistic model and the integrated model. In the
mechanistic model, responsibility for managing social data collected by the project team and
consultants, is not considered nor specified. While this model includes two types of social risk
assessments – SRA workshops and the SIA study – it is common for these assessments to be
undertaken independently of each other. In general, the two groups of assessors do not work
together: project team members do not engage with the process of SIA and the social impact
assessor does not participate in the SRA. As a consequence, the data are not integrated, making it
difficult to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the social risks generated by the project and to
make risk decisions. This lack of integration can affect the accuracy of the project’s risk profile.
In contrast, the approach used in the Koala Extension Project, was far more complex, integrated and
collaborative than the mechanistic model. Representatives from three entities – the mining
company, the project team, and the consultants – all contributed to the project’s assessment of
social risk. In addition, many of the activities were undertaken by the project team and consultants
working collaboratively. Ownership of social data resided with the project team. Data generated
from a range of activities – social engagement undertaken by the existing Koala operation, EIS
studies, ongoing social engagement, risk mitigation workshops, and the SIA (including community
engagement, quantitative analysis, a community visioning study and a desktop SRA) – were
integrated into the project evaluation process, including decision-making around the mine plan. The
integrated model represents a process of SRA rather than two discrete mechanisms, making it a
more effective assessment approach.
Turning now to a discussion about paradigmatic assumptions, I note that there were a number of
comments made by project team members in the exploratory review that could be described as
positivist, and some of these are discussed in the following paragraph. The main influence on the
way team members assess social risk, however, is the prioritisation of business interests ahead of
the concerns of external actors. Project team members tend to prioritise social risks according to the
financial repercussion to the project, which positions the project rather than people as the subject of
risk. Project teams do not welcome activities that delay the project timeline or cut project value,
such as redesigning the mine plan to address the concerns of external actors. When the concerns of
external actors conflict with the proponent’s requirement to protect its business interests, it is
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common for priority to be given to the proponents’ interests. It is more likely that social risks and
other concerns of external actors are addressed when there is a business case to do so. ‘Front-end
loading’ the Koala Extension Project, for example, was a strategic decision to set the project apart
from its competitors.
Returning to the point about paradigmatic assumptions, I identify two positivist assumptions that
are made when project team members, particularly those with techno-scientific backgrounds,
discuss social risk. The first assumption is that ‘facts’ can be separated from values using strict rules
and procedures, and by generating quantitative data. The second assumption is that external actors
would adopt a more ‘rational’ approach to risk, one that is aligned with the risk perspectives of the
proponent, if they were provided with more and better communicated information. Project team
members said they expected scientific evidence about project risk to be given greater credence by
external actors because it was based on facts. They were also critical of the ‘emotional’ and
‘unscientific’ response of external actors to coal projects. The implication of these assumptions is
that project team members are likely to dismiss perspectives that do not align with empirical data or
their own constructions of social risk, such as non-physical social risks, people’s values, or the way
they feel about project-generated risks. This type of response represents a narrow conceptualisation
of social risk and may result in the priority social risks of external actors not being addressed and,
consequently, the potential for harm to people. It may also generate business risk via opposition to
the project.
The second assumption, application of the deficit model (Wynne, 1992), is evident in the frustration
project team members exhibit when they discuss the predominance of the anti-mining voice in the
media. Team members suggest that if the industry improved the way it communicated then the level
of opposition to coal projects would diminish. When project teams engage with the deficit model,
they tend to respond to the concerns of external actors by increasing the distribution of
communication collateral that emphasises all the facts rather than listening to what people’s
concerns are and working with them to identify and implement solutions. The outcome from this
approach is the same as the outcome described in the previous paragraph: that the priority social
risks of external actors may not be addressed, resulting in the potential for harm to people. It may
also generate business risk via opposition to the project.
Addressing the research questions indicates that the potential for coal projects to expose people to
harm is heightened when the process of assessing social risk is fragmented, when project teams do
not negotiate a shared meaning of social risk, and when project teams do not actively manage the
collection, integration and optimisation of social data in risk decision-making and mine planning.
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Harm to people is also heightened when proponents do not consider the risk perspectives of
potentially affected people in the design of the mine plan, even if the perspectives are not supported
by empirical evidence or when they differ from the perspectives held by project team members. The
tendency to focus on physical social risks may result in the priority risks of external actors not being
addressed, potentially leading to conflict. The paradigmatic assumptions held by project team
members need to be revealed and openly discussed, and the validity of alternative risk perspectives
accepted before any real progress can be made in addressing the social risks generated by
Australian coal projects.
Contribution of the research
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by extending the notion of risk governance
articulated by Renn (2008), Aven and Renn (2010) and van Asselt and Renn (2011) into the
Australian coal mining project environment. Conceptualising project evaluation as a component of
risk governance aims to help mining proponents look beyond their own narrow self-interest, and to
consider maximising the benefits and minimising the downside risks of their projects. In addition,
the research reconfigures the principles of risk governance developed by van Asselt and Renn
(2011) so that they are more applicable to the achievement of SRA competence by project team
members in project evaluation.
A further contribution is the identification, naming and description of two models of SRA – the
mechanistic model and the integrated model. The objective of differentiating the SRA approaches is
to identify practices that strengthen the proponent’s ability to deliver projects that avoid or mitigate
risks to people. The concept of SRA competence is also presented.
The thesis confirms that the diversity of meaning attributed to social risk in the literature is evident
within coal mining project teams. A definition of social risk is proposed that takes into account the
temporal parameters of risk, to distinguish it from impact, and accommodates both upside and
downside risk by use of the term ‘uncertainty’. The definition of social risk is: uncertainty and
ambiguity about the physical or non-physical consequences of future events or activities on
individuals and civic entities. In addition, the concepts of social risk and social impact are
differentiated in the literature review and in the discussion chapter to address the conceptual
confusion identified within project teams.
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Limitations of the research
This is a qualitative research project that investigated how social risk is constructed and assessed by
team members of Australian coal mining projects. As this is a relatively new area of research, the
objective was to obtain deep insights into this practice. A second objective was to determine
whether constructions of social risk varied across team members from different professional
backgrounds. I chose, therefore, to design the research in two stages; the first, an exploratory review
using purposive sampling to ensure participants from the professions represented in project teams
were included, as well as social practitioners who may only contribute to the project on an ad hoc
basis. Participants were drawn from different types of employer groups, including small, medium
and major mining companies, EPCMs and specialist consultancies. The second stage comprised a
case study of a coal project that had obtained development consent – the Koala Extension Project.
Conducting an exploratory review and case research enabled the generation of two different but
complementary levels of data – broad data from across the Australian coal industry and rich data
from a specific project. Not only did the case research enable deep evaluation of a specific project,
but it allowed the triangulation of project team members’ experiences and perspectives of the same
project. The data generation progressed as expected and the research method delivered the richness
of data that was envisaged.
One of the limitations of the research is that only one case was evaluated. There would have been
value in exploring two different cases, such as brownfields and greenfields, open-cut and
underground, New South Wales and Queensland, and straightforward route to development consent
and initial refusal of development consent, so that the findings could be compared. However, time,
access and resource constraints did not enable multiple cases to be examined.
Other limitations relate to the narrow group of research participants (coal mining proponents) and
the narrow scope of the research; that is, the geographical and commodity boundaries. Although the
underlying premise of this thesis is that people construct risk differently, the perspectives of
potentially affected people and other external actors, such as local governments and regulating
authorities, were not incorporated into the primary data generation process. The consequence of
limiting the scope may mean that some of the findings are not transferable due to cultural,
historical, jurisdictional and technological factors, size of mining footprint, and other differences.
Nevertheless, a trail of evidence has been provided in the thesis for readers to determine
transferability of the findings to their set of circumstances.
Sandy Worden Chapter 10 177 | P a g e
Implications of the research findings and recommendations for
policy and SRA practice
The research findings presented in this thesis have important implications for the assessment of
mining development applications in Australia, the conferring of development consent, and SRA
practice across the coal industry and the global mining industry more generally. This section
explores key implications of the findings and presents recommendations for policy and practice.
10.5.1 Policy implications of the research findings
Project evaluation, a key component of the risk governance of mining projects, is the context for
this thesis. The role of the regulating authority in risk governance is to decide whether to approve or
refuse development consent based on the authority’s assessment of the project’s benefits against its
costs. This assessment is done primarily via the EIS (incorporating the SIA), which the proponent
submits as part of its development application. The EIS sets out the existing physical and social
environment within the project footprint (the baseline); the project’s environmental, economic and
social risks; and the proponent’s proposals to avoid, minimise, mitigate and/or offset the risks.
Substantial studies are undertaken to inform the EIS.
From a regulatory perspective, there is a much stronger focus on environmental risks compared
with social risks (usually referred to as social impacts), and little guidance is provided on what
should be done with the data generated from the SIA. Some jurisdictions, for example, Queensland
and New South Wales, have published guidelines about what the SIA should address, but guidance
on social risk is limited. In the NSW guideline, social risk is discussed in an appendix and a generic
social risk matrix tabulating likelihood and consequence is presented. Social risk is not, however,
defined nor differentiated from social impact. The Queensland guideline does not refer to social risk
at all. In the NSW document, the SIA is presented in the context of the other regulatory
requirements. There is scope to build on this contextualisation by identifying the relationship
between the regulatory framework and the activities undertaken by the proponent. This could
include how data from SRA workshops might be integrated into the SIA and how SIA data might
be considered by the proponent in making risk decisions and in designing the mine plan.
Furthermore, there is scope to include indicators of SRA competence and this thesis proposes 10
indicators: (1) the project team has the disciplinary backgrounds and experience to assess the social
risks generated by the project and to commission and review the associated studies;
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(2) the proponent takes responsibility for the social risks generated by its project; (3) responsibility
is allocated for managing the collection of social data and the assessment of social risk;
(4) the project team actively engages with potentially affected people to identify their priority social
risks; (5) the proponent and the project team are realistic about the cost of risk mitigation measures;
(6) the proponent is willing to fund risk mitigation; (7) the project team develops a project schedule
that accommodates social engagement, including working with potentially affected people to
identify and, later, undertake risk mitigation measures; (8) the project team adopts an integrated
approach to the assessment of social risk; (9) the project team ‘front-end loads’ the project so that
decisions are made on how to mitigate priority social risks before the development application is
submitted; (10) the proponent takes a long-term approach to project management.
Social risk should be included in every broad-brush risk assessment undertaken during project
evaluation, from the concept stage through to the feasibility stage. The scale of the project, where it
is located and the characteristics of the potentially affected communities will determine the extent
of the assessment; not all circumstances will require comprehensive assessments. Regulating
authorities should develop threshold criteria to specify when comprehensive SRAs are required and
those criteria should be incorporated into their SIA guidelines.
Further work is required to expand or, in the case of the Queensland SIA guideline, include SRA in
the SIA study. Social risk perspectives of potentially affected people and other external actors
should be collected as part of the community engagement work undertaken for the SIA and the
different risk perspectives should be compared. The regulating authorities should recommend that
proponents work with external actors to identify risk mitigation measures and, where there is
interest, for those actors to be involved in monitoring the outcomes.
In circumstances in which proposals to develop new mines occur in environmentally or socially
sensitive areas, or when there is substantial land-use conflict, regulators should consider directing
proponents to use community-led SIAs. In this type of assessment, potentially affected people have
an active role. They work with social impact assessors to broaden the scope of the SIA and to
recommend avoidance or mitigation measures that address their priority social risks. Experience in
New Zealand (see Morgan and Fa’aui, 2018), Sweden (Laurence and Larsen, 2017) and in Western
Australia (O’Faircheallaigh, 2011) indicate that these types of SIAs capture the perspectives of
external actors more effectively than standard assessments and they have the potential to reduce
conflict. Consideration could also be given to having the SRA process, including the SIA, peer-
reviewed by an independent, qualified entity to ensure that the assessment reduces the likelihood of
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harm to people. The peer reviewer would be appointed by the regulator and the work funded by the
proponent.
The final policy recommendation is for regulating authorities to address social risk from regional
and cumulative perspectives. Consideration needs to be given to the type of performance data
required and for strategies to be developed that enable the standardisation of metrics among
proponents. The challenge of cumulative impacts has been examined by Brereton et al. (2008),
Franks et al. (2013) and others. Franks et al. (2013) recommend a more collaborative approach to
regional monitoring and coordination committees, and the use of adaptive management rather than
prescription of conditions at the start of the project and the compliance with those conditions even
when circumstances change. These recommendations are still applicable.
10.5.2 Implications for SRA practice
Moving now to implications for practice, I note that proponents undertake project evaluation for
two primary reasons: to deliver the EIS to the regulating authority as a precondition to obtaining
development consent and to determine whether the project’s risk profile warrants the investment
needed to develop a mining operation. At times, these two objectives can be in conflict – a project
that maximises its value may not deliver an EIS that specifies the most effective risk mitigation
measures. The way proponents conceptualise project evaluation can undermine the intent of the
regulatory framework. This occurs when delivering the EIS is reconceptualised as simply obtaining
development consent, removing the EIS, and project evaluation more generally, from the context of
mining project risk governance. The proponent’s focus becomes narrow self-interest; that is,
maximising project value and obtaining development consent rather than maximising the benefits of
the project and minimising the costs to people and the environment.
This over-riding focus leads to a propensity for the following practices: risks to people outside the
geographic location of the project not being considered; non-physical risks not being considered;
activities that delay the project schedule not being prioritised or being avoided altogether; and the
design of the mine plan not being amended to address the priority social risks of external actors.
The mining project risk governance framework via existing regulation requires that external actors
have an opportunity to make formal submissions in support of, or in opposition to, the development
application. There is a tendency among proponents operating within a narrow self-interest
framework to minimise the mitigation of social risks, particularly those that would require
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significant capital investment, in their mining application.35 In these circumstances, the priority
social risks of external actors may only be addressed when proponents are directed to do so by the
regulating authority in response to those formal submissions. Proponents who take a narrow
approach to SRA, may deliver an SIA and EIS, without meeting the intent of the regulatory
framework. This can lead to the granting of development consent to coal projects that do not avoid
or mitigate risks to people.
The adoption of the mechanistic model of SRA, which appears to be more prevalent than the
integrated model, is not conducive to the governance of social risk. The principles of risk
governance – multidisciplinarity, inclusiveness and multidimensionality – are put forward as a
means of moving from the mechanistic model to the integrated model of SRA, and to address the
shortcomings of current practice. The principle of multidisciplinarity is concerned with populating
project teams with people who have the disciplinary backgrounds and experience needed to assess
the diversity of risks the project generates – including social risk – and to commission and review
the associated studies. This thesis found, in general, that social practitioners are not employed in
project teams on a full-time basis. Having them embedded into project teams would increase the
likelihood that they were able to influence decision-making on an ongoing basis, rather than
providing guidance out of context or after key decisions had been made. Furthermore, most project
team members with techno-scientific backgrounds express an unwillingness to engage with the
‘social space’. This reluctance creates a dilemma in terms of the assessment of social risk. If techno-
scientific specialists do not want to undertake this work and the project team does not include social
practitioners, who is responsible for social risk? Without team members experienced in the social
dimensions of mining, project teams may struggle to assess social risk effectively.
The principle of inclusiveness encourages project team members to acknowledge that potentially
affected people, the regulating authority, the local council and other actors may have different risk
perspectives from their own. It has an external focus. When project teams practice inclusiveness,
external actors can discuss their risk perspectives, concerns and aspirations for the project and their
views are considered in the design of the mine plan. Project teams should use diverse social
engagement mechanisms to maximise inclusiveness, so that external actors have an opportunity to
question experts, and their knowledge and experiences are integrated into the project evaluation
process. Decisions are made collaboratively. The objective of collaborative decision-making is for
the project team and other actors to agree on a mine plan and a suite of risk mitigation measures that
the parties can live with, even if they don’t agree on individual elements of the plan. Interested
35 An example of a capital-intensive mitigation measure is the construction of a large, earthen bund to protect neighbours from the dust, noise and
other social amenity impacts generated by open-cut mining.
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parties are able to participate in monitoring activities and monitoring data is made publicly
available.
In assessing the extent that project teams adopt inclusiveness, I note from the exploratory review
and case research interviews that community engagement is widely practised in the project
environment and supported by project teams. Many other components of inclusiveness, however,
are missing from these project teams’ assessment of social risk. For example, external actors are not
included in risk assessment workshops, they seldom contribute to the selection of risk mitigation
measures, and risk decisions tend to be made by the project team in isolation. The Koala Extension
Project, which can be mapped against the integrated model of SRA, is an exception to this finding.
The risk perspectives of potentially affected people were considered and their priority social risks
addressed. External actors were involved in identifying and designing risk mitigation measures, and
they were able to question experts during the risk mitigation workshops. The mine plan underwent
more than 40 iterations to address the concerns of external actors, and the proponent ‘front-end
loaded’ the project.
While the principle of inclusiveness is directed to actors outside the project team, multidisciplinarity
has an internal focus. It seeks to promote discussion of different risk perspectives within the project
team as well as ensuring that team members have the expertise to assess the diversity of risks
generated by the project. Within project teams, the study found that the level of inclusiveness was
limited, given the absence of social practitioners from most teams. Social practitioners tend to sit
outside project teams and provide advice on an ad hoc basis.
The principle of multidimensionality requires that different types of knowledge, such as techno-
scientific, local, and indigenous knowledge, are used in the project evaluation process so that
proponents are able to make informed risk decisions. It is also about project teams considering
psychological and sociocultural factors to help them understand alternative risk perspectives. In the
mining project environment, techno-scientific knowledge is well-integrated into the evaluation of
coal projects; techno-scientific experts dominate project teams and the consultancies that undertake
the series of studies during feasibility. In addition, local knowledge is used by team members in
their assessments of social risk. Indigenous knowledge and psychological and sociocultural factors
tend not to be considered by project teams.
When the principles of risk governance are not adopted by project teams, the ability of team
members to attain SRA competence is diminished. Furthermore, adoption of these principles is
Sandy Worden Chapter 10 182 | P a g e
needed to shift SRA performance from the mechanistic to the integrated model, and to reduce the
likelihood that projects will cause harm to people.
Directions for future research
Mining project risk governance in Australia is a complex undertaking and it encompasses all the
regulations, systems, processes and tools that are used by diverse actors – including governments,
corporations, civil society and individuals – to collect, analyse and communicate risk information in
order to make risk-related decisions. The assessment of social risk is an integral component of that
undertaking. This research project has examined how project team members construct and assess
social risk in this environment. Opportunity exists to extend this work by examining how
potentially affected people and other external actors, such as regulating authorities and local
governments, construct and prioritise social risk. This research should explore their views on the
SRA performance of mining proponents and their recommendations for improvement.
The Koala Extension Project case study provided rich data about how social risk is assessed in a
specific environment and under particular conditions. This data was useful in identifying
components of a high standard of SRA practice. Additional case studies are needed to build on this
knowledge and to explore different contexts. Within the Australian coal industry, consideration
should be given to drawing cases from greenfields and underground projects. If access could be
negotiated, significant benefit would be derived from examining coal projects that faced significant
opposition and were refused development consent (such as the Drayton South project in the Hunter
Valley of New South Wales) or projects that obtained development consent after lengthy delays and
legal action (such as the Mount Thorley Warkworth project, also in the Hunter Valley). Further
cases should be drawn from projects in other mining commodities and from global locations to
enable comparative analysis.
The research found that project teams are reluctant to address the priority social risks of external
actors by amending the mine plan due to delays to the project schedule and the cost of
implementation. As a means of providing context for the business case for this work, research
should be undertaken to determine the feasibility of, and to identify potential methods for,
integrating social risk governance into calculations of NPV and IRR. Having an understanding of
the NPV and IRR implications of social risk governance over the life of the project and the
subsequent operation would provide project team members, particularly those from techno-
scientific backgrounds, and PGCs with quantitative data that they are familiar with and can
understand the significance of. It would also provide metrics for comparing the implications of
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different social risk mitigation options, including acceptance of the risk (that is, do nothing), and
calculating the changes in project value. In addition, being able to compare the costs of front-end
loading projects with the costs of mitigation after the mine has been commissioned, should lead to a
greater willingness to amend the mine plan during the feasibility stage. This, in turn, should
improve the scheduling and budgeting of mining projects, thereby enhancing SRA and reducing
risks to people.
The thesis found that project team members with techno-scientific backgrounds did not understand
the ‘social space’. Furthermore, while they supported the concept of social engagement, they
preferred to leave this work to social practitioners. To demystify the social domain and to build
capacity so that mining engineers and scientists can better understand and engage with external
actors, further research is required into how this topic is addressed in existing university courses. A
range of options should be considered, including adaption of existing courses through to the
development of new curricula, from single guest lectures that could be delivered into existing
courses, to lengthier modules and semester-length courses at undergraduate and postgraduate levels.
The need for, and the creation of, professional development courses for mining personnel should
also be explored.
Based on the mechanistic and integrated models of SRA, future research could be undertaken to
develop these models into an overarching maturity model. Maturity models have been used to
describe development paths for diverse organisational characteristics and capabilities. These types
of models derive from research into how organisations grow and become more effective. Most
maturity models present several stages of maturity in which progress is made from a low state of
development to a highly developed and successful state, by building on the capacity developed in
the previous stage. The objective of developing an SRA maturity model is to enable proponents to
identify where their assessment practice currently sits and map a path forward to enhanced
performance. A further objective is to provide a framework for the performance of different mining
proponents to be compared.
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Concluding comment
This thesis examined how social risk is constructed and assessed by team members of Australian
coal mining projects. It mapped assessment practices against two models of SRA – the mechanistic
model and the integrated model. The thesis found that it is possible for coal mining proponents in
Australia to deliver projects that give a high priority to mitigating risks to potentially affected
people. Their ability to do so, however, requires a shift in thinking from short-term, narrow self-
interest to longer-term, enlightened self-interest; a willingness to accept responsibility for the social
risks generated by their projects; and adoption of the three risk governance principles of
multidisciplinarity, inclusiveness and multidimensionality to guide practice in this area.
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APPENDIX F: CODING FRAMEWORK (TIER 1 AND 2 ONLY)
Governance
• Approvals process (government)
• Company policies, standards, strategies, systems, processes
• Company v consultant & contractor
• Corporate governance processes
• Designated non-mining area
• Federal government
• Global standards & guidelines
• Local government
• PAC process
• Project tollgates & lifecycle
• Role of industry associations
• Who should approve projects
Project approval
• Activities undertaken
• Consent conditions
• Focus on obtaining approvals
• Front-end loading
• Project approvals outcomes
• Project approvals performance
• Project team
Risk
• Definitions
• Environmental risk
• Project risk
• Rebound dynamic
• Risk monitoring
• Social risk
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• Social acceptability risk
• Risk type
• Risk monitoring
• Sovereign risk
Issues / topics raised
• Acceptable and robust mine plan
• Assessing SIA under EIS
• Attitude of project team members
• Budget and resources
• Buffer land
• Clean coal technology
• Communication
• Compliance
• Complacency
• Continuation of mine plan
• Continuity of staff
• Corporate career path
• Corporate knowledge
• Data management
• Decision makers live in region
• Delegated
• Decision making
• Due legal process
• Economic importance of industry
• Expectations
• Fatalities
• Gender
• Greenfields v brownfields
• Green offsets
• Importance of individuals
• Incompatible goals
• Integrating project and operational needs
• Media relations
• Message framing
• Perceptions of risk
• Poverty reduction
• Pro project mentality
• Project footprint
• Project team morale
• Project resourcing (financial & people)
• Project team workload
• Project timeline
• Relationships
• Resource ownership
• Responsiveness of project team
• Short-term decision making
• Social impacts linked to enviro impacts
• Stakeholder engagement
• Stakeholder experience with mining
• State election
• Stated issue not the real issue
• Strong well prepared project
• Sustainability
• Time constraints
• Transparency
• Trying to ‘buy’ communities
• Uncertainty
• Understanding of risk
• Understanding of social risk (analysts)
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• Leadership
• Long-term commitment to operating in the
region
• Loss of expertise in downturn
• Media personalities
• Understanding of technical data
(stakeholders)
• Understanding of the ‘social
space’(analysts)
• Willingness to engage (project teams)
Values
• Consider how people feel
• Consistent behaviour
• Do what we say we’re going to do
• Empathy
• Fairness and justice
• Genuine
• Good neighbour
• Honest
• Listen
• Loyal
• Open and transparent
• Respect
• Team work
• Trust
Epistemology
• Techno-scientific approach
• Sociology of risk
Background information
• Project background
• Project team
• Roles
Blue sky suggestions
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